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PREFACE 
everal institutional actors and academic experts have highlighted the 
inadequacy of the present EU budget to fulfil the objectives set and to 
deliver the outcomes it is expected to produce. The full, wide-ranging 
review of the EU budget requested by the European Council in December 
2005, due to be finalised in 2008–09, is at once an opportunity and a 
difficult challenge, unpredictable in its result. 
Many are the issues that are deemed to undergo scrutiny. The present 
EU budget concentrates its resources on two main policies whilst funding 
simultaneously, in a variety of sectors, dozens of programmes with 
reduced appropriations. It has a revenue system characterised by 
numerous specific arrangements accumulated over the years, which 
nevertheless provides the financial resources required but has no link with 
the taxpayer. The EU budget is framed in a seven-year financial perspective 
that allows little flexibility and limited opportunity for ongoing corrective 
action. It finances policies that are not really designed to achieve specific 
and identifiable results, while spending is an implicit objective. Finally, the 
EU budget is implemented for the most part in shared management with 
the member states, with a consequent weak accountability given the 
numerous actors involved, each of them with different responsibilities. 
These weaknesses are not attributable to a supposedly wrong 
conceptual design, but rather derive from the EU integration process. 
Behind the scenes, sensitive matters such as the unanimity rule, the 
institutional balance of powers between the European institutions and the 
role of national parliaments are at stake. As such, the EU budget is a key 
condition for the evolution of European integration and part of the debate 
about the legitimacy of the Union’s actions. Yet it cannot remain an issue 
among governments alone. In this respect, it is to be welcomed that the 
Commission has just launched a broad consultation to stimulate an open 
debate on the EU’s finances. Indeed, to debate the EU budget is actually to 
discuss visions of Europe’s future. 
S ii | PREFACE 
 
Against this background, this study identifies three reforms that seem 
a precondition for progress. These are the setting-up of a single revenue 
system for all member states, the clear identification of specific and 
verifiable objectives for the programmes financed and, finally, the 
achievement of full accountability for the implementation of the budget. 
Gabriele Cipriani 
November 2007 
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Not everything that counts can be counted, 
 and not everything that can be counted counts. 
Albert Einstein 
 
1. THE EU BUDGET – AN HISTORICAL 
RELIC? 
n 1978, the European Commission acknowledged that the Community 
budget “reflects the reality of a very partial and extremely localised 
financial integration”, being “neither a true instrument for financing a 
wide range of policies nor a means of redistribution worthy of the name, 
nor an instrument of economic stabilisation”.1 This statement must still be 
valid in its essence if, more than 25 years later, the Commission could 
conclude that the European Union “should commit itself to carrying out a 
comprehensive review of all aspects of the organisation of the EU budget – 
expenditure, revenue and structure – with a view to ensuring that the 
budget is equipped to respond to the challenges of the future”.2 The 
European Council also seems to have been convinced of the need to carry 
out a comprehensive reassessment of the financial framework, when it 
called on the Commission “to undertake a full, wide ranging review 
covering all aspects of European Union spending, including the CAP 
[Common Agricultural Policy], and of resources, including the UK’s rebate, 
to report in 2008/9”.3 
____________________________ 
1 See European Commission, Global appraisal of the budgetary problems of the 
Community, COM(78) 64, Brussels, 27 February 1978, p. 2. 
2 See European Commission, “Five proposals to relaunch negotiations”, 
Memo/05/386, Brussels, 20 October 2005(a). 
3 See European Council, Financial Perspective 2007-2013, 15915/05, Brussels, 19 
December 2005(a), paras 79–80. The Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary 
discipline and sound financial management of 17 May 2006 between the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission provides (Declaration No. 3) that the 
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Such statements do not come as a surprise to the academic world. For 
years, there has been a large identity of views among academic experts 
about the inadequacy of the present EU budget to fulfil the objectives set 
and to deliver the outcomes it is expected to produce.4 The conclusions of 
the Sapir et al. report (2003) are unambiguous in this respect:  
As it stands today, the EU budget is a historical relic. Expenditures, 
revenues and procedures are all inconsistent with the present and 
future state of EU integration. Half its spending goes on supporting a 
sector whose economic significance is declining, little is used to 
provide economic or non-economic public goods typically featuring 
large economies of scale, while convergence policy is very dispersed 
across EU countries and is not focused regarding the activities it 
should support.5 
Indeed, academia is at one in stating: 
•  The financing of the CAP by the EU budget no longer seems justified 
(and much less when it takes up around one-third of the budget), 
because the CAP has “moved away from being an allocative policy, 
promoting efficiency and production, towards being a distributive 
____________________________ 
 
European Parliament will be associated with the review at all stages of the 
procedure and will be part of any formal follow-up steps (see European 
Parliament, Council and Commission, Interinstitutional Agreement between the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 17 May 2006 on 
budgetary discipline and sound financial management, OJ C 139/1, 14.6.2006). 
4 See for example, Tabellini (2002), Sapir et al. (2003), Buti & Nava (2003), Begg 
(2004 and 2005), Baldwin (2005) and Gros & Micossi (2005). 
5 The report went on to say, 
More than 90% of the EU budget is financed through national contributions 
linked to national treasuries, rather than from taxes levied on EU-wide fiscal 
bases.  
Finally, the procedure for adopting the EU Financial Perspectives (the multi-
annual frameworks, which determine the maximum amount for every item 
of expenditure in the EU annual budget) is driven by narrow national 
calculations of self-interest, bolstered by unanimity voting. (Sapir et al., 2003, 
p. 172) 
Prof. André Sapir chaired a High-Level Group invited by the then President of the 
European Commission, Romano Prodi, to review the entire system of EU 
economic policies and to propose a strategy for delivering faster growth together 
with stability and cohesion in the enlarged Union. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 3 
 
policy for a particular group of citizens”.6 Instead, policies promoting 
economic growth within the EU area – research & development 
(R&D), innovation, education and training, and infrastructure – 
should be given priority, especially now that this need is recognised 
by the Lisbon strategy.7 
•  Cohesion policy should be refocused. To reduce the range of income 
disparities across EU countries brought about by enlargement, 
regional convergence funds should be allocated to low-income 
countries in need of above-average growth in order to converge 
towards the rest of the EU. Therefore, structural policies should be 
concentrated on genuinely poor countries (in other words, the new 
member states from Eastern Europe), rather than on poor regions of 
relatively rich countries (the old 15 member states or EU-15). 
•  The financing of the EU budget should be rationalised and exceptions 
should be avoided, above all the UK rebate.8 A choice should be made 
between a system of national contributions and an EU-based tax, thus 
____________________________ 
6 Ibid., p. 164. For a description of the CAP reform see European Commission, “EU 
fundamentally reforms its farm policy to accomplish sustainable farming in 
Europe”, Press release, IP/03/898, Brussels, 26 June 2003(a). 
7 At the Lisbon summit in March 2000, the European Council set out a strategy to 
make Europe the most competitive economy in the world. The Lisbon strategy 
consists of three pillars (economic, social and environmental) and covers a very wide 
range of policies. The Lisbon summit set the target of achieving far-reaching reforms 
at the European and national levels in areas such as macroeconomic policy, 
enterprise, R&D, opening markets and the environment. After initially modest 
results, the strategy was relaunched in spring 2005. The European Council agreed to 
refocus priorities on jobs and growth consistent with the sustainable development 
strategy, by mobilising to a greater degree all appropriate national and Community 
resources. Two headline targets have been set: investment of 3% of Europe’s GDP in 
R&D by 2010 and an employment rate (the proportion of Europe’s working age 
population in employment) of 70% by the same date, which is equivalent to the 
creation of 20 million jobs. For the implementation of the Community Lisbon 
programme, see the European Commission’s report, Communication on 
Implementing the Renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs: “A year of 
delivery”, COM(2006) 816, Brussels, 12 December 2006(a). 
8 The UK has benefited, since 1980, from a reduction in its budgetary burden under 
various forms. See the section “The UK rebate, at the crossroads of any reform”. 4 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
at least weakening the endless debate about net-payer and net-
recipient member states. 
‘Financial perspective’: Whose perspective? 
When considering the revenue side, the EU budget is objectively in an 
unenviable situation, unknown elsewhere in any member state. The 
financial resources are guaranteed whatever happens, and any form of ‘tax 
avoidance’ is unimaginable. This is because the EU budget is financed by 
the member states, which have an obligation to make the corresponding 
funding available.9 That is not to say, however, that the resources made 
available to the EU budget are unlimited. Member states have decided that 
a ceiling equal to 1.24% of the sum of member states’ gross national income 
(GNI)10 should apply. That means an amount of around €120 billion a year. 
____________________________ 
9 Art. 269 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty or TEC) 
(2006 consolidated version as amended by the Treaty of Nice) establishes an 
absolute obligation in this respect. For example, when owing to exhaustion of the 
own resources a shortfall in revenue appeared in 1984 and 1985, transitional 
financing solutions were applied and member states contributed supplementary 
amounts to cover the deficit. The Own Resources Decision implements Art. 269 
TEC. The Decision establishes in particular the global ceiling on the own resources, 
the typology of the resources financing the budget and the burden-sharing 
arrangements among member states. The Decision has first to be unanimously 
adopted by the EU Council of Ministers and, to come into force, requires 
ratification by the member states according to their own constitutional rules (for 
the period 2007–13, the Council’s Decision 2007/436/EC, Euratom of 7 June 2007 
on the system of the European Communities’ own resources, OJ L 163, 23.6.2007, is 
not yet in force, pending ratification). Hence, the Own Resources Decision 
constitutes in practice a treaty within the EC Treaty. It should be noted that the 
European Parliament can only give an opinion on this Decision. This is the 
consequence of the respective powers of the two arms of the EU budgetary 
authority (the European Parliament and the Council) outlined by Art. 272 TEC. 
Para. 10 of Art. 272 recalls that each institution shall exercise the powers conferred 
upon it by the Treaty, especially those relating to the Communities’ own resources 
and to the balance between revenue and expenditure. 
10 GNI is equal to gross domestic product (GDP) minus primary income payable by 
resident units to non-resident units, plus primary income receivable by resident 
units from the rest of the world. The GNI and GDP aggregates form part of the 
definitions laid down in the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts 
(ESA 95) adopted by Council Regulation (EC) No. 2223/96 of 25 June 1996 on the 
 RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 5 
 
Other limitations are applicable to the EU budget. Revenue and 
payment appropriations must be in balance (the principle of equilibrium)11 
and the EU may not raise loans.12 
Yet the main constraint is the so-called ‘financial perspective’, which 
was first introduced in 1988 to prevent previously recurring budgetary 
crises.13 This multi-annual framework, which is actually not foreseen in 
either the Treaty or Community legislation,14  arises from an 
Interinstitutional Agreement between the institutions involved in the 
budgetary cycle (the European Parliament, Council and Commission), 
which gives credibility to the mechanism. 
____________________________ 
 
European system of national and regional accounts in the Community (OJ L 310, 
30.11.1996). In the framework of the EU budget, the concept of GNI replaced the 
concept of gross national product (GNP) as of 2002. The concept of GNP applied 
under the ESA second edition statistical system is conceptually identical to the 
definition of GNI under the ESA 95. The problems with using GNI in the EU 
context are examined in the section “In need of more than one GNI?”. 
11 See Art. 268 TEC. The situation was different under the Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty) (1951), where the principle of 
equilibrium was applied over a number of years, with the result that annual 
imbalances were allowed. 
12 The Financial Regulation (Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002 of 25 
June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the 
European Communities, OJ L 248, 16.9.2002) as amended by Regulation No. 
1995/2006 of 13 December 2006 (OJ L 390, 30.12.2006) emphasises “that recourse to 
loans is not compatible with the system of Community own resources” (see the 
ninth successive para. introduced by “Whereas” and Art. 14(2)).  
13 The other bulwark in this context is Art. 270 TEC, introduced in 1992 by the 
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty). According to this provision, the 
Commission shall not make any proposal for a Community act, alter its proposals 
or adopt any implementing measure that is likely to have appreciable implications 
for the budget without providing the assurance that that proposal or that measure 
is capable of being financed within the limit of the Community’s own resources. 
14 Once ratified, the new reform Treaty for Europe, agreed by EU heads of state and 
government in Lisbon (18-19 October 2007), will modify the EC treaty by 
introducing the principle of establishing a multi-annual financial framework (for at 
least five years), to be decided by the Council after obtaining the agreement of the 
European Parliament (see article 270a of the draft treaty, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00001re01en.pdf). 6 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
Financial perspectives aim at guaranteeing financial discipline and an 
orderly development of expenditure.15 This framework sets the spheres of 
activity of the EU budget and the amounts devoted to each big spending 
area (agriculture, structural policies, internal policies,16 external actions,17 
administrative expenditure and reserves) and it fixes the limits of EU 
expenditure for seven years.18 Little flexibility is allowed (see Box 1.1).  
____________________________ 
15 Limitations on the growth of expenditure are set by category for commitment 
appropriations and on total expenditure for payment appropriations. The 
distinction between commitment and payment appropriations (‘differentiated 
appropriations’) is a peculiarity of the EU budget that has to reconcile the principle 
of annuality with the need to engage in multi-annual operations (notably for 
structural policies). This distinction goes back to Art. 176(1) of the Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) (1957) and 
was given widespread application by Art. 7 of the Financial Regulation. 
•  Commitment appropriations make it possible to enter into legal obligations 
during the financial year in respect of operations to be carried out over a 
period of more than one financial year. 
•  Payment appropriations make it possible to cover expenditure, up to the 
amount entered in the budget, arising from commitments entered into 
during the financial year or in previous financial years (or both). 
16 Internal policies cover a wide range of activities contributing to the development 
of the single market. More than half relates to research and technological 
development. Other areas of intervention are consumers, the internal market, 
industry and networks, training, youth and social operations, energy, Euratom and 
the environment. 
17 External policies deal with external aid (mainly food aid, food security, 
humanitarian aid, the co-financing of non-governmental organisations and 
relations with third countries) as well as the pre-accession strategy covering 
expenditure for Central and Eastern European countries and Turkey. 
18 For reasons of democratic responsibility and accountability, the European 
Parliament has pleaded in favour of a parallelism between the duration of the 
financial perspective and the five-year mandates of the European Parliament and 
of the Commission (see European Parliament, Resolution of 8 June 2005 on Policy 
Challenges and Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 2007–13, para. 33). RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 7 
 
Box 1.1  Financial perspective 
In the event of unforeseen circumstances, the Commission may propose a 
revision of the financial perspective. Yet the maximum level of financing of the 
EU budget must still respect the ceilings defined in the Own Resources 
Decision (1.24% of GNI for payments and 1.31% in commitments). A decision 
to revise the financial framework is taken jointly by the Council and the 
European Parliament. When this revision does not exceed 0.03% of the EU 
GNI, agreement requires a qualified majority in the Council and a vote of the 
European Parliament by a majority of its members and three-fifths of the votes 
cast. If the revision is above 0.03% of the EU GNI, the Council needs to act 
unanimously (see European Parliament, Council and Commission, 2006, Art. 
22). A number of instruments are already available outside expenditure 
ceilings agreed in the financial framework to face unforeseen events. They 
include: 
•  the EU solidarity fund (maximum €1 billion per year in current prices), 
created in 2002 to provide rapid financial support in the event of major 
disasters; 
•  the Instrument of Flexibility (maximum €200 million per year in current 
prices), intended to allow the financing of clearly identified expenditure 
that could not be financed within the limits of the ceilings available for 
one or more other headings. This instrument has been used intensively in 
the past, notably as an indirect means to raise the ceiling for external 
actions; 
•  the emergency aid reserve (maximum €1,744 million for the whole 
period, at current prices), to provide a rapid response to the specific aid 
requirements of non-member countries following events that could not 
be foreseen when the budget was established, chiefly for humanitarian 
operations; 
•  in addition, it is possible to mobilise the European globalisation 
adjustment fund (maximum €500 million per year in current prices) by 
using unused appropriations from the previous year. The fund is 
intended to enable the Community to provide support for workers made 
redundant as a result of major structural changes in world trade patterns 
where these redundancies have a significant adverse impact on the 
regional or local economy; and 
•  finally, an amount of €564 million for the whole period (at current prices) 
is foreseen for administrative expenditure. 
 8 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
By setting binding, long-term spending ceilings for the main 
categories of EU expenditure, the financial perspective establishes the 
expenditure for each of the years and for each heading or subheading. The 
annual ceilings apply to each financial year and they may in no way be 
aggregated over the period. Indeed, the institutions acknowledge that each 
of the absolute amounts shown in the financial framework represents an 
annual ceiling on expenditure under the EU budget. The consequence is 
that the annual EU budget becomes a subsidiary instrument of the multi-
annual framework. It remains instrumental in its implementation and is 
indeed largely predictable.  
As shown by Figure 1.1, the Council (and thus the member states) 
largely dominates the financial framework, as a consequence of its absolute 
power over the resources to be allocated to the EU budget.19 
Figure 1.1 Adoption of the 2006 EU budget (payment appropriations) (€ billion) 
 
Source: European Commission (2006i). 
 
The first two financial perspectives were characterised by significant 
increases in appropriations, especially owing to the development of the 
____________________________ 
19 Indeed, the Council’s website reminds visitors that “[t]he Council is the main 
decision-making body of the European Union”. See also footnote 9. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 9 
 
structural policies and the accession of Spain and Portugal to the EU. For 
the period 1988–92, the overall ceiling was gradually increased from 1.15% 
of GNP for 1988 to 1.20% for 1992. 
A further increase (from 1.24% to 1.27% of GNP) was agreed for the 
period 1993–99. During this period, there was an especially significant 
development of the structural policies, as economic and social cohesion 
became a pre-condition for creating the single European currency. 
Since 2000, the tendency has been rather in the direction of the 
stabilisation of expenditure. For both financial perspectives, 2000–06 and 
2007–13, the same overall own resources ceiling has applied (1.24% of 
GNI).20 This ceiling has been maintained despite the unprecedented 
challenge to the competitiveness and internal cohesion of the Union 
represented by the accession to the EU of ten new member states in 2004 
and two more as of 1 January 2007. It is also notwithstanding the fact that 
in the enlarged Union, average GDP per capita is now more than 12% 
lower than in the EU-15, and income disparities have doubled overall.21 
The financial perspective for 2007–13 sets the global level of 
commitment appropriations at €864.3 billion (2004 prices),22 equal to 1.05% 
____________________________ 
20 Although conceptually identical, total GNI is higher in volume than total GNP 
(1.24% of GNI is equal to 1.27% of GNP). For the details of this equivalence see 
European Commission, Communication on adaptation of the ceiling of own 
resources and of the ceiling for appropriations for commitments following the 
entry into force of Council Decision 2000/597/EC, Euratom, COM(2001) 801, 
Brussels, 28 December 2001. It should be noted that the Own Resources Decision 
(Council Decision 2000/597/EC, Euratom of 29 September 2000 on the system of 
the European Communities’ own resources, OJ L 253, 7.10.2000) established the 
principle (in the seventh successive para. introduced by “Whereas”) that the 
change in the reference aggregate from GNP to GNI should not increase the 
amount of financial resources put at the disposal of the Communities. The ceiling 
of own resources had therefore to be adjusted downwards. See also footnote 176. 
21 See European Commission, Building our common future: Policy challenges and 
budgetary means of the enlarged Union 2007–13, COM(2004) 101, Brussels, 26 
February 2004(a), p. 15. 
22 As far as the global level of commitment appropriations for the period is 
concerned, it should be recalled that the Commission’s proposal was for €1,022.4 
billion (1.24% of EU GNI – 2004 prices). The European Parliament asked in June 
2005 for a lower amount (€974.8 billion, or 1.18% of EU GNI – 2004 prices). The 
Council reached agreement in December 2005 at €862.4 billion (1.045% of EU GNI – 
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of EU GNI. Total payment appropriations have been fixed at a lower level, 
€820.8 billion (2004 prices), and equal to 1.00% of EU GNI. This means that, 
by reference to the 1.24% of the EU GNI ceiling, €197 billion of further 
expenditure remains theoretically possible. A revision of the financial 
perspective would be required, however.23 
As shown in Table 1.1, agricultural (heading 2) and structural policies 
(heading 1b)) continue to take up the lion’s share of expenditure (nearly 
80%). 
____________________________ 
 
2004 prices). Compared with this last figure, the final compromise set in the 
Interinstitutional Agreement entails a supplementary €2 billion (essentially for 
competitiveness for growth and employment), plus a further €2 billion outside the 
expenditure ceilings.  
23 The 2007–13 financial perspective does not include EU expenditure on financial 
and technical cooperation with developing countries under the European 
development fund (EDF), which, as in the past, will continue to fall outside the EU 
budget. The EDF represents appropriations equal to around 0.03% of GNI. The 
financial provisions of the current EDF (9th EDF) expire at the end of 2007. For the 
period 2008–13 member states have agreed global expenditure of €22.7 billion 
(current prices). The proposal to integrate the EDF into the EU budget dates back 
to 1973 and it was reiterated by the Commission in February 2004. This 
expenditure will continue to be funded through separate contributions by the 
member states. This is because the cost-sharing formula, reflecting the special 
relations between certain member states and the beneficiary countries, is different 
from that used to determine the expenditure of the general budget. For example, 
the UK, Spain and Ireland opposed the integration of the EDF in the EU budget as 
of 2007 because this would have increased their financial contribution (on the EDF 
financial and management peculiarities, see European Commission, 2002a, chapter 
17). Further evidence of member states’ different interests is provided by the 
setting-up, in April 2007, of a trust fund for the development of major 
infrastructure networks in Africa, with an initial allocation (2006–07) of €87 million, 
of which €27 million is provided by nine member states (Germany, Austria, 
Belgium, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and the 
balance by the EDF. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 11 
 
Table 1.1 Financial perspective 2007–13 (€ billion) 
Heading €  Billion 
(2004 prices) 
% of Total 
1. Sustainable growth  382.1  44.2 
a) Competitiveness for growth and employment   74.1  8.6 
b) Cohesion for growth and employment  308.0  35.6 
2. Preservation & management of natural resources  371.3  43.0 
3. Citizenship, freedom, security and justice  10.8  1.2 
a) Freedom, security and justice  6.6  0.8 
b) Citizenship  4.1  0.5 
4. The EU as a global player  49.5  5.7 
5. Administration and other  49.8  5.8 
6. Compensations  0.8  0.1 
Total for 2007–13  864.3  100.0 
Source: European Commission (2006j).  
Concluding remarks 
The financial perspective has fully played its role of straitjacket and 
expenditure stabiliser, in both absolute volume and for each of the different 
spending headings. Yet these two objectives are not interdependent, as the 
limitation on the volume of resources for the EU budget could be ensured 
by the own resources ceiling alone. Instead, ways of ensuring greater 
freedom concerning the expenditure headings of the financial perspective 
could be explored, for example by relaxing the current practice of 
committing the whole appropriations at the beginning of the financial 
perspective (in particular for structural policies). This step would facilitate 
taking account of new emerging priorities and permit the necessary 
corrective action in the programmes decided. Not least, it would enhance 
the meaningfulness of the annual budgetary procedure. 12 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
Is the size of the budget a major issue? 
The EU Treaty establishes that “[t]he Union shall provide itself with the 
means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies”.24 
Concerning the EU budget, it is often observed that it is too small as it 
corresponds to ‘only’ slightly more than 1% of member states’ joint GDP, 
while for example the federal budget of the United States represents the 
equivalent of some 20% of US GDP and that of Canada some 18%. 
Comparisons are also made with the member states’ budgets, which take 
up an average of around 48% of national income. The MacDougal report 
had already suggested in 1997 that in order to have a perceptible 
macroeconomic effect on the Community economy as a whole, the 
minimum volume of the EU budget should be 2 to 2.5% of member states’ 
joint GDP.25  
The evolution of the EU budget has been completely different, as 
shown by Figure 1.2. Three elements may be highlighted: 
•  EU expenditure was relatively stable in the period considered. It 
represented around 1% of EU GDP. Both the stability and volume of 
funds are attributable to the straitjacket of the financial perspective 
that governs EU expenditure. For the same reason, no significant 
change should be expected at least until 2013. 
•  The trends of EU and national expenditure were different and clearly 
asymmetric for some years. Still, this seems of little relevance, given 
the huge differences in the order of magnitude of the appropriations 
(and of the policies covered). In addition, unlike the EU budget, 
national budgets are not bound by a ‘financial perspective’ or by the 
principle of equilibrium between revenue and expenditure. 
•  The annual increase of EU expenditure also participated in the trend 
towards a general rise in public expenditure greater than that of real 
GDP growth, although again without a causality link over time.  
____________________________ 
24 See Art. 6(4) of the Treaty on European Union (signed in Maastricht, 1992). 
25 See European Commission (1977), p. 17. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 13 
 
Figure 1.2 EU expenditure and EU national expenditure 1996–2006  
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Note: Data is for the EU-15 for 1996–2003 and for the EU-25 for 2004–06. 
Source: Own calculations based on European Commission (2007l) and Eurostat data. 
 
When examining whether the present size of the EU budget is or is 
not sufficient, one should be aware that the appropriations already 
available by applying the own resources ceiling of 1.24% of GNI are usually 
not fully used. As has been stressed by the European Parliament, “no 
budget has ever come close to this ceiling…with payment appropriations 
reaching their maximum level in 1993 at 1.18% of GNP”. Had this ceiling 
been fully used, the EU “budget would have gained an annual 0.2% of GNI 
over the last 13 years, equivalent to an increase of approximately EUR 240 
billion”.26 As confirmation of the above, the 2007 budget foresees 
expenditure equal to 0.99% of the GNI, while the financial perspective for 
2007–13 would authorise a rate of 1.06% of GNI.  
Moreover, the slow process of actually disbursing the funds for 
operations managed over a number of years, i.e. structural policies and 
internal policies as well as external policies, makes a surplus of the EU 
____________________________ 
26 See European Parliament, Resolution of 29 March 2007 on the future of the 
European Union’s own resources, paras 8 and 32. 14 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
budget at year-end a normal occurrence.27 Between 1999 and 2003, under-
spending caused cancellations of almost €40 billion of payment 
appropriations. 
The evolution of EU expenditure is essentially determined by how 
fast the programmes are carried out (by the member states, in the case of 
structural policies), a factor over which the Commission has de facto little 
influence, except by purely cancelling the funds allocated.28 If a certain 
amount of outstanding payments is normal owing to the multi-annual 
nature of several programmes, one should note that at the end of 2006 
outstanding payments reached €132 billion (some 11% more as compared 
with 2005).29 Structural policies accounted for about 70% of this amount, 
which represented as a whole 2.6 years of payments (at the 2006 spending 
rate). One could also notice that at the end of the 2000–06 programming 
____________________________ 
27 Art. 268 TEC requires the budget to be balanced each year. An annual surplus is 
entered into the budget for the following year, reducing the revenue required from 
member states (see also footnote 11). In recent years, the surplus went from €11.6 
billion in 2000 to €2.4 billion in 2005 and €1.9 billion in 2006. Yet, this was because 
of a significant reduction of payment appropriations during the year (€4.6 billion in 
2006), anticipating lower than expected spending in agricultural and structural 
policies. For the period 2007–13, there is a risk that the surplus will increase again 
until new programmes have reached their cruising speed. 
28 For example, according to the rules applicable to structural policies, the 
Commission can decommit the amounts committed in year n for programmes for 
which no justified payment claim is presented by the end of year n+2 (n+3 for 
those member states – the new member states, Greece and Portugal – whose GDP 
from 2001 to 2003 was below 85% of the EU-25 average in the same period). Such 
decommitments remain limited (less than 1%) in comparison with average annual 
commitments. In 2005, €286 million was decommitted (slightly over the €254 
million of 2004). A significant share (44%) was related to the European social fund 
operations. A lower amount was decommitted in 2006 (€217 million). 
29 In this respect, one should note an increasing trend of outstanding payments, 
mostly owing to structural policies (and the cohesion fund in particular). As a 
matter of comparison, the increase between year-end 2005 and year-end 2006 was 
+ 14% (+ 23% for the cohesion fund). In particular, the enlargement countries 
record a low absorbing rate for structural funds. Yet, approximately half of the 
€347 billion worth of 2007–13 cohesion spending is intended for the new member 
states. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 15 
 
period, an amount of 28% remained to be paid.30 This will be in addition to 
the payments for the new programming period. 
As has been observed by the European Court of Auditors, “it is 
contradictory to increase the budget each year when there is not the ability 
to absorb the resources on multi-annual programmes within the timescale 
foreseen”,31 not to mention that an accumulation of unspent commitments 
inevitably increases the risk in terms of the quality of spending. One can 
indeed imagine the pressure that would be brought to bear on member 
states (by their own citizens) and on the Commission (through criticism 
from the European Parliament) if Community funds were to remain 
unused.32 
Figure 1.3 shows that outstanding commitments33 have risen faster 
than the budget.  
Figure 1.3 Outstanding budgetary commitments 1994–2006 (€ billion) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Commitments
Payments
Outstanding budgetary commitments
 
Source: European Court of Auditors (2007c), Graph 3.1. 
____________________________ 
30 This level of outstanding payments is significantly higher (+30%) compared with 
the situation in 1999, at the end of the previous programming period. 
31 See European Court of Auditors, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2003, 
OJ C 293, 30.11.2004, para. 2.49. A similar observation has been made by the Court 
in its 2006 Annual Report (2007c), para. 3.20. 
32 Concerning specifically the European Parliament, see footnote 98. 
33 The reference here is to differentiated appropriations (for a definition see 
footnote 15), which comprise expenditure on structural policies, internal policies, 
external actions and pre-accession aid.  16 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
Concluding remarks 
There are grounds for wondering whether the present EU financial and 
management framework, which is to a large extent dependent upon the 
administrative capacity of the member states to implement EU agricultural 
and structural policies, could actually cope with a substantial increase of 
appropriations. This consideration also shows that, given the different 
functions assigned to these budgets and the different share of 
responsibilities between central and local levels, comparisons with the size 
of federal states’ budgets or those of the EU member states in general are 
not in themselves an appropriate scale of reference. There is actually no 
‘ideal’ or ‘normal’ size for the EU budget as such. Whether the EU budget is 
too small or not is basically a question that is only relevant once the 
objectives to meet have been set. As the Commission has said in the context 
of future enlargements, “[T]he Union needs to ensure…that its budget is 
commensurate with its objectives and with its financial resources.”34 What 
matters is what it is intended to achieve. The size of the EU budget ought 
naturally to be determined by the sum of the costs of the various policies 
assigned to the EU. If the ‘volume’ of funds is an issue, this is much more at 
the programme level than for the EU budget as a whole. 
A panoply of programmes  
The Commission’s proposal concerning the 2007–13 financial framework 
aimed at a reorientation of expenditure in favour of policies fostering 
growth and employment. It was made clear, however, that the evolution of 
expenditure for the period 2007–13 had already been largely determined.35 
On one hand, market-related and direct payments on agriculture had been 
previously agreed until 201336 and, on the other hand, the significantly 
lower level of prosperity in the new member states required increased 
expenditure on cohesion. Taking account also of the requirements of the 
other policies, the Commission therefore concluded that “a ceiling around 
1 %  o f  G N I ,  w o u l d  f a i l  t o  m e e t  the European Council commitments on 
____________________________ 
34 See European Commission, Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main 
Challenges 2006–07, COM(2006) 649, Brussels, 8 November 2006(b), p. 20. 
35 See European Commission, Communication on the Financial Perspective 2007–
13, COM(2004) 487, Brussels, 14 July 2004(b), pp. 3–4. 
36 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council 
of 24-25 October, 14702/02, Brussels, 26 November 2002. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 17 
 
agricultural payments, would undermine the phasing-in of cohesion policy 
in the 10 new member states, and would jeopardise the existing levels in 
other policies, let alone to implement the new priorities”.37 According to the 
Commission, under such a scenario, the EU would for example (among 
other things) have to decrease cohesion support drastically in the old 
member states in the face of major problems of lagging development, 
unemployment and social exclusion.  
The fact is that the own resources ceiling has been precisely set at 
around 1% of GNI, with a consequent cut of about €140 billion (or -14%) 
compared with the Commission’s proposal (excluding the European 
development fund). Such a reduction can only reinforce the need for clarity 
about the relation between the objectives pursued and the outcomes 
expected. This point is notably true for the sectors having suffered the most 
from the Council’s axe, such as competitiveness (-44%), citizenship, 
freedom, security and justice (-42%) and the EU as a global player (-31%). 
The question is namely this: What are the consequences in terms of 
effectiveness of a financial framework that is quantitatively the same as for 
the 2000–06 period, despite 12 further member states and 110 million more 
inhabitants (moreover, with a lower income level)? One could wonder in 
particular whether, as a result of these cuts, the objectives have been 
reviewed and more selectivity has been introduced in the programmes or 
whether the Commission had been simply too generous in its forecast.  
The Commission has emphasised that despite the constraints in 
financial resources, a comparison with the previous 2000–06 financial 
framework would show a 69% increase in the areas of competitiveness for 
growth and employment38 and a 21% increase for cohesion for growth and 
____________________________ 
37 See European Commission (2004a), pp. 26–27. 
38 See European Commission, “Q&A on Interinstitutional Agreement on Budgetary 
Discipline and Sound Financial Management 2007-2013”, Memo 06/204, Brussels, 
17 May 2006(j). 
The rise would be seen in the following areas:  
•  139% increase for transport and energy, 
•  81% increase for environment-friendly transport (Marco Polo II), 
•  75% increase for research (7th Research Framework Programme), 
•  60% increase for the Competitiveness and Innovation Programme, and  
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employment,39 whilst citizenship, freedom, security and justice recorded a 
spectacular increase (+78%). Nevertheless, these are limited shifts, 
especially to finance policies in the framework of the Lisbon strategy,40 
which were largely included in the previous internal policies. Out of the 59 
programmed actions planned, only a couple can actually be considered 
really new initiatives. In this regard, the Sapir report stressed that “there is 
considerable inertia in the allocation of EU spending and the choice of 
spending priorities does not square with the Union’s present economic 
priorities,” and this “allows for only minor tinkering”.41 
Since total revenue is strictly limited by the own resources ceiling, 
once administrative expenditure is accounted for, the other policies must 
share for the seven-year period the around €135 billion slice of the cake left 
by the two big spending areas. This portion is no more than 0.16% of the 
EU GNI, or 16% of the commitment appropriations available.  
One would expect that if, for whatever reason, the financial resources 
are limited, the targets should be set accordingly and at a level permitting 
____________________________ 
 
•  52% increase for knowledge/training (Lifelong Learning and Erasmus 
Mundus Programmes). 
39 Ibid. More specifically, the growth would be seen in these areas: 
•  11% increase for structural policies, and 
•  74% increase for the cohesion fund. 
40 For a definition, see footnote 7. 
41 See Sapir et al. (2003), pp. 126 and 162. That is not to say, however, that nothing 
has changed. For example, in the research area, a strong focus has been put on 
major research themes within the largest programme component of FP7 – 
Cooperation – to make the programme more flexible and responsive to the needs 
of industry. FP7 is also establishing new regions of knowledge that bring together 
the various research partners within a region. A new funding instrument, the Joint 
Technology Initiatives, specifically addresses those areas of research activity where 
enhanced collaboration and considerable investment are essential to long-term 
success. A specific programme (Ideas) will support ‘frontier research’ on the sole 
basis of scientific excellence, in any area of science or technology and without 
obligation for cross-border partnerships. The European Research Council (ERC) 
will oversee the funding of this programme, which entails appropriations for about 
15% of the whole FP7. ERC is the first pan-European funding body set up to 
support investigator-driven frontier research. The ERC complements other funding 
activities in Europe such as those of the national research funding agencies. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 19 
 
the achievement of a critical and perceivable scale of action. Indeed, with 
the aim of ensuring that the objectives are met, one of the guiding 
principles of the Commission’s financial perspective proposal was to 
concentrate the Community resources on a few major initiatives. This was 
because “sound financial planning means matching resources to needs. As 
financial resources are limited, financial decisions are essentially about 
choices to be made and priorities to be fixed.”42 
Looking purely at the volume of funds allocated to the programmes, 
only 9 out of the 59 programmes record appropriations of more than €1 
billion per year. As is shown in Table 1.2, the four biggest programmes, 
accounting for a large share of the financial perspective (77%), are 
unsurprisingly concentrated in structural or agricultural policies. It should 
also be noted that there is no large programme under the citizenship, 
freedom, security and justice heading. In this respect, the European 
Parliament has observed that the relevance of this heading, although still 
acceptable in political terms, “may be questioned in terms of the volume of 
appropriations compared with all the other headings”.43 
____________________________ 
42 See European Commission (2004a), p. 26. In this respect, the Agenda 2000 
programme underlined 10 years ago that “the relevance of policies, structures and 
procedures should be examined critically in a screening process preceding 
decisions on funding programmes and allocating resources to their management”. 
It also stressed that “[c]onsideration should be given to the appropriate size of 
programmes and projects supported financially by the Community to ensure that 
the programmes deliver a clear added value at European level”. It acknowledged, 
because of budgetary constraints, a need “to identify more clearly the core 
functions on which the Commission should concentrate” (see European 
Commission, Agenda 2000, Communication for a Stronger and Wider Union, Vol. I, 
97/6, Brussels, 15 June 1997(a), pp. 47–48). Agenda 2000 was meant to respond to 
the ‘threats’ of globalisation and a multi-polar world. It outlined a large spectrum 
of actions, from institutional reform (the weighting of votes in the Council and a 
reduction in the size of the Commission) to policy reforms, such as continuing to 
reform the CAP (to take further the movement towards world market prices 
coupled to direct income aids), pursuing the priority goal of economic and social 
cohesion (to foster competitive development and lasting growth to create jobs 
throughout the Union), strengthening internal policies (to promote a high quality 
of life, a sound environment, freedom, security and justice), enhancing the pre-
accession aid to applicant countries and absorbing the impact of the first 
enlargement. See also the section “The ‘European’ added value: What is it?”. 
43 See European Parliament, Resolution of 8 June 2005 (op. cit.), para. 36.  20 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
Table 1.2 Financial perspective 2007–13 – The most important spending 
programmes (€ million, commitment appropriations, current prices) 
Headings Total  % of Financial 
perspective 
% of Heading/ 
subheading 
Average/ 
year 
Sustainable growth  409,961  42.06  95.14  58,566 
Competitiveness for 
growth and 
employment   62,551  6.42  74.82  8,936 
1. Research 
Framework 
Programme  54,538  5.59  65.24  7,791 
2. Trans-European 
Transport Network  8,013  0.82  9.58  1,145 
Cohesion for growth 
and employment  347,410  35.64  100.00  49,630 
3. Structural funds  277,703  28.49  79.94  39,672 
4. Cohesion fund  69,707  7.15  20.06  9,958 
Preservation & 
management of natural 
resources  407,477  41.80  97.30  58,211 
5. Agricultural 
market expenditure 
and direct aids  318,988  32.72  76.17  45,570 
6. Rural development  88,489  9.08  21.13  12,641 
The EU as a global player   39,656  4.07  71.07  5,665 
7. Development 
cooperation 
Instrument  16,958  1.74  30.39  2,423 
8. Instrument for Pre-
Accession  11,476  1.18  20.57  1,639 
9. European 
Neighbourhood and 
Partnership 
Instrument   11,222  1.15  20.11  1,603 
Total   857,094  87.93  –  – 
Source: Own calculations based on the European Commission’s (2007j) Financial 
Programming 2007–13. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 21 
 
Table 1.3 Financial perspective 2007–13 – Medium-size spending programmes (€ 
million, commitment appropriations, current prices) 
Headings Total  % of Financial 
perspective  
% of Heading/ 
subheading 
Average/ 
year 
Sustainable growth  11,596  1.19  2.69 1,657 
Competitiveness for 
growth and employment   11,596  1.19  13.87 1,657 
1. Lifelong learning  6,970  0.72  8.34 996 
2. Competitiveness and 
Innovation Framework 
Programme  3,621  0.37  4.33 517 
3. Galileo  1,005  0.10  1.20 144 
Preservation & management 
of natural resources  8,849  0.91  2.11 1,264 
4. European fisheries 
fund  4,340  0.45  1.04 620 
5. Common fisheries 
policy and Law of the Sea  2,412  0.25  0.58 345 
6. Life+  2,098  0.22  0.50 300 
Citizenship, freedom, security 
and justice  1,820  0.19  14.92 260 
Freedom, security and 
justice  1,820  0.19  24.59 260 
7. External borders fund  1,820  0.19  24.59 260 
The EU as a global player  13,904  1.43  24.92 1,986 
8. Humanitarian aid  5,614  0.58  10.06 802 
9. Instrument for Stability   2,062  0.21  3.70 295 
10. Common foreign and 
security policy  1,981  0.20  3.55 283 
11. Emergency aid 
reserve  1,744  0.18  3.13 249 
12. Loan guarantee 
reserve  1,400  0.14  2.51 200 
13. European Instrument 
for Democracy and 
Human Rights  1,104  0.11  1.98 158 
Total   36,169  3.71  – – 
Source:  Own calculations based on the European Commission’s (2007j), Financial 
Programming  2007–13. 22 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
Most of the 50 remaining programmes have been granted 
appropriations of less than €1 billion for the whole 2007–13 period (inter 
alia, all programmes devoted to the citizenship subheading). In fact, 27 of 
them are worth less than €0.5 billion, and a full 20 of those programmes 
have funding of less than €0.2 billion. 
Table 1.3 above presents the 13 programmes worth at least €1 billion. 
These are mainly concentrated on external actions: only two among them 
(lifelong learning and humanitarian aid) represent appropriations 
accounting for more than 0.5% of the total financial perspective. Under the 
citizenship, freedom, security and justice heading, the external borders 
fund is actually the largest programme in absolute terms for the whole 
heading (it also represents one-fourth of the total subheading 
appropriations). 
The combination of a limited amount of appropriations available as a 
whole and the retention of existing programmes has resulted in a reduced 
budget for most of these initiatives. Irrespective of the interest and the 
qualities of the individual programmes, one may ask whether the volume 
of the appropriations for many of the programmes is enough to make the 
EU’s actions in these domains meaningful and visible across the 27 member 
states. More specifically, the issue is whether it is possible to achieve critical 
masses of material, human and intellectual resources to respond to the 
generally very ambitious objectives. The risk is, for some of these actions at 
least, that they will be no more than symbolic and will merely ‘mark the 
territory’ of the EU budget. 
One example is given by the programmes under the competitiveness 
for growth and employment subheading, at the heart of the Lisbon 
strategy. These programmes are meant to support the Union’s physical and 
knowledge infrastructure. Despite a cut in the appropriations available well 
above 40%,44 this subheading still encompasses expenditure on a wide 
____________________________ 
44 The Commission’s financial perspective proposal entailed appropriations 
amounting to €132.8 billion (2004 prices). This amount has been reduced to €74.1 
billion in the financial perspective. For example, in the field of the trans-European 
networks (TENs) for transport and energy, the amounts finally decided (€8.2 
billion) were significantly lower than the budgetary resources set out in the 
Commission’s proposal (€20.7 billion), although representing a doubling of the 
resources for the transport projects (benefiting from the overwhelming share of the 
resources) as compared with the 2000–06 period. In this respect, the European 
Parliament remarked that “selecting and prioritising projects will become even 
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range of actions (research and innovation, education and training, security 
and environmental sustainability of EU networks, support for an integrated 
single market and the accompanying policies, and implementation of the 
social policy agenda).  
When looking at the present 16 actions planned under the 
competitiveness for growth and employment subheading and worth less 
than €1 billion per year, the three largest programmes (the Lifelong 
Learning Programme, the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework 
Programme and Galileo) represent altogether no more than 1.2% of the 
financial perspective. The other 13 programmes have to share among them 
an amount of €3.15 billion, hence the average value of these programmes is 
no more than €0.242 billion for the whole period. In comparison, the 
average value of programmes worth less than €1 billion under the headings 
of freedom, security, justice, and citizenship and the EU as a global player 
range from €0.349 billion to €0.416 billion. The European Parliament has 
expressed concern “that previous innovation and competitiveness 
programmes have failed to deliver the necessary link between fundamental 
and applied research and industrial innovation partly due to the fact that 
the financial resources were rather limited”.45 
The EU’s satellite navigation system Galileo is one of the programmes 
under the competitiveness subheading. The High-Level Group on the 
trans-European transport network viewed the project as being of 
particularly important strategic interest as it is meant to provide the EU 
with an autonomous radio navigation system, thus improving efficiency 
and safety in all transport modes while at the same time guaranteeing the 
EU’s technological independence in this area.46 Owing to the failed 
____________________________ 
 
more important” because of the reduction of appropriations compared with the 
initial Commission proposal and thus Parliament asked the Commission “to set up 
a comprehensive list of clear criteria which allow projects to be prioritised in a 
transparent manner” (see European Parliament, Resolution of 24 April 2007 on the 
discharge for implementation of the European Union general budget for the 
financial year 2005, paras 194 and 199). 
45 See European Parliament, Resolution of 8 June 2005 (op. cit.), para. 52.  
46 The High-Level Group, chaired by Karel Van Miert, was mandated by the 
Commission to identify the priority projects of the trans-European transport 
network up to 2020 on the basis of proposals from the member states and the 
acceding countries. The Group delivered its report on 27.6.2003. 24 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
negotiations with the private consortium, which had initially been expected 
to secure at least two-thirds of the financing for the deployment phase, the 
Council decided in June 2007 that this phase would be funded with public 
money. 47 Thus, a further €2.4 billion is necessary over the next five years 
(2008–12), in addition to the €1 billion already foreseen in the financial 
perspective. Where this extra funding should come from has still to be 
decided. Two major funding options are theoretically available, i.e. funding 
by member states’ contributions from outside the EU budget, for example 
through the European Space Agency (but 10 member states are not 
members of the ESA) or a revision of the financial perspective (favoured by 
the European Parliament). 48 Being aware that most member states are 
hostile to a review of the upper limits of the financial perspective,49 the 
Commission has adopted a proposal of revision of the financial perspective 
2007–13 without increasing the overall budgetary ceiling. Funding was 
found in the margins of different headings available in 2007 and in 2008 
(mostly under heading 2, “Preservation & Management of Natural 
Resources”), money that otherwise will not be used and ought normally to 
reduce member states’ contributions. 50 For this reason, several member 
____________________________ 
47 See Council Resolution 10126/07 of 1 June 2007. See also European Commission, 
Communication on Galileo at a cross-road: The implementation of the European 
GNSS programmes, COM(2007) 261 final, Brussels, 16 May 2007(k) and the 
attached Working Document. 
48 See European Parliament, Resolution of 20 June 2007 on the financing of the 
European programme of satellite radio navigation (Galileo), para 8. An analysis of 
the various financing options has been provided by the Commission in its 
Communication on Progressing Galileo: The Re-Profiling of the European GNSS 
Programmes, COM(2007) 534, Brussels, 19 September 2007(n). 
49 By launching the development phase of the Galileo project, the Council decided 
i n  2 0 0 2  “ t h a t  m e m b e r  s t a t e s  w i l l  n o t  b e  r e q u e s t e d  t o  m a k e  d i r e c t  f i n a n c i a l  
contributions of their own national resources to the GALILEO programme; any 
further public sector funding of GALILEO, in any of its phases, should be met by 
redeployment under the appropriate ceilings of the Financial Perspectives in force 
at that time” (see European Transport and Telecommunications Council, 
Conclusions of the 2420th Council meeting, 7282/02, Brussels, 25–26 March 2002, 
pp. 20-21). 
50 See European Commission, Communication Concerning the Revision of the 
Multi-annual Financial Framework (2007–13), COM(2007) 549, Brussels, 19 
September 2007(o). Since the amount at stake for the revision is below 0.03% of the 
EU GNI within the margin for unforeseen expenditure, the decision to revise the 
 RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 25 
 
states might favour instead a redeployment of funds within the 
competitiveness subheading and hence an across-the-board reduction for 
several programmes (namely research, lifelong learning and Erasmus). The 
Commission observed, however, that these programmes have all been 
adopted with their respective envelopes and claimed therefore that at this 
stage significant changes are not possible, except for the €300 million 
available within the transport-related research programmes dedicated to 
Galileo under the 7th Research Framework Programme. 
The proposed doubling of the EU’s research funding (to an average of 
€10 billion per year) was justified by a full exploitation of the European 
added value of EU action (e.g. the growing pressure of international 
competition). More precisely, the substantial increase proposed by the 
Commission was meant to be crucial in restructuring research in the EU, in 
pooling and leveraging resources more widely, and in moving Europe 
closer to a real ‘single market’ for research.51 The financial perspective has 
reduced the proposed amount to around €8 billion per year, however. This 
reduction has a consequence on meeting the Lisbon agenda goal of raising 
overall research investment in the EU from 1.9% of GDP to around 3% by 
2010. This objective is based on the assumption that 1% will come from 
public sources and 2% from the private sector. The Commission has 
estimated that public investment in research in the member states is 
planned to increase to 0.88% of GDP by 2010, still below the 1% agreed 
target for the public spending share of the 3% Lisbon target.52 It is therefore 
assumed that there is a gap of 0.12% of GDP. The EU research budget has 
actually been increased from 0.04% to 0.06% of EU GDP. This means that 
even though it represents almost 6% of the financial perspective (and the 
fifth largest spending area), the EU research budget can only cover half of 
the gap in the 1% target for public investment. 
____________________________ 
 
financial perspective can be adopted by a qualified majority in the Council and a 
majority of the members of the European Parliament with three-fifths of the votes 
cast. See also Box 1.1. 
51 See European Commission, Impact assessment and ex ante evaluation of the 7th 
Framework Programme, Annex 1, SEC(2005) 430, Brussels, 6 April 2005(b), p. 46. 
52 In its proposal for the financial perspective, the Commission made a strong case 
for a significant increase in EU research funding, as a contribution to bridging the 
remaining gap towards the 1% target of public investment. See European 
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A further example is provided by the structural policies, which, 
although accounting for about one-third of the EU budget, still represent a 
limited fraction of national investments in regional and social policies. 
Despite the increased disparities among the regions following the recent 
enlargements, all EU regions remain eligible for one or the other of the 
structural policy objectives, with a consequent drop in the aid per head of 
population.53 Although approximately half of cohesion spending is 
intended for the new member states, there is still a concrete risk of 
fragmentation of the interventions. For example, the structural fund rules 
provide that EU-15 member states concentrate their co-financed 
investments towards the Lisbon objectives. At the same time, the regulation 
leaves them the choice among a large range of 47 types of actions within 9 
priority themes, so it is hard to see a decisive attempt at selectivity.54 The 
idea that all kinds of expenditures contribute effectively to the strategy is 
hardly credible. Moreover, these actions, which are not dissimilar to the 
interventions financed in past periods, risk overlapping with other 
programmes. 
____________________________ 
53 According to a study made for the European Parliament, there will be a drop in 
funds per head of population in the convergence regions from approximately 
€3,134 per head of population (2000–06 period) to €2,501 in the 2007–13 period. The 
estimate has been made in constant 2004 euros, and according to the forecasts of 
the December 2005 Council. See European Parliament, Measurement of impact of 
structural actions on employment, quality of life and infrastructure: Relevant indicators, 
April 2006, p. 18. See also footnote 96. 
54 The priority themes are research and technological development, innovation and 
entrepreneurship; information society; transport; energy; environmental protection 
and risk prevention; increasing the adaptability of workers and firms, enterprises 
and entrepreneurs; improving access to employment and sustainability; improving 
the social inclusion of less-favoured persons; and improving human capital. The 
number of 47 types of actions is applicable to the ‘convergence’ regions. In regional 
competitiveness and employment, the eligible actions have been reduced to 33, 
which is still not really “a limited number of policy priorities” as the Commission 
intended to promote. Concerning structural policies in general, there are 
indications of a reduction in the size of projects. A comparison between the last 
two programming periods (1994–99 and 2000–06) shows a significant reduction 
(more than 60%) in both the number and funding for the so-called ‘major projects’, 
probably as a result of the increased threshold (from €25 million for infrastructure 
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These examples also show that agreement on the financial perspective 
implies a compromise between sometimes conflicting interests, i.e. whether 
the appropriations should be redirected towards policies for promoting 
growth through increased investments in knowledge or, on the contrary, 
whether the EU budget should increase its redistributive function. This 
issue furthermore arises against a background of tension between net-
payer countries (wishing to limit their contribution to the EU budget)55 and 
net recipients, with the Eastern European countries seeking to claim 
concrete evidence of the solidarity, repeatedly affirmed in the accession 
process, with their economically weak situations. But there are also 
different budget priorities put forward by different ‘sponsors’ (the 
Commission, the European Parliament, individual member states and, last 
but not least, the over 15,000 interest groups and lobbyists56 with 
entrenched interests in EU spending). Which kinds of policies the EU 
should finance is, ultimately, not a harmless issue. 
The final compromise is therefore a mixture of allocative, 
redistributive and stabilising measures in a context where the unanimous 
agreement of the member states is required. Indeed, reaching an agreement 
is a lengthy enterprise each time. It took almost two years to agree on the 
current 2007–13 financial perspective: four different presidencies of the 
Council dealt with this sensitive issue.57 A flavour of this is given by the 
Council document containing the last (and finally adopted) proposal. The 
document states that the proposal consists of three parts (expenditure, 
revenue and review) considered “complementary and inseparable. This 
____________________________ 
55 For example, in December 2003, when the Commission was about to present its 
proposal for a new 2007–13 financial perspective, six member states (France, 
Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria and the UK) made known their desire 
to see the ceiling for own resources reduced to “1.0% of GNI, including agriculture 
spending within the ceiling set by the European Council in October 2002”. This 
issue is a recurrent one. In the minutes of the European Council meeting in Cardiff 
(see the Presidency Conclusions of the Cardiff European Council of 15-16 June, 
SN150/1/98 REV 1, Brussels, June 1998, para. 54) one could read, concerning the 
preparation of the 2000–06 financial perspective: “The European Council notes the 
Commission’s working assumption that the existing Own Resources ceiling will be 
maintained, but that some member states have not accepted this.” 
56 This is an estimate of Agence Europe, see the edition of 13 March 2007. 
57 The EC Treaty (Art. 203) provides that the office of president of the Council shall 
be held in turn by each member state for a term of six months. 28 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
means that the principle of nothing is agreed until everything is agreed 
continues to apply.”58 
Concluding remarks 
The limitation on the financial resources made available to the EU budget 
requires increased selectivity in identifying the programmes to be financed. 
The simultaneous concentration on two main policies and the financing of a 
plurality of programmes runs the risk of ineffective spending, in particular 
through the dispersion of the financial resources. In order for EU spending 
to achieve perceivable effects, it seems necessary to concentrate the 
resources on priority actions, starting from a transparent scrutiny process 
of the present programmes.  
The ‘European’ added value: What is it? 
The raison d’être of the EU budget (and of the Commission’s management 
powers in respect of it) lies in Art. 5 TEC, on the ground that “the objectives 
of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states 
and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, 
be better achieved by the Community”. In practice, this means that the EU 
budget should do things that nobody else can (or will) do with better 
results. Moreover, as most (if not all) member states are reluctant to see any 
significant increase in total public expenditure at both national and 
European levels, any increase of the EU budget should be offset by a 
corresponding reduction in the national budgets. In other words, where, 
between the EU budget and the national budgets, could the taxpayer’s 
money be better invested? 
Evidence about the European added value of EU expenditure is 
therefore crucial in convincing people that “the scale or effects of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states” and 
that management at the EU level would be the most cost-effective method 
of achieving the objectives.59 ‘Convincing’ is actually not an issue solely for 
the government representatives in charge of negotiating a financial 
perspective The EU budget matters to all citizens, both as taxpayers and as 
potential beneficiaries of the expenditure that they themselves pay for. 
____________________________ 
58 See European Council (2005a), p. 1. 
59 For a critical analysis of the concept of European added value and its use in 
various policy settings, see Tarschys (2005). RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 29 
 
Box 1.2  European added value and subsidiarity 
The Commission has acknowledged on several occasions that the 
Community should be made responsible solely for those tasks that can be 
best carried out at the Community rather than the national level or for those 
tasks that, for other reasons, determine the progress towards integration. For 
example, the then President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer 
said in his investiture speech of 17 January 1995 before the European 
Parliament: “[W]e must make a constant effort to concentrate on essentials, 
to do at Community level only that which cannot be done at national level, 
in short to apply the principle of subsidiarity” (Santer, 1995). His successor, 
Romano Prodi, also recommended enabling “the Commission to deliver on 
our core business commitments in the years to come”, in order to allow it to 
concentrate “on its real job and [do] it efficiently and well” (Prodi, 2000a). It 
is worth noting that the Commission tried, in 1978, to determine what the 
EU should be doing by identifying some criteria, such as “economies of 
scale”, the “need of a comprehensive approach with other EU financed 
policies” or of “lightening the burden on national budgets”. These criteria, 
however, were too vague to be made operational (European Commission, 
1978, pp. 6–8). The European Convention has examined the issue of 
subsidiarity and concluded that this principle was essentially political in 
nature. Its implementation involved a considerable margin of discretion for 
the institutions (considering whether shared objectives could better be 
achieved at the European level or at another level). The monitoring of 
compliance with that principle should take place before the entry into force 
of the act in question. Also, ex ante political monitoring of the principle of 
subsidiarity should primarily involve national parliaments.* The European 
Parliament has observed that all expenditure from the EU budget should be 
designed to add European value to the public expenditure of member states, 
and that the principle of subsidiarity should be strictly respected with 
regard to spending decisions in the field of non-exclusive competence – in 
particular the criterion that EU action does, by reason of its scale or effects, 
better achieve the objectives of the Union.** 
________ 
* See European Convention, Conclusions of the Working Group I on the Principle of 
Subsidiarity, CONV 286/02, Brussels, 23 September 2002. 
** See European Parliament, Resolution of 8 June 2005 on Policy Challenges and 
Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 2007–13, para. 1. 
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Moreover, the perception of added value in EU expenditure also 
plays a role in determining citizens’ attitudes towards Europe in general. 
Already in 1978, at a time when the EU budget represented no more than 
10% of today’s volume, the Commission observed, “As long as people 
believe that Community budgetary expenditure is an additional call on the 
national purse, their reaction will be to systematically curb such 
expenditure.”60 The proposed 2007–13 financial perspective provided the 
opportunity for the Commission to reaffirm the necessity “of a clear vision 
of what we want to do”, in order “to maximise the impact of our common 
policies so that we further enhance the added value of every euro spent at 
European level”.61 This aspiration was set out with a view to “higher 
financial transparency, scope for improved quality and effectiveness of 
expenditure [and the] possibility to better assess Community value 
added”.62 One of the key assumptions for asking for a substantial increase 
of the appropriations in the 2007–13 period was precisely that “pooling 
national resources at EU level can bring major savings for national 
budgets” and that therefore “one euro spent at EU level can offer more 
than one euro at national level”.63 
This issue is actually the key one at the heart of the subsidiarity 
principle. It is nevertheless not sufficient to proclaim such added value – at 
the least, some degree of precision about the concrete achievements 
pursued should be provided. Indeed, effective results are not the inevitable 
consequence of the origin of the funds (the EU budget), nor are they a 
matter of idealism; they are rather the outcome of well-managed policies, 
with clear and achievable objectives, and defined expected results. The 
problem is that EU policies pursue a multiplicity of different targets,64 with 
the risk of separated vertical strategies and limited or no synergies among 
the various strands and, not least, with the difficulty of drawing 
____________________________ 
60 See European Commission (1978), p. 7. 
61 See European Commission (2004a), p. 4. 
62 Ibid., p. 30. 
63 See European Commission (2004b), pp. 5 and 8. See also the section “Financial 
perspective: Whose perspective?”. 
64 The Sapir report observed that “quite often in the EU economic system, policy 
instruments are assigned two objectives at the same time: for example, fostering 
growth and improving cohesion. It would be better to assign one objective to each 
policy instrument.” See Sapir et al. (2003), p. 4.  RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 31 
 
crosscutting conclusions. For example, the Lisbon strategy,65 at the heart of 
the financial perspective, is implemented through a number of different 
programmes, each of them dealing with multiple (although connected) 
objectives. This approach raises the issue of how coordination and added 
value will be achieved in substantive terms.66 
Structural policies are one of the main items of the Lisbon agenda.67 In 
the impact analysis prepared by the Commission for the present 
programming period, a specific section is dedicated to the Community 
added value.68 The document is rather convincing in stating that EU 
____________________________ 
65 A definition of the Lisbon strategy is given in footnote 7.  
66 For example, to the question “Has real change been achieved in policies 
addressing social inclusion?” the evaluation report of the EU programme to 
promote member state cooperation to combat social exclusion and poverty states: 
“Real change so far has probably only been achieved in a small number of cases, 
where all the conditions were right for learning and implementation.” The overall 
conclusion is that the programme has made a good contribution at the strategic 
level. Nevertheless, the programme could “have achieved more through greater 
focus and coherence, involving more active, ongoing management of thematic 
integration between the actions at both EU and national levels” (see European 
Commission, Evaluation of the EU programme to promote member state co-operation to 
combat social exclusion and poverty, Main Report, December 2006(c), pp. 74–75). 
67 In financial terms, the most important programmes contributing to the Lisbon 
strategy are the structural policies and the 7th Research and Development 
Framework Programme (FP7). For structural policies, the EU-15 member states are 
to ensure that 60% of expenditure on the convergence objective and 75% of 
expenditures on the regional competitiveness and employment objective target the 
EU priorities of promoting competitiveness and creating jobs, including meeting 
the objectives of the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (see Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006, laying down general provisions on 
the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the 
Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, OJ L 210, 31.7.2006, 
Art. 9(3)). It is nonetheless likely that an important part of the operations co-
financed in the other member states will also focus on the Lisbon objectives. 
Preliminary Commission estimates suggest that, overall, the member states have 
earmarked for Lisbon investments around €200 billion. Almost €50 billion or 15% 
of the overall cohesion budget will be allocated to research and innovation, about 
equal to the total of the 7th Framework Programme for Research. 
68 See the European Commission’s Proposal of a legislative package revising the 
regulations applicable to the management of the Structural and of Cohesion Funds: 
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cohesion policy has contributed (and will contribute) to inducing changes 
in the member states’ policies, enhancing principles such as programming 
and strategic approach, multilevel governance and evaluation.69 Yet, the 
link between these expected ‘qualitative’ impacts and the level of EU 
expenditure is not made explicit. The document basically takes the view of 
typological continuity in the interventions between the previous (2000–06) 
period and the new programming periods. It also assumes a linear 
progressivity of the impacts, as it simply extrapolates to the new 
programming period estimated impacts from the previous period. In this 
way, it concluded that EU funds in the regional competitiveness and 
employment regions would create one-third of the new jobs necessary to 
reach the 70% employment rate by 2010 as fixed by the Lisbon strategy. The 
document admits that the low level of funding does not permit a credible 
evaluation of the effect on the GDP. It nevertheless provides, for the 
convergence regions, growth simulations on GDP, employment, 
investment and productivity based on a macroeconomic model, which, 
according to the Court of Auditors’ examination of ex post evaluations, 
“suffered from significant limitations”.70 
A comprehensive impact analysis is of the outmost importance in the 
case of structural policies where there is no definite link between the funds 
allocated to a given region and the identification of intervention priorities, 
the ability to put forward suitable projects and the capacity to handle the 
interventions (during and after implementation).71 This would seem a pre-
condition of the Commission’s ambition to retain “the political duty to 
define the strategic objectives and the frameworks of expenditure 
____________________________ 
 
Analysis of impact in the enlarged Union, Commission Working Paper, SEC(2004) 924, 
Brussels, 14 July 2004(c). 
69 Danuta Hübner, the European Commissioner responsible for Regional Policy, 
has defined cohesion policy as a “Trojan horse” to improve and modernise public 
administrations, to enhance transparency and to foster good governance (Hübner, 
2007, p. 3). 
70 The Court referred to the Hermin model. See European Court of Auditors, Special 
Report No. 10/2006 on ex post evaluations of Objectives 1 and 3 programmes 1994 to 
1999, OJ C 302, 12.12.2006(a), pp. 4 and 23.  
71 Concerning the difficulties of executing the forecasted expenditure, see the 
section “Is the size of the budget a major issue?”. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 33 
 
programmes”.72 With an eye to the future, policy-makers would have been 
interested in knowing more about the expected results of the various 
operations financed for each region/country under the EU cohesion policy 
objective of “reducing disparities between the levels of development of the 
various regions”.73 One could recall in this respect that following concerns 
expressed in the Maastricht Treaty about “the need to monitor regularly the 
progress made towards achieving economic and social cohesion”,74  the 
Council ensured that in the future “assistance will be allocated where 
appraisal shows medium term economic and social benefits commensurate 
with the resources deployed. Operations should be adjusted to accord with 
the results of monitoring and evaluation.”75 Actually, the Constitutional 
Treaty repeated the same concerns expressed in 1992.76 
Concerning research expenditure, another important item of the 
Lisbon agenda, an expert panel had concluded that it was necessary for the 
Commission to take “a leading role in developing a simple and robust 
definition of European Added Value taking into account the latest research 
on the need for government intervention and the need to develop lead 
____________________________ 
72 See European Commission (2004a), p. 32.  
73 See Art. 158 TEC. The European Parliament has observed that “there is a lack of 
detailed information and comparative studies with rankings on the advancement 
of regions that profit from Structural Funds” and “the fact that funding has been 
granted does not guarantee per se that it will be put to good use” (see European 
Parliament, Resolution of 12 July 2007 on the role and effectiveness of cohesion 
policy in reducing disparities in the poorest regions of the EU, points H and P). 
The Commission’s fourth cohesion report provides an outlook with regard to 
economic, social and territorial cohesion and also attempts to analyse, although 
indirectly, the impact of cohesion policy at the national and Community levels, 
particularly in terms of the structure of spending (see European Commission, 
Growing Regions, Growing Europe, Fourth Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, 
Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, May 2007(p)). 
74 See the Protocol on Economic and Social Cohesion attached to the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992. 
75 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in 
Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992. 
76 See para. 7 of the Protocol on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion attached 
to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe of 2004.  34 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
markets for European solutions”.77 In this respect it is to be welcomed that, 
for the first time, the 2007–13 Framework Programme proposals have been 
accompanied by an ex ante impact assessment, based on an econometric 
model, with the aim of restricting the programme to actions “with a clear 
European value added” in order “to maximise positive impacts”.78 The 
impact assessment contains a specific section dedicated to the European 
added value of Community intervention that, while admitting that 
European added value is a complex concept, provides a clear analysis of 
the objectives and the reasons for EU intervention in research. Indeed, in 
general, EU-funded research has high added value by encouraging 
researchers to cooperate across national boundaries and to share 
complementary skills and knowledge, thus generating in particular a 
‘behavioural additionality’ favouring continuation of collaborative research 
in the future. Intervention at the EU level promotes competition in 
research, leading to higher quality and excellence. In addition, EU-funded 
research may make possible projects that, because of their complexity and 
large scale, go beyond what is possible at the national level. Finally, EU 
research provides a framework for disseminating research results across 
Europe. 
The document is very much focused on the likely impact of research 
expenditure in general. It could have been useful to examine to what extent 
this (moreover increased) EU research funding will help to achieve the 
Lisbon target of reaching expenditure equal to 3% of GDP by 2010. Indeed, 
this target is for Europe as a whole, not for individual member states, 
which have a variable level of R&D spending, some member states being in 
this respect leading or at least average performers, while others are 
catching up or even losing ground.79 The issue is even more important as it 
____________________________ 
77 See European Commission, Five-Year Assessment of the European Union Research 
Framework Programmes 1999–2003, Brussels, December 2004(d), p. 8. 
78 See European Commission (2005b), Main report, p. 12. The first research 
framework programme was launched in 1984. 
79 For example, Sweden and Finland spend on R&D more than 3% of their GDP. 
Denmark, Germany, Austria and France are spending more than the EU average of 
1.93%. Other member states vary from the Netherlands and the UK, which are only 
just under the EU average, to less than 0.4% of GDP in Latvia and Cyprus. Only 10 
member states have fixed an R&D target for 2010 of at least 3%. A similar situation 
applies at the regional level. The European Commission’s fourth progress report 
on cohesion reveals worrying disparities in modern infrastructure, research and 
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is admitted that some research areas are insufficiently covered by national 
spending, while a considerable overlap exists in other areas of national 
research.80 
The European Commission’s report, Key Figures 2007 on Science, 
Technology and Innovation, shows that EU R&D intensity (R&D expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP) has stagnated since the mid-1990s. In 2005, only 
1.84% of GDP was spent on R&D in the EU-27 and it remains at a lower 
level than in the US, Japan or South Korea. The Commission has stressed 
that high R&D intensity can be achieved when high contributions from the 
private sector go hand in hand with high levels of public funding.81 While 
the 3% Lisbon objective assumes that 2% will come from the private sector, 
more than 85% of the R&D intensity gap between the EU-27 and its main 
competitors is caused precisely by the low rate of the EU’s business sector 
in EU spending.82 This is because a considerable part of EU business 
research investment takes place in non-EU countries. Consequently, there is 
a net outflow of R&D funding from the EU to other countries (over €6 
billion in 2001) as illustrated by Figure 1.4.83 The situation is admittedly 
similar for the flow of researchers.  
____________________________ 
 
education. For example, in 47 out of 254 regions, there is hardly any R&D, with 
expenditure on R&D below 0.5% of GDP. Collectively, these 47 regions account for 
approximately 0.5% of total R&D expenditure in the EU-27 (their GDP share is 
3.5%). See European Commission, Communication on the Growth and Jobs 
Strategy and the Reform of European cohesion policy: Fourth progress report on 
cohesion, COM(2006) 281 final, Brussels, 12 June 2006(d), p. 6.  
80 See European Commission, “Why Europe Needs Research Spending”, Memo 
05/199, Brussels, 9 June 2005(c), p. 4; and also European Commission (2005b), 
Annex 1, pp. 24 and 55. 
81 See European Commission, “Low business R&D a major threat to European 
knowledge-based economy”, Press release, IP/07/790, Brussels, 11 June 2007(a). 
82 Over the past 10 years, the R&D financed by the business sector has remained at 
around 1% of GDP in the EU. According to the Commission, the low level of 
private R&D expenditure in Europe in comparison with the US is mostly owing to 
differences in industrial structure and to the smaller size of the high-tech industry 
in the EU. See European Commission (2007a). 
83 It should be noted that EU investment in the US even exceeded the flow of intra-
EU member states’ R&D investment in 2001 (€15,399 million versus €13,644 
million). Key Figures 2007 on Science, Technology and Innovation: Towards a European 
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Figure 1.4 Attractiveness of the EU for R&D investments (in € million PPS 2001) 
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Source: European Commission (2005b), Annex 1, p. 16. 
 
It seems clear that the whole process of linking funds, policies and 
objectives would benefit from increased transparency, an explicit 
‘intervention logic’ describing how an intervention is expected to attain its 
global objectives.84 In this respect, the cost of a policy is not just equal to the 
budgetary appropriations, as has indeed been observed: 
____________________________ 
 
Knowledge Area (European Commission, Brussels, 11 June 2007(b)) shows that in 
2003, the balance of R&D investment flow between the US and EU-15 member 
states was negative for the latter by 4.4 billion of PPS (PPS is an artificial currency 
that reflects differences in national price levels that are not taken into account by 
exchange rates. This unit allows meaningful volume comparisons of economic 
indicators among countries). 
84 “Intervention logic” is “the conceptual link from an intervention’s inputs to the 
production of its outputs and, subsequently, to its impacts on society in terms of 
results and outcomes” (see European Commission, Evaluating EU activities – A 
Practical Guide for Commission Services, Brussels, July 2004(e), p. 106). The European 
Parliament, while considering that “the Commission is the guardian of the Treaties 
and is responsible for defining the Community interest” has stressed the 
importance for the EU budget “to be established in accordance with the financial 
principles of the systematic sequence of the definition of tasks, the planning of 
expenditure, the securing of revenue and evaluation and that, when the tasks are 
defined, a distinction should be made between regulatory and fiscal tasks” (see 
European Parliament, Resolution of 11 March 1999, op. cit., paras 1 and 3).  RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 37 
 
Resources allocated in the budget for a given policy should also cover 
the ‘delivery’ costs of that policy, that is, the administrative costs of 
designing, implementing, monitoring and ex post evaluating any 
given policy. This should demonstrate which are cost-efficient 
policies and the good management practices.  …Evaluation should 
also be applied to the financial and management practices according 
to criteria specified ex-ante. Monitoring and evaluation should allow 
the disbursement of EU money to be made conditional on its past 
efficient use.85 
There is a need for a more focused ex ante role when approving the 
financial perspective and, later, the annual budget, especially with regard 
to the match between resources and measurable objectives, performance 
targets and indicators. Only if evaluation evidence related to past 
programmes is available can the budgetary authority exert any real 
influence in the budget decision-making.  
In this context, the Court of Auditors’ review of the ex post evaluation 
for the 1994–99 period for structural policies revealed a number of 
shortcomings in the approach and in the quality of the assessments made.86 
Notably, the objectives set lacked clarity and coherence, few performance 
indicators were available and an appropriate balance between quantitative 
and qualitative analysis was not always achieved. These weaknesses 
resulted in conclusions being drawn that were not supported by adequate 
analysis. The conclusions reached in a recent study ordered by the 
European Parliament were no less worrying.87 The study concluded that 
there is a lack of a common methodology on impact evaluation that would 
allow a synthesis of the influence of the actions as a whole on a specific 
territory or region, and the particular added value for each fund and 
initiative. The monitoring and supervision system implemented prevented 
the results from being integrated with the actions and outcomes obtained in 
a given region. A direct link between actions and their impact on growth 
could not be established. The study also concluded that there is a lack of 
general criteria and common indicators for determining the impact of 
structural funds on other policies at the EU level and their synergies with 
other actions taken in eligible regions. The European Parliament has 
____________________________ 
85 See Sapir et al. (2003), p. 165. A similar concern was raised in the framework of 
the initiatives to improve the Commission’s management – see footnote 249. 
86 See European Court of Auditors (2006a).  
87 See European Parliament (2006), pp. 7–8. 38 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
recently invited the Commission “to demonstrate to what extent the 
methodology for ex ante, midterm and ex post evaluation has been 
consolidated” in order to prevent the errors of the past.88 
It is to be welcomed that, for the first time in 2006, the Commission 
published a synthesis of policy achievements, which “sets out what the 
Commission has done to help realise its five-year strategic objectives”.89 
Indeed, this is an impressive review of initiatives and legislative proposals 
that, however, does not yet say very much about the actual achievements of 
EU-funded policies. The same could be said of the recent Annual 
Evaluation Review.90 The Review, which reports the results of completed 
evaluations, gives a generally positive conclusion about the relevance and 
the added value of the different EU policies. Yet, if one looks for example in 
the policy sections concerning structural policies, the information provided 
is rather limited and often concentrated on the kinds of actions that have 
been financed but not on their expected impact. It is therefore of limited 
value for preparing future activities, including, if need be, corrective 
actions.91 As has been observed, there is a ‘delivery deficit’: “[T]he citizen is 
all too well aware of what is being spent through the EU budget, but very 
much less aware of what is being achieved as a result of that spending.”92 
____________________________ 
88 See European Parliament, Resolution of 24 April 2007 (op. cit.), para. 266.  
89 See European Commission, Communication on Policy Achievements in 2005, 
COM(2006) 124, Brussels, 14 March 2006(e), p. 2. For the year 2006, see European 
Commission, Communication on Policy Achievements in 2006, COM(2007) 67, 
Brussels, 28 February 2007(c). See also European Commission, Communication on 
the Synthesis of the Commission’s Management Achievements in 2006, COM(2007) 
274, Brussels, 30 May 2007(d). 
90 See European Commission, Communication on the Annual Evaluation Review 
2006, COM(2007) 300, Brussels, May 2007(e). 
91 The section of the document dealing with “Preparing future activities” is limited 
for structural policies to elaborating a roadmap in the framework of “Gender 
equality”.  
92 See European Convention, Contribution of Lord Tomlinson, “EU Budget: 
Building-in enhanced scrutiny of sound financial management”, CONV 635/03, 
Brussels, 25 March 2003(a), pp. 2–3. It is worth noticing that one of the arguments 
invoked by the European Parliament for refusing to grant discharge to the 
Commission for the financial year 1996 (and which led to the resignation of the 
Santer Commission – see the section “The need for a management culture”) was 
the lack of clarity as to whether the significant funds “made available in the 
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The European Parliament has stressed the link existing between the 
development of the financial resources allocated to the Union and their use 
“for actions with real European added value, clearly defined priorities and 
visibility for citizens”,93 to the point “that an initiative that is insufficiently 
verifiable should not be financed by public money”.94 
It must be recognised that assessing the relationship between EU-
specific policies and particular effects is a difficult exercise. Indeed, the 
financial size of EU policies, although not insignificant in absolute terms, is 
relatively small. For example, national programmes still account for the 
vast bulk of public research spending in the EU.95 The same is true for the 
structural policies,96 although representing about one-third of the EU 
budget. That being said, one should not forget that the financial perspective 
is a rather rigid framework decided for seven years as a global package of 
multi-annual actions, often based on all-inclusive objectives. And 
‘absorption’ of the funds is itself an implicit objective. If, because of 
____________________________ 
 
Community budget for a virtually unmanageable number of measures to promote 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)…will help to meet the aim of creating 
more jobs” and that “the Commission until now was totally unable to explain how 
this money has been allocated” (see European Parliament, Resolution of 31 March 
1998 informing the Commission of the reasons for the postponement of the 
discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European 
Union for the 1996 financial year, paras 22–23). 
93 See European Parliament, Resolution of 8 June 2005 (op. cit.), para. 7.  
94 In this respect, the Parliament referred to the Court of Auditors’ special reports 
on the European social fund combating early school leaving and on rural 
development (see European Parliament, Resolution of 24 April 2007, op. cit., paras 
205 and 238).  
95 The 6th Research and Development Framework Programme represented 5–6% of 
total EU public R&D expenditure. 
96 A study commissioned by the European Parliament concluded for example that 
the volume of structural actions on employment is not sufficient to modify the 
structural or current performance of regional economies. It added that the 
European social fund is increasingly oriented towards supporting what are called 
“active employment strategies”, through the European employment strategy, in 
particular improvements in human capital skills and training. But the impact of 
these actions on sustaining or even creating jobs cannot be clearly established. See 
European Parliament (2006), p. 8. See also footnote 53. 40 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
methodological weaknesses (for example, the lack of specific and 
measurable objectives) or simply owing to a reduced scale of funding, it is 
not possible to achieve (and identify) the desired results of the actions, the 
risk is that concerns about the maximum take-up of funding will take 
precedence over the implementation of a coherent strategy aiming at the 
efficient, effective and economic use of the expenditure. There would be 
pressure to execute the earmarked expenditure,97 to the point that the 
spending rate could well become the main indicator of the implementation 
of programmes, thus basically equating the European value added to the 
EU budget contribution. 
Considering that a high rate of expenditure is proof of the 
implementation of its budgetary priorities, the European Parliament is 
normally quite attentive to ensuring that the ‘spending’ objective 
materialises in practice. In a recent Resolution, the Parliament expressed 
concern at the renewed increase in outstanding commitments and called 
for a higher rate of utilisation over the next three years. In so doing, it 
pointed to the low payment implementation rate in several cases.98 
Concluding remarks 
Without indisputable evidence of their added value, as compared with 
similar national expenditures, it will not be possible to persuade policy 
actors that EU policies should be kept at their present level or should even 
be enhanced.  
One might wonder whether, just as the Commission cannot make any 
proposal for a Community act “without providing the assurance that that 
proposal or that measure is capable of being financed within the limit of the 
Community’s own resources”,99 it should equally provide an assurance as 
to the possibility of setting “specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and 
____________________________ 
97 See in this respect the example referred to in footnote 297. 
98 For example, the Parliament viewed as being low the expenditure rate for 
transport safety (74%), the Marco Polo programme (53%), the Daphne programme 
(58%) and the area of freedom, security and justice (80%). See European 
Parliament, Resolution of 24 April 2007 (op. cit.), paras 9, 117, 132 and 136. 
99 See Art. 270 TEC. This provision was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty to 
ensure budgetary discipline. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 41 
 
timed objectives”.100 This assurance should be, in the full sense, one of the 
criteria enacted in Art. 5 TEC so that one could conclude whether the 
objectives of the action envisaged can “by reason of the scale or effects…be 
better achieved by the Community”. In this way, it would be possible to 
enhance the role of the EU budget as an instrument of action and potential 
achievements, as opposed to pre-agreed intergovernmental redistribution. 
 
____________________________ 
100 As prescribed by Art. 27 of the Financial Regulation No. 1605/2002 of 25 
June 2002 (op. cit.), 
Specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed objectives shall be set for 
all sectors of activity covered by the budget. Achievement of those objectives 
shall be monitored by performance indicators for each activity and 
information shall be provided by the spending authorities to the budgetary 
authority. …Institutions shall undertake both ex ante and ex post 
evaluations…which shall be applied to all programmes and activities [that] 
entail significant spending and evaluation results disseminated to spending, 
legislative and budgetary authorities.  
See also footnote 289.   
42 | 
 
2. READS AS ‘OWN RESOURCES’, MEANS 
NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
he EU budget is financed from three main sources of revenue. The 
first of these are customs duties, levied at the external frontiers of the 
EU, together with agricultural levies, in particular on the production 
and storage of sugar and isoglucose. The second source of revenue is 
represented by the VAT own resource, which is levied on member states’ 
statistical ‘notional’ harmonised  VAT bases, calculated on the basis of 
national VAT receipts. The third resource is a residual resource used to 
balance the budget. It is levied at a uniform rate in proportion to the GNI of 
each member state (Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1 The composition of the EU’s own resources 1996–2006 (% and € million, 
cash basis) 
 
Customs duties and 
agricultural levies (%) 
VAT 
 resource (%) 
GNI 
 resource (%) 
Total  
(€ million) 
1996 19  51  30  71,177 
1997 19  45  36  75,415 
1998 17  40  43  82,223 
1999 17  38  45  82,700 
2000 17  40  43  88,040 
2001 18  39  43  80,788 
2002 12  29  59  77,550 
2003 13  26  61  83,352 
2004 13  15  72  95,201 
2005 14  16  70  100,942 
2006 15  17  68  102,367 
Source: European Commission (2007l).  
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Out of the taxpayer’s sight, out of mind 
Unlike the ECSC Treaty, which was financed through levies on the 
production of coal and steel paid directly by producing companies (hence 
by a real Community tax),101 the EEC budget (like the Euratom budget) was 
initially financed by a system of member states’ contributions.102 Yet, the 
EEC Treaty of 1957 had foreseen the possibility of replacing national 
contributions by own resources.103 In 1965, the Commission presented a 
global package of measures aimed at establishing a link between financing 
the CAP, raising independent revenue for the Community and wider 
budgetary powers for the European Parliament. Not only did the 
Commission propose a gradual transfer (as of July 1967) of the customs 
duties and agricultural levies to the EU budget, it also proposed amending 
Art. 201 of the EEC Treaty in order to allow the European Parliament (once 
____________________________ 
101 See Art. 49 of the ECSC Treaty. This Treaty expired on 23 July 2002, under the 
terms of its Art. 97. 
102 Art. 200 of the founding Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (EEC Treaty) (1957) fixed as below the share of the financing 
among member states. 
Table A. Financing share of the member states (%) 
Member states  Administrative 
expenditure 
Social fund  
Belgium 7.9  8.8 
Germany 28.0  32.0 
France 28.0  32.0 
Italy 28.0  20.0 
Luxembourg 0.2  0.2 
Netherlands 7.9  7.0 
Total 100  100 
Source: Art. 200, EEC Treaty. 
Similarly, the Euratom Treaty established different scales of member states’ 
contributions for the operating budget and the research and investment budget 
(Art. 172). 
103 See Art. 201 of the EEC Treaty. Art. 173 of the Euratom Treaty constituted an 
even more explicit move towards EU financial independence, as it provided that 
financial contributions could be replaced by the proceeds of levies collected by the 
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directly elected) to create independent sources of revenue for the 
Community. Thus, the member states’ veto right would have 
disappeared.104 
Although the Commission’s proposals were not accepted in the end, 
concrete expectations were still raised by the European Council’s Own 
Resources Decision of 1970.105 This Decision established not only the 
principle that “the Communities shall be allocated resources of their own”, 
but also that “from 1 January 1975 the budget of the Communities shall, 
irrespective of other revenue, be financed entirely from the Communities’ 
own resources”.106 Since customs duties and agricultural levies were not 
sufficient to ensure the equilibrium of the budget, the Decision judged it 
advisable to allocate “to the Communities, in addition, tax revenue, the 
most appropriate being that accruing from the application of a single rate 
to the basis for assessing the value added tax, determined in a uniform 
manner for the member states”..107 The maximum call rate was set at 1% of 
the assessment base.  
Actually, as explained in the following sections, the practice has 
evolved in such a way that the adjective ‘own’ before resources has become 
somewhat misleading, as it merely indicates the member states’ obligation 
to finance the budget through national contributions, not the autonomy of 
____________________________ 
104  See the Commission’s proposals «  Financement de la politique agricole 
commune - Ressources propres de la Communauté – Renforcement des pouvoirs 
du Parlement européen », COM(65) 150, Brussels, 31 March 1965.  
105 See Council Decision 70/243/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 21 April 1970 on the 
replacement of financial contributions from member states by the Communities’ 
own resources, OJ L 94, 28.4.1970. The role of the Own Resources Decision is 
described in footnote 9. 
106 Ibid., Arts 1 and 4.  
107 See the fifth successive para. introduced by “Whereas” and Art. 4 of Council 
Decision 70/243/ECSC, EEC, Euratom (op. cit.). Customs duties and agricultural 
levies were transferred to the Community in a gradual process lasting from 1971 to 
1975, in order to mitigate the effects on the budgets of the member states. Because 
of a late introduction of the arrangements for a harmonised VAT base, member 
states continued to pay transitional national contributions replacing VAT resources 
until 1978 (this was done by six member states; three others – Germany, Ireland 
and Luxembourg – did so as of 1980 onwards).  RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 45 
 
the EU to fix and to manage its financial resources. Own resources are not 
to be equated with EU financial autonomy.108 
There is an indirect link with the taxpayer for the so-called ‘traditional 
own resources’ (customs duties and agricultural levies).109 Such a link does 
not exist at all for the GNI-based resource. The same applies to the VAT 
resource. Although potentially fulfilling the characteristic of “revenue 
accruing from other charges introduced within the framework of a 
____________________________ 
108 The following definition of own resources is given by the Lamassoure report, a 
Working Document of the European Parliament on the European Communities’ 
own resources:  
Own resources can be taken to mean a source of finance separate and 
independent of the member states, some kind of tax revenue assigned once and 
for all to the Community to fund its budget and due to it by right without the 
need for any subsequent decision by the national authorities. The member 
states, then, would be required to make payments available to the Community 
for its budget. (European Parliament, Annexes to the Explanatory Statement, 
Working Document No. 1 on the European Communities Own Resources, A6-
0066/2007, 13 March 2007(a), p. 20) 
A Commission document seems to claim that today the Communities’ own 
resources already accrue to the EU budget “without the need for any subsequent 
decision by the national authorities” (see European Commission, Updated check-list 
of administrative conditions in the area of the European Communities’ own resources, 
Brussels, November 2003(a), p. 5). This is actually a matter for interpretation. 
Member states may not indeed withhold at will their contributions to finance the 
budget (Art. 269 of the EC Treaty places on them a clear obligation in this respect); 
however, for an Own Resources Decision to enter into force a process of ratification 
in each member state according to their constitutional rules is required. For an 
analysis of the distinction between financial contributions and own resources, see 
Ehlermann (1982). 
109 An importer of goods from a third country is formally liable for any duties only 
vis-à-vis its national administration, and not the EU, although the latter is the 
‘institutional recipient’ of this entitlement. The debtor vis-à-vis the EU is actually 
the member state where the import took place. Like GNI and VAT resources, 
traditional own resources are managed and collected by national administrations 
and subsequently made available to the Commission. The latter’s role is limited to 
making sure that national systems operate in conformity with Community law. It 
should also be pointed out that any interest earned on traditional own resources 
prior to the amounts being made available to the Commission are owned by the 
member state involved, as well as penalties and late interest fees charged by the 
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common policy”,110 the VAT resource has simply been transformed in such 
a way as to produce a financial contribution, which is directly at odds with 
the initial objective.111 
Concluding remarks 
The expression ‘own resources’ suggests more than it actually means 
because the EU lacks genuine financial autonomy. As the Commission 
points out, 
The present financing system has ensured a smooth financing of the EU 
budget. However, in its present form the financing system lacks a 
direct link to citizens…The budgetary consequences of the Union’s 
policies thus remain impalpable to the general public. With the 
overwhelming weight of the GNI resource, member states, and in 
particular net contributors, tend to judge EU policies and initiatives 
exclusively in terms of their national allocation and with little regard to 
the substance of policies, with the risk of obscuring the added value of 
EU policies.112 
The VAT resource, voided of all substance 
The introduction of a VAT-based resource was intended to achieve the 
overall objective of financing the EU budget entirely from own resources 
and to make available sufficient resources for its future development. 
Moreover, the VAT resource was also meant to be a Community tax, as the 
underlying assumption was to establish a link with the Community 
taxpayer. 
The implementation of the VAT resource suffered initially from 
difficulties with establishing a common VAT system across the member 
____________________________ 
110 This criterion was set by Council Decision 70/243/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 21 
April 1970 (op. cit.), Art. 2, to identify resources other than agricultural levies, 
sugar levies and customs duties. As a harmonised EU-wide tax, moreover with a 
very extensive assessment basis representing a large part of member states’ 
income, VAT fulfils this requirement. 
111 See the following section and Box 2.1 in particular concerning the methods of 
calculation of the present VAT resource.  
112 See European Commission, Financing the European Union, Commission report on 
the operation of the own resources system, Vol. I, COM(2004) 505 final, Brussels, 14 
July 2004(f), p. 8. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 47 
 
states and with defining the VAT assessment base.113 Still, once it was 
operating ‘at full capacity’, the VAT resource began to fulfil its original 
function of becoming (at least potentially) the main own resource. It 
financed around half of the budget in 1981 and even more in the following 
years. To meet the costs of the enlargement to Spain and Portugal, the call 
rate was raised from 1% to 1.4% as of 1 January 1986, with the possibility of 
further increasing it to 1.6% as of 1 January 1988.114 
The enlargement to Spain and Portugal coincided with a marked 
change in the destiny of this, until then, most promising EU resource. The 
VAT resource was increasingly accused of being inherently regressive on 
the ground that the VAT base is structurally higher in the least prosperous 
member states than it is in the richest ones.115 This aspect of the matter was 
____________________________ 
113 See footnote 107. 
114 See Council Decision 85/257/EEC, Euratom of 7 May 1985 on the Communities’ 
system of own resources, OJ L 128, 14.5.1985, Art. 3(2) and the fourth successive 
para. introduced by “Whereas”.  
115 Taxation in the form of VAT is generally considered regressive with relatively 
less well-off member states contributing proportionately more to the EU budget 
financing as a result of the lower share of savings in national income (the criterion 
of vertical equity is not satisfied – see European Commission, Financing the 
European Union,  Commission report on the operation of the own resources system, 
COM(1998) 560, Brussels, 7 October 1998, annex 2, p. 8). The European Parliament 
highlighted in 1981 the necessity of ensuring greater equity among member states 
by introducing a corrective mechanism to VAT revenue (see European Parliament, 
Resolution of 9 April 1981 on the Community’s own resources, paras 27-28). It 
emphasised this issue in 1990,  noting “that VAT, which has become the main 
source of revenue, while having the advantage of being applied to a tax which is 
almost harmonized, has the grave disadvantage of interpersonal and spatial 
regressivity, and should therefore not occupy in future the pre-eminent position it 
enjoys at the moment” (see European Parliament, Resolution of 22 November 1990 
on the future financing of the European Community, para. 16.). Yet some authors 
are not convinced that the regressivity of VAT is a real issue. For example, Begg, 
Grimwade & Price (1997), and Gretschmann (1998) challenge the opinion that the 
VAT resource has a significant regressive effect. The regressivity of the VAT 
resource was first raised in the context of the budgetary burden of the UK after its 
accession to the Union, and it provided grounds for the compensation and 
reimbursement measures in favour of the UK (see the section “The UK rebate, at 
the crossroads of any reform”). In this context the MacDougal report has indicated 
that being an indirect tax, the VAT resource tends:  
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first recognised in the 1988 Own Resources Decision.116 The intention was 
clearly to allow for an adjustment of the disparities in economic structures 
(differences in the proportion of member states’ GNP accounted for by 
consumption, and thus in the VAT base). Therefore, instead of increasing 
the VAT call rate (as previously envisaged to deal with the problem of the 
exhaustion of own resources), the Decision introduced a GNI-based 
resource “with a view to matching the resources paid by each member state 
more closely with its ability to contribute”.117 
The Decision also established the principle that a member state’s VAT 
base could not exceed 55% of its GNP at market prices (the capping 
mechanism). As a consequence, the VAT-based own resource was turned 
into a GNI-based resource for the numerous countries that were concerned 
by the capping rule.118 
Equity being understood to mean proportionality with GNI, other 
measures were taken in subsequent Own Resources Decisions in order 
____________________________ 
 
to have a somewhat regressive incidence, but this distributive problem has 
broadly speaking been dealt with by the ‘Financial Mechanism’, which 
reimburses to economically weaker member states, in certain circumstances 
and in a certain degree, the excess of their share in total Own Resource 
payments over their share in Community GNP; this puts the Own Resource 
system onto an approximately neutral basis from the distributive stand-point. 
(European Commission, 1977, p. 64) 
116 See Council Decision 88/376/EEC, Euratom of 24 June 1988 on the system of the 
Communities own resources, OJ L 185, 15.7.1988.  
117 Ibid., see the 10th successive para. introduced by “Whereas”. 
118 The percentage of capping does not result from any specific criteria. As shown 
by its successive gradual reduction, this percentage is purely based on a burden-
sharing deal among the member states. In the 2007 EU budget, the capping of the 
VAT base is applicable to 11 member states (see Table 3.1) and the draft 
preliminary budget for 2008 foresees its application to two further member states 
(Latvia and Poland). It is worth noting that the present rules do not exempt 
member states whose VAT base is capped from making the complicated 
calculations underlying the VAT resource. Consequently, the Commission carries 
out the corresponding controls. This task may appear redundant, although it might 
prove useful in cases where revisions of national accounts show afterwards that 
the VAT base capping is no longer justified and that adjustments in the VAT 
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gradually to convert the GNI resource into the main source of revenue for 
financing the Community. In 1992, member states declared “their intention 
of taking greater account of the contributive capacity of individual member 
states in the system of own resources, and of examining means of 
correcting, for the less prosperous member states, regressive elements 
existing in the present own resources system”.119 Unsurprisingly, the 1994 
Own Resources Decision, which transposes into law the Protocol, further 
reduced the capping of the VAT base to 50% of GNP and provided for a 
gradual return to the limit of a 1% VAT resource call rate. 120 
This call rate was further reduced by the 2000 Own Resources 
Decision (to 0.75% as of 2002 and to 0.5% as of 2004), “in order further to 
continue the process of making allowance for each member state’s ability to 
contribute to the system of own resources and of correcting the regressive 
aspects of the current system for the least prosperous member states”.121 
With the new financial perspective, the European Council cut the call 
rate of the VAT resource from 0.5% to 0.3% as of 2007 onwards.122  
Figure 2.1 presents the evolution of the VAT resource and shows its 
sharp decline since 1995 in the share of the EU’s budget financing.123 
____________________________ 
119 See the Protocol on Economic and Social Cohesion attached to the Maastricht 
Treaty. It is interesting to note that exactly the same wording was repeated (para. 
8) in the Protocol on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion attached to the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe of 2004.  
120 See Council Decision 94/728/EC, Euratom of 31 October 1994 on the system of 
the European Communities’ own resources, OJ L 293, 12.11.1994. The cap at 50% of 
the VAT base, which is still applicable, was set from 1995 onwards for Greece, 
Spain, Ireland and Portugal, and in equal steps over the period 1995 to 1999 for the 
other member states. 
121 See Council Decision 2000/597/EC, Euratom of 29 September 2000 (op. cit.). 
122 See Council Decision 2007/436/EC/Euratom of 7 June 2007 (op. cit.), which is 
not yet in force, pending ratification by the member states. The constitutional 
implications of the Own Resources Decision are explained in footnote 9.  
123 It should be noted that the reduction of the VAT resource share in EU budget 
financing is partly explained by a lower call rate than the maximum authorised. 
See also the section “Is the size of the budget a major issue?”. 50 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
Figure 2.1 Evolution of the VAT resource in financing the EU budget 1992–2006 
 
Source: Own Resources Decisions and European Commission (2007l). 
 
If the objective of making the VAT resource the main item of EU 
budgetary revenue failed owing to the ‘sin of regressivity’, the aim of 
establishing a link with the Community taxpayer through this resource 
fared no better. After an initial possibility to calculate the VAT resource 
directly from taxable persons’ returns, the system was modified so as to 
make unnecessary any link with taxpayers, and hence with individual 
consumers and indeed citizens (see Box 2.1). Taxable persons are subject to 
the tax rules of their member states: they have no ‘fiscal’ liability vis-à-vis 
the EU budget.124 
____________________________ 
124 See also footnote 109. An indirect proof of the willingness of the member states 
to exclude any link whatsoever with taxable persons can be found in the 
declaration attached to the Brussels Treaty (the Treaty amending Certain Financial 
Provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Communities and of the Treaty 
establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European 
Communities (1975)), which sets up the European Court of Auditors. Concerning 
customs duties and the other levies, the declaration stated that the Court’s audit 
“shall not cover substantive transactions properly so called shown in the 
supporting documents which relate to such establishment; accordingly, the audit 
on the spot shall not be carried out by recourse to the debtor”.  RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 51 
 
Box 2.1  The VAT resource assessment base 
The determination of the assessment base for the VAT resource was 
introduced by Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No. 2892/77 of 19 
December 1977  implementing in respect of own resources accruing from 
value added tax the Decision of 21 April 1970 on the replacement of financial 
contributions from member states by the Communities’ own resources (OJ L 
336, 27.12.1977). Member states could either calculate the VAT assessment 
base directly from taxable persons’ tax returns (the returns method) or 
indirectly (the revenue method) by dividing net VAT receipts by the 
weighted average rate of VAT. This intermediate base had to be 
subsequently adjusted, with negative or positive compensations, in order to 
obtain a harmonised VAT base corresponding to the provisions in the Sixth 
Directive of 17 May 1977. The weighted average rate depends on statistical 
calculations to take account of the different VAT rates applicable to the 
various categories of taxable goods and services. Hence, the revenue method 
reconstructs a fictitious tax distinct from that actually paid by consumers in 
the various member states. The returns method proved to be less favourable 
to the member states (it was initially chosen only by Denmark and Ireland), 
as the VAT resource was not linked to VAT actually collected by the 
member states, but to VAT due (potentially higher than VAT collected). As a 
result, the revenue method became the practice. Council Regulation (EEC, 
Euratom) No. 1553/89 of 29 May 1989 on the definitive uniform 
arrangements for the collection of own resources accruing from value added 
tax (OJ L 155, 7.6.1989) fixed the revenue method as the definitive one. In 
this respect, a European Parliament report* raised what it considered a 
‘fundamental political question’: “Can Parliament tolerate the fact that 
revenue from VAT is being increasingly watered down to a national 
financial contribution following the necessary abandonment of the principle 
of the uniform VAT rate and can it accept that the establishment of the 
uniform VAT base is ultimately reduced to a statistical calculation? Or must 
every effort be made in connection with the calculation of the VAT base to 
revive the Communities’ own resources system and the financial autonomy 
of the Community which is dependent thereupon?” 
___________ 
* See the Report on behalf of the Committee on Budgets on the Commission’s proposal 
for a Regulation extending the term of validity of Regulation No. 2892/77 and on the 
report from the Commission on the implementation of Council Regulations Nos. 2891/77 
and 2892/77, A2-126/85, Rapporteur: P. Cornelissen, 21 October 1985, point 15, p. 13. 
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As remarked earlier, the downgrading of the VAT resource has been 
formally justified by its regressive impact. Nevertheless, it is curious to 
observe that the last cut in the call rate, which was decided upon in 2005, 
was made “in the interests of transparency and simplicity” while, at the 
same time, the Council decided a different call rate for four member states 
to reduce their budgetary burden.125 
This further reduction is actually only a confirmation of the tendency 
since 1988 to increase the GNI-based part of EU’s budget financing. One 
should not exclude the possibility that the specific interests of member 
states, aiming at diminishing their share in the financing of the budget, 
played a role in the downgrading of the VAT resource. In this connection, 
Table 2.2 evaluates the theoretical impact, by member state, of replacing the 
current VAT resource by the own resource based on GNI. 
 Member states with a share in total EU GNI that is higher (lower) 
than their share in the total EU-capped VAT base would lose (gain) from 
the replacement of the VAT resource by the GNI-based resource.126 As may 
be observed, most of the member states would benefit from the 
replacement of the VAT resource by the GNI resource. It is therefore no 
surprise that the Council concluded, “a broad majority of delegations are 
favourable to the idea of switching to a GNI-based system from the current 
system based on VAT receipts”.127 It should be pointed out that the overall 
impact of such a shift would be fairly limited at present, owing to the low 
share of the VAT-based own resource in the total financing of the EU 
budget.128 It seems clear, however, that the VAT resource is only being kept 
alive by the simple fact that a change in the current financing system 
requires the unanimous agreement of the 27 EU governments. 
 
____________________________ 
125 See Council Decision 2007/436/EC/Euratom of 7 June 2007 (op. cit.), the 
seventh successive para. introduced by “Whereas” and Art. 2(4). See also the 
section “The price of unanimity: A system of financial deals”. 
126 A ‘+’ (‘-’) in column 6 of Table 2.2 means a gain (loss) if the VAT resource is 
replaced by the GNI-based resource. 
127 See Ecofin Council Conclusions, 14429/04, Brussels, 16 November 2004(a), p. 9. 
128 This low impact is even accentuated by the ‘capping mechanism’, following 
which more than one-third of this resource is actually calculated on the basis of 
GNI.  
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Table 2.2 Impact by member state of replacing the VAT resource by the GNI-based resource (2005 EU budget) 
(in € million unless otherwise indicated) 
Member 
states 
VAT 
payments 
Share in 
total VAT 
based 
payments 
(= share in 
EU-capped 
VAT base) 
(%) 
GNI-based 
payments 
Share in total 
GNI-based 
payments 
(= share in EU 
GNI) (%) 
GNI 
payments 
required to 
replace VAT 
resource 
Difference 
by member 
state 
In % of total 
VAT- and GNI-
based payments 
(excl. UK rebate 
payments) 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6)=(1)-(5)  (7)=(6)/((1)+(3)) 
Czech Rep.  130.2  0.85  607.2 0.78  119.8  10.3  1.40 
Estonia 13.3 0.09 62.1 0.08  12.2  1.1  1.40 
Greece 276.5 1.81  1,289.5 1.66  254.5  22.0  1.40 
Spain 1,313.8  8.58  6,127.0 7.90  1,209.4 104.4  1.40 
Ireland 197.8 1.29 922.4  1.19  182.1  15.7  1.40 
Cyprus 20.2 0.13 94.0 0.12  18.6  1.6  1.40 
Luxembourg 36.8  0.24  171.6 0.22  33.9  2.9  1.40 
Hungary 130.9  0.85  610.4 0.79  120.5  10.4  1.40 
Malta 7.3  0.05  33.9 0.04  6.7  0.6  1.40 54 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
Poland 303.8 1.98  1,416.9 1.83  279.7  24.2  1.40 
Portugal 216.4  1.41 1,009.0 1.30  199.2  17.2  1.40 
Slovenia 42.7  0.28 198.9 0.26  39.3  3.4  1.40 
UK 2,948.1  19.25  13,748.9  17.72 2,713.8  234.4  1.40 
Netherlands 709.1  4.63  3,446.1 4.44  680.2  28.9  0.69 
France 2,458.8  16.06  12,275.7 15.82  2,423.0  35.8  0.24 
Austria 348.0 2.27 1,740.7 2.24  343.6  4.4  0.21 
Slovak Rep.  49.4  0.32  254.3 0.33  50.2  -0.8  -0.26 
Lithuania 26.1  0.17  136.7  0.18 27.0 -0.9  -0.57 
Latvia 14.8  0.10 78.4  0.10  15.5  -0.6  -0.69 
Germany 3,044.0  19.88 16,331.2  21.05 3,223.5  -179.5  -0.93 
Finland 209.2 1.37 1,123.0  1.45 221.7  -12.5  -0.94 
Sweden 388.7 2.54 2,100.7  2.71 414.6  -25.9  -1.04 
Italy 1,811.1  11.83  10,171.1  13.11 2,007.6  -196.5  -1.64 
Belgium 371.0  2.42 2,156.3  2.78 425.6  -54.6  -2.16 
Denmark 245.7  1.60  1,477.0 1.90  -45.9  -2.66 
Total 15,313.5  100.00  77,583.0 100.00  15,313.5  0.0  0.00 
Source: European Commission (2005d). 
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Concluding remarks 
In 1998 the Court of Auditors noted, 
T h e  V A T  r e s o u r c e  p o s e s  a  p r o b l e m  o f  c o n s i s t e n c y .  I f  i t  i s  t o  b e  
considered a contribution by the member states, it should logically 
have been abolished in 1988 and replaced by the GNP resource. If, on 
the other hand, it is meant to be a tax on the final consumption of 
European citizens, capping it in accordance with GNP may 
reasonably be questioned. Indeed, in the latter case, it should be 
considered a genuine own resource, and capping it would therefore 
not be justified because that would nullify its primary function. [The 
Court concluded,] A resource based on the taxable consumption of 
citizens only has a raison d’être if it is based directly on a tax base 
declared by the taxpayers.129  
These conclusions remain relevant today.  
Does a VAT-based tax have a future?  
Over the years, the European Parliament has been considered the main 
advocate of an EU tax, in particular a VAT-based resource. In 1981, in a 
context close to the exhaustion of available resources, the Parliament tried 
to avert a return to the pre-1970 system of national contributions by 
requesting that “VAT should no longer be collected on the basis of 
statistical estimates, but on the basis of tax declarations…so that this source 
of revenue becomes a veritable Community VAT…levied at separate rates, 
independent of the national VAT rates”. 130 This stance was pursued by 
Horst Langes who, as rapporteur for the Committee on Budgets, 
extensively developed the possible introduction of a VAT-based 
resource.131 These proposals finally led the Parliament, more than 10 years 
ago, to come out in favour of a new own resources system “guided by the 
____________________________ 
129 See European Court of Auditors (1998), paras 3.16 and 5.5.  
130 See European Parliament, Resolution of 9 April 1981 on the Community’s own 
resources, para 13. 
131 See the European Parliament, Report on a New System of Own Resources for the 
European Union, A3-0060/94, Rapporteur: H. Langes, 7 February 1994(a) and the 
Report on the System of Own Resources in the European Union, A3-0228/94, 
Rapporteur: H. Langes, 8 April 1994(b).  56 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
criteria of direct revenue-raising, equal, direct and equitable European 
taxation, transparency and identifiability”.132 And, despite some hesitations 
expressed in the past concerning the regressive effect of VAT,133 it decided 
to propose more specifically the creation, in place of the existing VAT and 
GNP resources, of a new source of revenue “which should take the form of 
a specified percentage of VAT … directly imposed on the basis of tax 
declarations and denoted as such on invoices”.134 
The Parliament gave several reasons for such a choice. VAT was 
considered to represent the most reliable basis for own revenue, to be 
politically controllable, well known and familiar to the taxpayer and 
capable of being harmonised throughout the Community. According to the 
Parliament, a true VAT resource would represent a simple and transparent 
way of establishing a link between the taxpayer and the destination of the 
tax. VAT revenue “is politically defensible as its yield is dependent on 
economic activity and economic growth” and, interestingly, “if national 
economies stagnate…both the member states and the Union would have to 
economise”.135 Moreover, this would help to correct misperceptions about 
the costs of the EU. A fiscal VAT resource would also have the advantage 
of being flexible, as it could be increased as the range of tasks expands. 
The position of the Parliament has evolved since then; its support for 
a tax-based resource has become less clear-cut, probably as a result of a 
certain degree of realism.136 For example, in 1999 the Parliament reaffirmed 
____________________________ 
132 See European Parliament, Resolution of 9 February 1994 on the system of the 
Communities’ own resources, the amendment introduced as new Recital 17a.  
133 See footnote 115. 
134 See European Parliament, Resolution of 21 April 1994 on a new system of own 
resources for the European Union, paras 9 and 10.  
135 See European Parliament 1994(a), point 24, p. 15. According to the rapporteur, 
the consequence of a genuine own resources system would be that eventual 
surpluses would remain at the EU’s disposal (now they correspondingly reduce 
the own resources call rate for the following year) and unforeseen deficits would 
be the responsibility of the Union to be met by its own credit financing, although 
temporarily and under strict conditions. According to the present rules, EU 
revenue and payment appropriations must be in balance (see footnote 11). 
136 The Parliament observed recently that all its “efforts to use the actual VAT 
returns to determine the assessment base to be used for the VAT resource (‘returns 
method’) instead of the harmonised base calculated by applying an average 
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that “the budget should be based on new own revenue not constituting 
member state contributions”.137 Nevertheless, one year later, a large 
majority did not follow its budgetary committee whose intention was to 
support initiatives “for a possible introduction of a European tax as a direct 
revenue which does not lead to additional costs for the taxpayer and could 
strengthen the link between the Union and its citizens”.138 
However that may be, in its 2004 own resources report, the 
Commission in practice endorsed the Langes proposal. The Commission 
expressed its view as below: 
A genuinely fiscal VAT resource would be implemented through an 
EU rate as part of the national VAT rate paid by taxpayers. It would 
imply a specific percentage rate of VAT that would be levied for the 
benefit of the EU. The rate would be incorporated in, and levied 
together with, the national rate and thus on the same taxable base. 
Citizens would not have to support an additional tax burden as the 
C o m m u n i t y  r a t e  w o u l d  b e  o f f s e t  b y  a n  e q u i v a l e n t  d e c r e a s e  o f  t h e  
national VAT rate. For example, if the national VAT rate is 21%, and 
assuming the introduction of an EU rate of 1%, the national rate would 
come to 20%. The total VAT rate levied would still be 21%. For 
visibility purposes, the Community VAT and national VAT should 
appear as separate taxes on the invoice or receipt that a taxable person 
provides to his customer.139 
____________________________ 
 
weighted rate on the total net revenue (‘revenue method’) were in vain, with the 
result that the VAT resource changed from a genuine own resource with a strong 
direct link to European citizens to a purely statistical device for calculating a 
contribution of a member state”. See European Parliament, Resolution of 29 March 
2007 (op. cit.), para. D. Concerning the method of calculation of the VAT resource, 
see Box 2.1. 
137 See European Parliament, Resolution of 11 March 1999 (op. cit.), para. 9.  
138 See the report by Jutta Haug, European Parliament, Report on the situation 
concerning the European Union’s own resources in 2001, A5-0238/2001, 26 June 2001, 
p. 8, para. 11. At that time, the Belgian government expressed its intention of 
defining a new budgetary framework over the medium term, during the Belgian 
presidency, which could lead to discussions on the desirability of a European tax. 
139 See European Commission, Technical Annex, Financing the European Union, 
Commission report on the operation of the own resources system, Vol. II, COM(2004) 505 
final, Brussels, 14 July 2004(g), p. 54. The Commission also observed,  
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Thus, member states would transfer to the EU budget the same 
percentage of each national VAT base. According to the Commission, the 
implementation of a VAT-based resource would be feasible over the 
medium term, with the intention being to replace the current VAT resource 
by a genuinely tax-based own resource by 2014. 
In its 2004 own resources report, the Commission also developed 
seven criteria for assessing own resources.140 While the Commission 
observes that “it is virtually impossible for individual own resources to 
satisfy all criteria”,141 it seems clear that a real fiscal VAT resource would 
easily meet criteria such as visibility and simplicity (the Community VAT 
and national VAT could appear as separate taxes on the invoice or receipt 
that a taxable person provides to his/her customer), financial autonomy (it 
would be possible to create independent revenues for the Community as 
already proposed by the Commission in 1965), sufficiency and stability 
(VAT is a buoyant and relatively stable source of revenue), efficient 
allocation of resources and cost-effectiveness (VAT exists already and it is 
the sole European tax for which the base harmonisation is quite advanced. 
As a result, no modification of the structure of prices or of the behaviour of 
economic agents should be expected). 
If the above six criteria are doubtless met by a fiscal VAT resource, 
what about ‘equity’ and the concerns expressed in the past about the 
____________________________ 
 
Tax base harmonisation in the field of VAT is quite advanced and it is a 
sufficient and stable source of revenue. A fiscal VAT resource would make 
the financing of the EU highly visible to EU citizens. It would also be 
evolutionary, since it would entail a reform of existing provisions rather than 
the introduction of a completely new resource. From an administrative point 
of view, its introduction would not present any insurmountable difficulties. 
…Strengthening the direct link of citizens to the budget would also help 
focussing expenditure debates on substance rather than on purely ‘national’ 
budget ‘net positions’. (European Commission, Vol. I, 2004f, p. 13) 
It is worth mentioning that already in 1998 the Commission considered that among 
the different options for a tax-based own resource, “[o]nly actual VAT, as proposed 
by the European Parliament in 1994, would appear to be a solution which could be 
considered for the medium term”.  See the speech by Jacques Santer to the 
European Parliament (Santer, 1998). 
140 See European Commission (Vol. II, 2004g), Annex I. 
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regressive effects of VAT? In this respect, one should first note that, as 
shown by Figure 2.2, the structure and evolution of member states’ taxation 
systems record a predominance of indirect taxes. Furthermore, this 
tendency has been accentuated by the upward trend in the taxation of 
consumption since 2001, both for the EU-25 as a whole and for the 
subgroup of the EU-15.142  
Figure 2.2 Evolution of direct/indirect taxation (EU-25 and EU-10 – GDP 
weighted average), 1995–2004 (%) 
6
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Direct Taxes as % of GDP-EU 10
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Source: European Commission (2006f). 
 
One might therefore wonder why VAT regressivity, which is not 
uncontroversial,143 should be a major issue for the EU budget, when this is 
apparently not the case for the almost 50 times larger national budgets.  
____________________________ 
142 For an analysis of the taxation structure, see European Commission, Structures of 
the taxation systems in the European Union: 1995–2004, Doc. Taxud 
e4/2006/doc/3201, Brussels, 2006(f). 
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In addition, if there is no apparent reason to differentiate between the 
types of taxation financing the national budgets and the EU budget, there is 
equally no reason to discriminate between different indirect taxes. If VAT is 
regressive, it is just as regressive as other indirect taxes such as customs 
duties, which, moreover, also automatically increase the final price as their 
value is naturally incorporated into a product’s price, which is subject to 
subsequent VAT taxation. Nobody has thought of accusing customs duties 
of regressivity, even when they ensured the financing of a larger share of 
the EU budget.  
Equity should be assessed on the assumption that the ‘owners’ of the 
EU budget are the European citizens (and taxpayers) and not just their 
governments. In this context, a fiscal VAT resource will clearly fulfil the 
criterion of ‘horizontal equity’ (final consumption could be taxed 
everywhere in the EU, at the same percentage, for the benefit of the EU 
budget). Concerning ‘vertical equality’ or the citizens’ ability to pay, one 
could first observe the relative small size of the EU budget. Second, nothing 
would prevent lower VAT rates from being set on essential goods.144 
Finally, any budgetary imbalances should in principle find a solution on 
the expenditure side of the budget. This is in line with the Fontainebleau 
principle, according to which “expenditure policy is ultimately the essential 
means of resolving the question of budgetary imbalances”.145 
It therefore seems difficult to find an objective reason to rule out a 
fiscal VAT resource on the grounds of a supposed lack of equity. If, 
however, the above considerations tend to support the technical feasibility 
of a fiscal VAT resource, one should also consider whether such a resource 
would be at all politically acceptable.  
____________________________ 
144 This idea was suggested for example by the European Parliament report 
(1994b), point 26, p. 15. The rapporteur also envisaged, in view of greater tax 
fairness, the possible introduction of an adjustment mechanism based on GNP (see 
point 30). 
145 See European Council, Conclusions of the Session of the European Council at 
Fontainebleau, 25-26 June 1984. The Council Decision 2000/597/EC, Euratom of 29 
September 2000 (op. cit.) reaffirmed that budgetary imbalances should be resolved, 
to the extent possible, by means of expenditure policy (see the 11th successive para. 
introduced by “Whereas”). See also the section “The UK rebate, at the crossroads 
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The option of superseding the present national contributions by a real 
fiscal resource to finance the EU budget has been regularly raised in 
different fora for at least 40 years.146 Many proposals have been made but 
none has found the required unanimous support. The issue of an EU tax 
was last discussed in the context of the European Convention. The idea 
again proved controversial. On one side were the advocates of the principle 
of people consenting to taxes, which is at the heart of democracy; on the 
other side were those who expressed reservations because of the 
differences in taxation in the member states and the danger of providing 
Eurosceptic public opinion with more ammunition. Indeed, it has been 
claimed that “an EU tax would inevitably be seen as an additional burden, 
would be deeply unpopular in its own right, and would reduce popular 
support for the EU”,147 and that “it is through maintaining the current 
dominant role of the member states for budget revenues, rather than 
providing for a European tax or participation in national taxes, that 
transparency and legitimacy of budget revenues is best secured”.148 
It would be naïve to expect that the idealistic objective of establishing 
a link with the European citizen would take precedence over fundamental 
issues such as member states’ fiscal sovereignty or more prosaic ones, such 
as the impact on burden-sharing. In this respect, the simulations provided 
by the Commission show that for several member states there is a 
considerable difference between their share in a fiscal resource based on 
____________________________ 
146 In 1965, the Commission proposed to allow the European Parliament (once 
directly elected) to create independent sources of revenue for the Community (see 
European Commission, 1965). Among others, the issue has been examined for 
example by the study group on the role of public finance in European integration 
chaired by D. MacDougal (European Commission, 1977) and by the Reflection 
Group for preparing the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference chaired by Carlos 
Westendorp. For a review of possible tax-based EU own resources see Cattoir 
(2004). 
147 See European Convention, “Discussion circle” on own resources: Response from 
Lord Tomlinson to the questions put to the Discussion Circle on Own Resources, 
Working Document 2, CONV 654/03, Brussels, 8 April 2003(b). 
148 See European Convention, “Discussion circle” on own resources: Note from 
Peter Hain, Member of the Convention – Comments on Secretariat Note describing 
the system of own resources (Cercle 3, WD 01), Working Document 4, Brussels, 11 
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VAT and both the present VAT resource and a levy based on GNI.149 It is 
maybe for this very reason that at the Council, where a broad majority is in 
favour of a unique GNI-based system, “delegations did not express support 
for the Commission’s idea of introducing a new tax-based EU own 
resource”.150 
The European Parliament does not indulge in vain hopes either. A 
recent Resolution recognised “that the time for a new European tax has not 
yet come in the short term”. The Parliament called therefore for a gradual 
approach, in two stages “but which should form part of a single decision”, 
whereby in the short term the financing of the EU budget would be 
ensured by traditional own resources and the GNI resource, abolishing the 
VAT resource in its current form. The Parliament “recognises that the GNI 
resource is less visible for citizens but equitable in relating contributions to 
the general level of prosperity of member states and an expression of 
solidarity between them”. It “emphasises, however, the temporary nature 
of such a phase, in that its sole aim would be to prepare the ground for the 
introduction of a genuinely new own resources system” in a second phase, 
“based on a tax already levied in the member states, the idea being that this 
tax, partly or in full, would be fed directly into the EU budget as a genuine 
own resource, thus establishing a direct link between the Union and 
European taxpayers”.151 
This recent position of the European Parliament is actually in line 
with its previous statements,152 in particular concerning the fact that a “new 
system must not increase overall public expenditure nor the tax burden for 
citizens”, that “the ceiling of 1.24% of GNI which already allows for a 
sizeable margin of manoeuvre” should be maintained and, finally, that “a 
reform of the structure of EU revenue and a reform of the structure of EU 
expenditure have to go hand in hand”.153 
____________________________ 
149 See European Commission (Vol. II, 2004g), pp. 55–56. 
150 See the Ecofin Council Conclusions (2004a), p. 9.  
151 See European Parliament, Resolution of 29 March 2007 (op. cit.), paras 10, 23, 26, 
37 and 38.  
152 See for example European Parliament, Resolution of 11 March 1999 (op. cit.).  
153 See European Parliament, Resolution of 29 March 2007 (op. cit.), paras 30, 32 
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The position of the Parliament has nonetheless evolved on one 
fundamental issue, namely fiscal sovereignty. In 1994, the Parliament 
stressed that  
the transfer to the Community of an increasing number of political 
powers in fields such as agricultural policy, external trade, internal 
trade, development aid, transport and social policy and economic and 
monetary policy should go hand in hand with corresponding action 
to provide the Union with democratic legislative powers, which 
would include both tax and budgetary powers and appropriate 
financial autonomy (‘no representation without taxation’).154 
It took a similar position a few years later, by claiming full budgetary 
powers over both expenditure and revenue and emphasising that 
increasing the EU’s financial endowment “also means giving the Union 
clear responsibility for the relevant fiscal legislation, including appropriate 
power to raise revenue”.155 Concerning such a claim for EU fiscal 
independence, a recent Resolution has since dispelled any suspicion. The 
Parliament has indeed stressed full respect for the principle of the fiscal 
sovereignty of the member states, “who might, however, authorise the 
Union, for a limited period to be revoked at any time, to benefit directly 
from a certain share of a tax as is the case in most member states with 
regional or local authorities”.156 
This result is the likely one of a pragmatic approach. The Parliament 
might hope that giving up any claim to EU direct fiscal sovereignty would 
____________________________ 
154 See European Parliament, Resolution of 21 April 1994 (op. cit.), para. 21.  
155 See European Parliament, Resolution of 11 March 1999 (op. cit.), paras 8 and 9. 
The principle of giving to the European Parliament full budgetary powers in both 
expenditure and revenue was reaffirmed in 2000, in the framework of the 
Intergovernmental Conference, where the Parliament observed that the level of the 
Union’s own resources “should be fixed by Parliament acting in codecision with 
the Council” (See European Parliament, Resolution of 13 April 2000 containing the 
European Parliament’s proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference, para. 
51.4). 
156 See European Parliament, Resolution of 29 March 2007 (op. cit.), para. 29. In this 
way, the Parliament finally did not endorse the definition of ‘own resources’ as a 
“source of finance separate and independent of the member states” and a “tax 
revenue assigned once and for all to the Community“, which was given by the 
Lamassoure report (see footnote 108). On the issue of fiscal sovereignty, see 
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facilitate an increase in the Parliament’s powers on another sensitive issue: 
its present very limited role in revenue arrangements, in particular 
concerning the sources and the volume of the EU’s budget revenue. 
Concluding remarks 
It seems rather clear that, in comparison with other possible forms of 
taxation, VAT has an advantage over other taxes as a potentially genuine 
fiscal resource for the EU budget. The key issue in this regard seems to be 
how (and by whom) the call rate will finally be set and whether the EU 
institutions will have a direct power of control over the taxable persons. For 
the member states, the EU’s VAT future may represent a greater challenge 
for their fiscal sovereignty than for the financial impact on their 
contributions.  
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3. EXCEPTION AS THE RULE, TO EACH HIS 
OWN 
f the EU budget suffers from a number of weaknesses, they do not 
derive from conceptual ‘mistakes’ made by those (the Commission and 
the member states) who have set up the current architecture. These 
peculiarities of the EU budget simply reflect the incompleteness of 
European integration and the fact that the EU is still pre-eminently an 
intergovernmental organisation. Although much more advanced than 
traditional international organisations like the United Nations, it is still far 
from models like the US. Thus, a reform of the EU budget cannot be 
conceived in isolation, as a technical question confined to specialists. 
These weaknesses, of which some examples are provided below, are 
the inevitable result of a series of tortuous horse-tradings among member 
states. The evolution of the EU’s budget financing shows that, contrary to 
the expectations of the EEC Treaty, not only has it not evolved from a 
system of national contributions towards one of genuine EU own resources, 
but also owing to the different exceptions and specific arrangements 
introduced over the years, the system is in reality the outcome of merely 
intergovernmental deals. 
The price of unanimity: A system of financial deals 
The history of EU financing is full of examples where specific arrangements 
have been introduced to accommodate the claims of one member state or 
another, the UK rebate being just the best known. Each new financial 
perspective deal provides the opportunity to include specific adjustments 
to both revenue and expenditure. The consequence is a system that suffers 
from instability and is not applicable to all member states in the same way. 
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As the Commission points out, “Past adjustments to accommodate specific 
interests have added to the system’s opaqueness.”157 Along the same lines, 
the European Parliament has observed that the derogation regimes that 
have been added to the current own resources system “have only made it 
more complex, more opaque for citizens and increasingly less equitable and 
have led to a financing system which has resulted in unacceptable 
inequalities between member states”.158 
Here are some examples of corrections and derogations on the 
revenue side: 
•  The UK rebate, applicable since 1986, consists of reducing by two-
thirds the negative balance between the UK’s contribution to the 
budget and the EU’s expenditure on the UK.  
•  In principle, the cost of the UK rebate is to be borne by the other 
member states through a corresponding increase in their 
contributions to the EU budget. Yet since the entry into force of the 
rebate, Germany has been allowed to pay only two-thirds of its 
normal share, the balance being divided among the other member 
states on the same scale. As of 1 January 2002, the European Council 
again altered the scale for financing the UK rebate, by reducing the 
share paid by Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden to a 
quarter of what it ought to be. Consequently, these reductions are 
again made up by all the other member states.159 
•  Because of the enlargement, the UK rebate was expected to rise 
considerably.160 After an (unsuccessful) attempt by the Luxembourg 
____________________________ 
157 See European Commission (Vol. I, 2004f), p. 8. 
158 See European Parliament, Resolution of 8 June 2005 (op. cit.), para. L.  
159 As a result, in 2007, Germany bears only 6% of the rebate. France, Italy and 
Spain altogether bear more than 60%.  
160 As the UK rebate is based on the UK’s share in total EU expenditure (in the 
member states), any increase in the expenditure (in other member states) has the 
effect of increasing simultaneously the volume of the UK rebate. The Commission 
estimated that if the correction mechanism had remained unchanged, the rebate 
would have increased during the period 2007–13 from €4.6 to €7.1 billion/year. 
The UK would have become (together with Finland) the smallest net contributor to 
the EU budget. At the Berlin European Council (in March 1999), when the 
envisaged enlargement to 10 new member states was unanimously agreed, the UK 
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presidency to limit the ‘damages’161 the UK government finally 
agreed to reduce the impact of the rebate by €10.5 billion for the 
period 2007–13.162 Nevertheless, the UK will not participate in the 
financing of the costs of enlargement related to agriculture and will 
only fully participate in other enlargement-related expenditure after a 
phasing-in period between 2009 and 2011. 
•  With the intention of limiting the contributions of less well-off 
member states, since 1988 a member state’s VAT base has been 
capped at a percentage of its GDP to counter the regressive effect of 
the VAT resource.163  
•  In the framework of the new financial perspective agreement, the 
European Council concluded that four countries should benefit from 
reduced rates of call of the VAT resource to reduce their respective 
budgetary burden. Hence, during the 2007–13 period the rate of call 
of the VAT resource for Austria is fixed at 0.225%, for Germany at 
0.15% and for the Netherlands and Sweden at 0.10%. 
•  Again, to reduce the budgetary burden for these countries, the 
European Council also concluded that for the period 2007–13 the 
____________________________ 
 
obtained an agreement that enlargement-related expenditure would be taken into 
account when calculating the UK rebate, thus shielding it from most of the 
financial consequences of enlargement. 
161 The Luxembourg presidency proposed to set the UK rebate at its nominal 
average over the seven-year period immediately prior to the most recent 
enlargement (1997–2003), i.e. at around €4.6 billion per year. This proposal was 
justified by the need to take due account of the substantial changes since the 1984 
Fontainebleau agreement such as the considerable decrease in agricultural 
expenditure as a proportion of the budget, the increase in cohesion expenditure as 
a result of enlargement to states with substantially lower levels of prosperity and 
the rise in the UK’s relative prosperity to amongst the highest in the Union (see 
European Council, Presidency Note, “Financial Perspective 2007–2013”, 10090/05, 
Brussels, 15 June 2005(b)). 
162 The UK rebate is thus expected to reach approximately €6 billion averaged over 
2007–13. This amount will be adjusted further upwards in case of further 
enlargement before 2013, except for the accession of Romania and Bulgaria. 
163 On the regressive effect of VAT, see footnote 115. The percentage of capping, 
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Netherlands shall benefit from a gross annual reduction in its GNI 
contribution of €605 million and Sweden from a gross annual 
reduction in its GNI contribution of €150 million.164 
•  As of 2001, the percentage of collection costs refunded to member 
states in return for collecting the traditional own resources was 
increased from 10% to 25%. Although of general application, this 
measure was intended to ‘lighten’ the contributions to the EU budget 
of some member states.165 
Table 3.1 shows that for the financing of the EU budget, exceptions on 
the revenue side are applied in one way or another to no fewer than 16 
member states. 
____________________________ 
164 These gross reductions will be financed by all member states, i.e. including the 
Netherlands and Sweden. It was only at the end of long negotiations that a political 
agreement could be reached in April 2007 as to whether these gross reductions 
should (in the view of the UK government) or should not (in the view of the other 
member states) enter into the calculation of the UK rebate. The UK has finally 
agreed that these gross reductions shall have no impact on the calculation of the 
rebate.  
165 See European Parliament Resolution of 29 March 2007 (op. cit.), para. M; see also 
European Commission (Vol. II, 2004g), p. 14. It is indeed hard to believe that such a 
high rate of refund justifies compensation for the cost of the administrative service. 
The refund rate has been set irrespective of the actual collection costs (how to 
calculate the exact costs for each member state would probably become a 
contentious issue) and the Commission’s proposal to link this increase to specific 
objectives (like the fight against fraud) was rejected by the member states. The 
main beneficiaries of this increase are Germany, the UK and the Netherlands. 
Between 1992 and 2005, they have together collected on average 58% of all customs 
duties. In 2005, they received some €2.2 billion as collection costs, plus interest, 
penalties and late interest charged to the debtors. It is worth noting that, as a way 
of increasing the EU’s own resources, the Commission proposed (although 
unsuccessfully) discontinuing this refund 20 years ago (see European Commission, 
Report by the Commission to the Council and Parliament on the Financing of the 
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Table 3.1 Specific arrangements applicable to some member states on revenue 
(2007-13) 
Member states  Capping of 
the VAT 
base to 
50% of 
GNI 
Reduced 
call rate of 
the VAT 
resource 
Abatements  Reduced 
participation in 
bearing the 
cost of the UK 
rebate 
Bulgaria x       
Czech Republic  x       
Germany   x   x 
Estonia x      
Greece x       
Spain x       
Ireland x       
Cyprus x      
Luxembourg x       
Malta x       
Netherlands   x x  x 
Austria   x    x 
Portugal x       
Slovenia x       
Sweden   x  x  x 
UK     x   
Source: Council Decision 2007/436/EC/Euratom of 7 June 2007. 
On the expenditure side, at the European Council of December 2005 
supplementary amounts worth €11.2 billion were granted, for different 
reasons, to a number of regions. In this respect, the European Parliament 
has stressed that of the 46 articles determining expenditure under the 
heading of cohesion for growth and employment, “a full 20 are ‘additional 
provisions’ handing out ‘Christmas presents’ freely to various member 
states or regions”.166 Table 3.2 summarises these special arrangements.  
____________________________ 
166 See European Parliament, Resolution of 29 March 2007 (op. cit.), para. 13. 70 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
Table 3.2 Specific measures agreed by the European Council in December 2005 on 
expenditure 
€865 million for the nuclear power plant Ignalina (LT) and 
€375 million for the nuclear power plant Bohunice (SK) 
Earmarked for 
projects 
€200 million for the peace process in Northern Ireland (UK) 
€879 million for five Polish Objective 2 regions (€107 per 
citizen) 
€140 million for a Hungarian region (Közép-Magyarország) 
€200 million for Prague 
€100 million for the Canary Islands 
€150 million for the Austrian border regions 
€75 million for Bavaria 
€50 million for Ceuta and Melilla (ES) 
€225 million for the eastern German Länder 
€136 million for the most remote regions (€35 per citizen) 
Earmarked for 
regions 
€150 million for the Swedish regions under the 
Competitiveness and Employment Objective 
€2,000 million for Spain, to be distributed freely among the 
Structural Fund Objectives 
€1,400 million for Italy (predefined distribution) 
€100 million for France (Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment Objective) 
€47 million for Estonia (€35 per citizen)  
Special funds for 
member states 
€81 million for Lithuania (€35 per citizen) 
€1,350 million for Austria 
€820 million for Sweden 
€500 million for Ireland 
€460 million for Finland 
€500 million for Italy 
€320 million for Portugal 
€100 million for France 
Additional 
payments from 
rural 
development 
€20 million for Luxembourg 
Source: European Parliament, Resolution of 29 March 2007 (op. cit.), extract from the Annex 
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Concluding remarks 
The European Parliament has recently remarked that the “numerous 
exceptions on the revenue side and its compensation gifts to certain 
member states on the expenditure side, is the clearest proof of the complete 
failure of the current system”.167 Indeed, in the place of an own resources 
system the EU budget is financed through a complex arrangement of 
financial deals on a country-by-country basis. These deals, negotiated in a 
context where unanimity is required, are pre-eminently based on what the 
individual governments consider their national interest. In this respect, the 
priority is often to achieve ‘acceptable’ net balances rather than specific 
policy objectives. The focus on budgetary balances tends to overwhelm 
other policy-oriented considerations.168  
In need of more than one GNI? 
The GNI underlies important decisions on the EU’s finances and the 
utilisation of statistics as ‘accounting data’ made by the EU budget is 
unique in the statistical context. This is true on the revenue side, where 
total own resources are fixed as a percentage of GNI, since the GNI 
resource constitutes the main source of financing of the EU budget and, 
finally, the same statistical categories on the basis of the GNI are used in 
the calculation of the VAT resource.169 It is also true on the expenditure 
side, where the GNI (or GDP, from which it is derived) determines the 
member states’ eligibility for the cohesion fund and the regions’ eligibility 
for funding from the structural funds (under the convergence objective), as 
well as the corresponding financing packages. Moreover, the government 
deficits and debts of member states are monitored in the framework of the 
excessive deficit procedure through reference values based on the GDP.170 
____________________________ 
167 Ibid., para. 6. 
168 For the concept of budgetary balances, see the section “Estimating the benefits, a 
facile solution”. 
169 The VAT resource is basically calculated by dividing the total net VAT revenue 
collected by the weighted average rate of the VAT. The establishment of the VAT 
weighted-average rate requires a breakdown of transactions by statistical category 
from national accounts, such as final consumption of private households, 
intermediate consumption and gross fixed capital formation. See also Box 2.1.  
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Since it plays such a key role in the EU budget, the legitimacy of the 
GNI/GDP needs to be beyond dispute, and particularly its use according to 
the most refined standards and the consequent reliability, exhaustiveness 
and comparability of the data that are produced by the national statistical 
o f f i c e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  E U  r u l e s .  A s  h a s  b e e n  o b s e r v e d  b y  t h e  C o u r t  o f  
Auditors,  “[o]ne might expect that macro-economic aggregates would 
always be used in their most complete form”.171 Moreover, “when statistics 
– gross domestic product or inflation, for example – have a financial 
impact, accuracy and comparability are vital”.172 (See also Box 3.1.) 
Box 3.1  European statistics 
The EC Treaty states that “the production of Community statistics shall 
conform to impartiality, reliability, objectivity, scientific independence”.* 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 322/97 of 17 February 1997 on Community 
Statistics (OJ L 52, 22.2.1997) has established a legislative framework for the 
systematic and programmed production of Community statistics, the so-
called ‘Statistical Law’. This Regulation also defines (Art. 10) the principles 
governing Community statistics. In addition, there is a self-regulatory Code 
of Practice. The Code was prepared and endorsed by the national statistical 
institutes. It was promulgated in the Commission recommendation of 25 
May 2005 on the independence, integrity and accountability of the national 
and Community statistical authorities. The Code consists of 15 principles to 
be applied in connection with the production of Community statistics. It has 
a dual purpose: on the one hand, to improve trust and confidence in the 
statistical authorities by proposing certain institutional and organisational 
arrangements and, on the other hand, to reinforce the quality of the statistics 
they produce and disseminate, by promoting the coherent application of the 
best international statistical principles, methods and practices by all 
producers of official statistics in Europe. The Code of Practice establishes the 
principle of professional independence in the following terms: “[T]he 
professional independence of statistical authorities from other policy, 
regulatory or administrative departments and bodies, as well as from 
private sector operators, ensures the credibility of European Statistics”.** 
Eurostat is the Community authority responsible for carrying out the tasks 
devolving on the Commission for producing Community statistics. 
____________________________ 
171 See European Court of Auditors (1998), para. 3.17. 
172 See Eurostat, Quality Work and Quality Assurance within Statistics, 1999 edition, 
European Commission, Brussels, p. 3. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 73 
 
_____________ 
* See Art. 285(2) of the EC Treaty introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty, the Treaty 
amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts) (1997). 
** See European Commission, Communication on the Independence, Accountability and 
Integrity of the National and Community Statistical Authorities, COM(2005) 217 final, 
Brussels, 25 May 2005(e). 
In 1996, a new (1995) version of the European System of Integrated 
Economic Accounts (ESA 95) was adopted.173 The new system was meant 
to “bring an improvement in Community statistics and make them more 
consistent…[and enable] the financing of the Community budget to be met 
more adequately”.174 Yet, the legislation expressly prevented this new ESA 
from being used for the purposes of own resources until a new decision on 
own resources had been adopted. This was because the Council was aware 
of the probability “that the new system will involve an increase in 
Community GNP and a change in the relationships between member 
states’ GNPs”.175 
Indeed, the GNI (ESA 95) was actually some 2% higher in volume 
when compared with the GNP (the former ESA). The effect on the global 
amount of resources for the EU budget was ‘neutralised’ through specific 
arrangements, but the ‘freeze’ of ESA 95 in the framework of own resources 
did result in some significant distributional consequences in the burden-
sharing among member states.176 
____________________________ 
173 The 1995 version of the ESA was introduced by Council Regulation (EC) No. 
2223/96 of 25 June 1996 (op. cit.), p. 1. 
174 See European Council, Presidency Note, “Progress Report on Statistics”, 
7057/95, 15 May 1995, p. 2. 
175 Ibid. 
176 The potential increase in the GNP if estimated according to ESA 95 was 
confirmed by a calculation made by the Commission in 2001 (see European 
Commission, 2001). This would have represented a theoretical supplementary 
amount of some €6 billion of own resources. The Own Resources Decision (Council 
Decision 2000/597/EC, Euratom of 29 September 2000, op. cit., Art. 3) maintained 
unchanged the amount of financial resources put at the disposal of the 
Communities by reducing the own resources ceiling from 1.27% (GNP) to 1.24% 
(GNI), on the basis of a formula of conversion between the old and the new ESA. 
For the period 1998–2000, the plus/minus differences between member states 
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The ESA 95 was first applied to the EU own resources in 2002, 
although with the explicit reservation that if future modifications to the 
ESA 95 resulted in significant changes in the GNI, the decision concerning 
whether these modifications should apply to the EU own resources would 
be taken by the Council, acting unanimously.177 As a result, a principle of 
duality between a ‘true’ GNI and a ‘surrogate’ for own resources purposes 
was established. Although there is no reason statistical changes to improve 
the ESA methodology should not apply in the own resources area. 
For example, the GNI version used for the purposes of own resources 
excludes the subdivision of financial intermediation services indirectly 
measured (FISIM),178 for both the establishment of the overall ceiling and 
____________________________ 
 
amounted globally to €1 billion, with France being the biggest winner (€560 million 
less than theoretically due if ESA 95 had been applied) and the UK being the main 
loser (€701 million in excess). 
177 See Council Decision 2000/597/EC, Euratom of 29 September 2000 (op. cit.), 
Art. 2(7). A similar provision has been inserted into the new Own Resources 
Decision (see Art. 2(7) of Council Decision 2007/436/EC/Euratom of 7 June 2007, 
op. cit.). The Council has again reserved itself the right to decide whether (and not 
when, as proposed by the Commission) the modifications to the ESA methodology 
should apply to the own resources. 
178 Financial intermediaries provide services for which they charge implicitly by 
paying or charging different rates of interest to borrowers and lenders. In this 
situation, the national accounts must use an indirect measure, the FISIM, of the 
value of the services for which the intermediaries do not charge. In principle, 
FISIM output should be allocated among the various users of the services for 
which no explicit charges are made, and therefore in national accounts treated as 
intermediate consumption by enterprises, as final consumption by households, 
general government and non-profit institutions serving households or as exports to 
non-residents. This would ensure that the levels of GDP and GNI take account of 
FISIM as for any other type of output. But in practice, it may be difficult to find a 
method of allocating FISIM among different users in a way that is conceptually 
satisfactory from an economic viewpoint and for which the requisite data are also 
available. National statistical offices have been required to allocate FISIM in 
national accounts since 2005. For a review of the topic, see European Commission, 
Report Concerning the Allocation of Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly 
Measured (FISIM) containing a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the results of the 
trial calculations for allocating and calculating FISIM as described in the Council 
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the GNI resource to be paid by each member state. This is so even though 
“it is broadly recognised that, from a theoretical point of view, allocating 
FISIM would improve ESA methodology as more accurate GDP levels 
could be obtained: GDP would include the entire value added generated by 
financial intermediaries, and not just the part (varying significantly 
between member states) corresponding to commissions and fees directly 
invoiced to customers”.179 
In particular, to the extent that FISIM are recorded as final 
consumption (rather than intermediate consumption) and net exports, GDP 
levels increase. It has been estimated that the impact of allocating FISIM to 
GDP (and GNI) would correspond to an increase of 1.3% (weighted 
average of the countries). Still, it should be stressed that this increase is 
different from member state to member state.180 Here again the issue is that 
a more accurate comparison of GDP levels within the EU would inevitably 
represent a potential change in the allocation key of the GNI resource. 
The European Parliament has recently expressed concern at such a 
‘dual’ GNI.181 As the European Court of Auditors observed, a discretionary 
use of the statistical data “offends against the principle of the impartiality 
____________________________ 
 
Regulation (EC) No. 448/98 of 16 February 1998, COM(2002) 333/F, Brussels, 21 June 
2002(b). 
179 See European Commission (2002b), p. 4. 
180 Ibid., pp. 4 and 9–18. It should be observed, incidentally, that this potential 
increase is close to the overall value of the EU budget.  
181 On the allocation of FISIM, the Parliament has regretted “that the Commission 
has so far not submitted a proposal to the Council to apply those modifications 
when calculating the own resources” and that “the Commission evidently takes a 
different approach from that taken to including illegal activities in GNI…which are 
included in the calculation of own resources although uniform application by the 
member states is not ensured and the Commission has therefore notified 
reservations making it possible to adjust the figures retrospectively” (see European 
Parliament, Resolution of 24 April 2007, op. cit., paras 91–92). In its response to the 
Court of Auditors’ annual report concerning the financial year 2005 (para. 4.30 (e)), 
the Commission indicated that it would present a proposal to include allocated 
FISIM for GNI own resources when it considered that all member states were able 
to implement this adjustment in a uniform manner, which is expected to occur in 
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of Community statistics, which implies that they should be produced in an 
objective and independent way”. The Court thus concluded: “The GNP 
resource is therefore in danger of becoming a purely financial contribution, 
ending up as a formula for budgetary cost-sharing among the member 
states.”182 
Concerning the reliability, exhaustiveness and comparability of the 
national accounts statistical data, a meaningful and legitimate use at the 
European level requires the data, which are established by the national 
statistical offices, to be made comparable using harmonised methodologies. 
In this respect, Eurostat has the key role in consolidating these data and 
ensuring that they meet the necessary statistical quality standards. In other 
words, data should be of high quality and comparable across countries, 
making it possible to compare apples with apples.183 
The European Court of Auditors has stressed that:  
the need to guarantee equivalent sources, methods and calculation 
procedures in the member states means that the GNP must be evaluated in 
the light of instruments for measuring the quality of the national accounts. 
Such instruments ought to ensure that the GNP enjoys the legitimacy that 
the various uses to which it is put within the European Union require.184 
____________________________ 
182 See European Court of Auditors (1998), para. 3.20. 
183 The question of the reliability and comparability of statistical data has been 
examined in a previous study, which explored the possibility of an indirect 
assessment through comparison between national accounts data and structural 
business statistics (for which a reliability rate – 95% – is required). Despite 
appropriate adjustments, the results showed several unexplained inconsistencies in 
the ‘value added’ estimations according to the two sets of data. It was also 
observed that in the structural business statistics the amount of the intermediate 
costs was higher compared with that recorded in the national accounts. As 
structural business statistics could be assumed to be a proxy of taxable persons’ 
returns, this constitutes an index of the undervaluation of the taxable amount by 
the taxable persons. It seems clear that the cross-checking of statistical data from 
different sources could only increase their consistency and legitimacy. See Cipriani 
& Polito (2003). 
184 See European Court of Auditors (1998), para. 5.5. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 77 
 
Several years ago, the Court examined the Commission’s control of 
the reliability and comparability of the member states’ GNP data.185 The 
concept is summarised by the diagram shown in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 The reliability and comparability of the data 
GNP quality
Comparability 
between  Member States
Reliability 
(accuracy of data)
Conceptual 
(equivalence of 
ESA standards)
exhaustiveness or  
degree of coverage
Practice 
(equivalence of 
methods and of 
sources)
 
Source: European Court of Auditors (2000), para. 18. 
The Court observed that, despite certain improvements, “the 
Commission has not yet adopted sufficiently transparent analytical 
procedures for validating the data used in calculating GNP”. Verifications 
are indeed limited to desk checks and relate more specifically to the sources 
and methods used by member states for the compilation of national 
accounts’ aggregates. The Commission considered, however, “that the 
regular checks conducted by its departments” and the activities of the GNP 
Committee “have made it possible to improve the quality and achieve a 
sufficient degree of comparability of the GNP data of the member states”.186 
In 2005, the Court continued to observe insufficient verification by the 
____________________________ 
185 See European Court of Auditors, Special Report No. 17/2000 on the Commission’s 
control of the reliability and comparability of the member states’ GNP data, OJ C 336, 
27.11.2000. 
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Commission of the underlying national accounts that form the basis for the 
GNI resource questionnaires.187 
The difficulties of Eurostat’s control of the quality of statistical data 
have been shown by the monitoring of ESA 95 government accounts in the 
framework of the excessive deficit procedure. The case of the significant 
revisions of the Greek deficit and debt figures for the years 2000 to 2003, “of 
a size and scope that is causing real worries to the Commission”,188 raised 
not only concerns about the reliability of the deficit and debt figures 
previously notified but also highlighted the possibility of weaknesses in the 
monitoring of fiscal statistics.189 
In reality, the Commission had previously expressed concern at the 
fact that in several countries  “the government accounts are not yet as 
reliable as they should be and are subject to large revisions” and are “not 
transparent enough”. It also observed that “statistical institutes have scarce 
resources to compile the government accounts and are not immune from 
political pressures”.190 The Council supported “a rigorous compliance 
monitoring of statistics for the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability 
and Growth Pact, notably based on a full transparency of the concepts, data 
and methods underlying the compilation of these data” and recognised the 
need “to strengthen and safeguard trustworthy official statistics”. In this 
perspective, the Council mandated Eurostat to assess “the compliance of 
____________________________ 
187 See European Court of Auditors, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2005, 
OJ C 263, 30.10.2006(b), para. 4.16.  
188 See European Commission, “Statement by Commissioner Joaquín Almunia on 
the revision of Greek deficit and debt data”, Press release, IP/04/1135, Brussels, 23 
September 2004(h). Towards the end of 2004, the Greek budgetary statistics 
underwent a very large revision. The government deficit for 2003, which was 
initially reported at 1.7% of GDP, stood at 4.6% of GDP after the September 2004 
notification. The deficits notified to the Commission for 2000, 2001 and 2002 were 
also revised upwards by more than two percentage points of GDP. The 
government deficit was revised upwards by 2.1% of GDP on average over the 
period 1997–2003, hence consistently exceeding the 3% ceiling of GDP (see 
European Commission, Report on the Accountability Issue related to the Revision of 
Greek Budgetary Data, COM(2004) 784, Brussels, 1 December 2004(i), p. 3). 
189 See European Commission, Communication, Towards a European Governance 
Strategy for Fiscal Statistics, COM(2004) 832, Brussels, 22 December 2004(j), p. 3. 
190 See European Commission (2002c), p. 4. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 79 
 
the reported data with the accounting rules, including the completeness, 
plausibility and consistency of the data”  and asked member states to 
provide “access to the information required for the purpose of this 
assessment”, including an in-depth examination of the ESA 95 government 
accounts of each member state.191 As the Council also noted, “[r]eliable 
fiscal statistics are essential for the credibility of the excessive deficit 
procedure” and “on several occasions the fiscal statistics had been revised 
after a new government took office. The Council considers that the 
compilation and reporting of statistics for the EDP must not be vulnerable 
to political and electoral cycles.”192 
Despite its role as a statistical authority,193 Eurostat has taken the view 
that it does not have the power to carry out direct controls on member 
states’ government accounts, it cannot oblige the national authorities to 
provide information that is considered relevant for counterchecking the 
reported deficit and debt figures, and finally it does not have the power to 
make on-the-spot verifications of items that may be deemed in need of 
further clarification.194 
Actually, the issue seems less ‘legal’ than one might believe, with the 
EC Treaty (in particular Arts 104 and 285) providing the logical framework 
for a more direct involvement of Eurostat in the scrutiny of the data 
provided. It must be recognised that, especially since 2000, Eurostat has 
been very active in promoting the quality of statistical data. Still, this is 
probably not yet sufficient to ensure a proper (and formal) ‘validation’ of 
these data by the European statistical authority, without which the use of 
the GDP/GNI in the framework of the EU budget or in other EU contexts 
will not have the required credibility and legitimacy. It is encouraging that 
the Commission is currently discussing with the member states ways in 
____________________________ 
191 See Ecofin Council Conclusions, 5936/03, Brussels, 18 February 2003, pp. 11 and 
34.  
192 See Ecofin Council Conclusions, 9779/04, Brussels, 2 June 2004(b), pp. 10-11. 
193 Council Regulation (EC) No. 322/97 of 17 February 1997 (op. cit.), the Statistical 
Law, identifies Eurostat as the Community authority. Furthermore, Art. 4 of the 
Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, annexed to the Treaty, establishes that 
the statistical data for the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure “shall 
be provided by the Commission”. 
194 See European Commission (2004i), p. 6. 80 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
which verification that is more direct might be carried out, as well as the 
scope for these checks.195 
Concluding remarks 
The impact of statistics on national accounts has fundamentally changed 
since their use as accounting data in the framework of the EU budget. In 
turn, this raises basic issues such as the quality of the data and their 
comparability across member states and, consequently, the identification of 
methodological instruments to assess their reliability through transparent 
validation procedures. There is no alternative but to invite Eurostat to play 
such a role, which, in the end, is intended to ensure a key precondition of 
Community statistics: the conceptual and practical comparability of data. 
In addition, the utilisation of one single GDP/GNI for all different 
requirements in the EU framework will increase its credibility and 
legitimacy.  
The UK rebate, at the crossroads of any reform  
The problem of the UK’s budgetary burden is as old as the accession of this 
member state to the European Community in 1973. This imbalance has 
been attributed to two factors:  
•  an agricultural sector that is relatively smaller than and structurally 
different from those of other member states, thus resulting in lower 
CAP spending in the UK; and 
•  a proportionately larger contribution to the financing of the 
Community budget because the UK’s share of the harmonised VAT 
base was relatively higher than its share of the total GNP of the 
Community.196 
The principle of a corrective mechanism to give a payment to a 
member state that was making a disproportionate contribution to 
____________________________ 
195 See European Court of Auditors, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2004, 
OJ C 301, 30.11.2005, response to para. 4.30(a). In its report to the Council on the 
follow-up to the 2005 Discharge Decisions (COM(2007) 537 final, Brussels, 19 
September 2007(q), p. 6) the Commission committed itself to “perform more direct 
verification of selected national aggregates in the sense indicated by the Court 
during the 2007–2009 round of GNI verification missions”. 
196 See European Commission (1998), Annex 4.  RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 81 
 
Community financing was agreed in 1974,197 one year after UK’s accession 
and it was formalised at the Dublin summit of March 1975. Although of 
general application, the mechanism was intended to answer the UK 
problem. A financial mechanism was introduced in 1976, for a period of 
seven years based on Art. 235 of the EC Treaty (actions not foreseen by the 
Treaty).198 The legal basis was a matter for concern at the time, as this 
Treaty provision requires the measures to contribute “to the realisation of 
the objectives of the Community”. The obvious risk was that the financial 
mechanism would be against the acquis communautaire represented by the 
own resources system set up by the Decision of 20 April 1970, as it was a 
____________________________ 
197 See European Council, Meetings of the Heads of State or Government (Summit) 
in Paris, 9-10 December 1974. 
198 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1172/76 of 17 May 1976 setting up a financial 
mechanism (OJ L 131, 20.5.1976). A partial reimbursement of a member state’s 
VAT-based contribution would be applied, depending on three conditions to be 
met simultaneously: GNP per capita of less than 85% of the Community average, 
growth rate of per capita GNP of less than 120% of the Community average and a 
member state’s share of financing the EU budget that is higher than 10% of its 
share of the Community GNP. No member state fulfilled the conditions for a 
payment. This was also because the transitional measures laid down by the Treaty 
of Accession limited the UK payments to the budget and because the Own 
Resources Decision of 1970 only came into full effect in 1980. The conditions for the 
application of the mechanism were relaxed in 1980 solely for the UK (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2743/80 of 27 October 1980 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 
1172/76 setting up a financial mechanism, OJ L 284, 29.10.1980) but they still did 
not give rise to a payment, particularly owing to the increase in the value of the 
pound (for a report on the application of the financial mechanism, see European 
Commission, Report on the Application of the Financial Mechanism, COM(81) 704 final, 
Brussels, 13 November 1981). At the same time, the Council decided that there 
would be net payments in the form of specific measures on the expenditure side 
(see Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2744/80 of 27 October 1980 establishing 
supplementary measures in favour of the United Kingdom, OJ L 284, 29.10.1980 
and Council Regulation (EEC) No. 624/83 of 15 March 1983 amending Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2744/80 establishing supplementary measures in favour of 
the United Kingdom, OJ L 073, 19.3.1983). On this basis, the UK received a net 
compensation worth €5.6 billion. A flat reduction of €1 billion in the UK’s VAT 
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potential threat to the objective of replacing the financial contributions 
from member states by the Communities’ own resources.199 
Despite several corrections, the mechanism proved to be 
unsatisfactory as a means of reducing the financial burden to a level that 
was acceptable for the UK. This gave rise to further negotiations and, 
finally, to the present UK rebate. This abatement, secured by the UK 
government in 1984,200 consists of reducing by two-thirds the negative 
balance between the UK’s contribution to the budget and EU’s expenditure 
on the UK.201 No link was established to any particular level of agricultural 
____________________________ 
199 Further developments of this issue have shown that this risk has indeed 
materialised and that the notion of juste retour is now an accepted principle and 
current practice in negotiations. The issue of the benefits for the member states 
accruing from the EU budget is examined in the chapter “Budgetary balances – An 
irresistible temptation”. 
200 See European Council (1984). For an analysis of the Fontainebleau agreement, 
see Denton (1984). The present UK rebate mechanism presents two main 
differences when compared with the previous period. It is enshrined in the Own 
Resources Decision and therefore in practice takes on the nature of a permanent 
mechanism, the modification of which in the future would necessitate the 
agreement of the UK government. Second, the mechanism is no longer a lump 
sum, as it was between 1981 and 1985, to be negotiated at regular intervals with the 
other member states. Being a proportionate and automatic mechanism, it 
represents for the UK a guarantee that the effects of any future increase of the 
European budget, especially following an enlargement, will be limited (for the 
effects of the last enlargement on the level of the UK rebate see footnote 160). 
201 On the revenue side, the calculation of the UK rebate excludes the traditional 
own resources (customs duties, agricultural levies) from the categories of revenue 
to be taken into account. This is justified for two reasons. First, traditional own 
resources are not considered a member state contribution but constitute revenue 
belonging to the EU by virtue of the customs union. Second, traditional own 
resources are often levied at the port of entry into the EU in application of the 
Common Customs Code. Since the final consumer of the imported goods does not 
necessarily live in the country of the port of entry there is no clear geographical 
link between the collection of the duties and the economic burden they represent 
(see European Commission, Vol. II, 2004g, p. 30). On the expenditure side, only the 
EU’s ‘allocated expenditure’ is taken into account. This is nothing else than the 
r e s u l t  o f  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  t o  m e m b e r  s t a t es of all EU expenditure that can be 
attributed to one of them (in practice: agriculture, structural policies, internal 
policies including research and administrative expenditure). Thus, the definition of 
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spending in the UK or to any particular level of VAT base at any time.202 
Despite the theoretical application erga omnes of such a rebate, the concept 
of ‘excessive’ burden remains undefined and “there is no monitoring 
procedure to examine that the said correction is still justified”.203  
More than 20 years later, the rebate is still applicable and it is 
legitimate to wonder whether the justifications for granting a correction to 
the UK are still relevant. It is worth remembering that the European 
Parliament had rejected the idea of “a Community à la carte in respect of 
the system of own revenue in which individual states might claim 
privileges for an indefinite period”.204 On the one hand, according to the 
Commission, in the absence of any correction mechanism, the UK would 
have been on average the largest net contributor over the last seven years, 
and this is probably why the European Council decided to maintain the 
rebate on all occasions after its reviews in 1988, 1992, 1999 and 2005. On the 
other hand, as the Commission also points out, economic developments, 
enlargement and changes in the structure of the EU budget have 
significantly modified the context in which the existing UK rebate 
mechanism operates. Incidentally, some indicators suggest that the UK’s 
____________________________ 
 
allocated expenditure excludes any expenditure benefiting recipients outside the 
EU, in particular external expenditure. Similarly, total allocated expenditure is 
reduced by an amount equal to pre-accession expenditure in the acceding 
countries in the last year before enlargement. Allocated expenditure represented in 
2005 around 92% of the total €105 billion of EU expenditure. It should be observed 
that the collection costs for customs, agricultural and sugar levies retained by the 
member states (around 20% goes to the UK, see also footnote 165) are excluded 
from the allocated expenditure. This approach is, however, conceptually doubtful, 
as the European Court of Auditors has pointed out (see Opinion No. 8/99 of 7 
October 1999 on a Council proposal for a Decision on concerning the European 
Union’s system of own resources, OJ C 310, 20.10.99, paras 11–19).  
202 In the same way, the establishment of the ceiling for the UK rebate at two-thirds 
of the negative budgetary balance is purely conventional, and in a way arbitrary. A 
European Parliament report has described the calculation of the UK rebate as 
“using a system which is complex and incomprehensible for the politicians in the 
budgetary authority. It is therefore impossible to judge whether it is sound” (see 
European Parliament, 1994b, p. 8).  
203 See European Court of Auditors (1998), para. 3.26.  
204 See European Parliament, Resolution of 21 April 1994 (op. cit.), para. 20. 84 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
relative degree of prosperity is now much better than it is for other 
countries that are also net contributors.205 
The changes in the degree of prosperity enjoyed by EU net 
contributors are outlined in Table 3.3, which shows the development of 
GNI per capita, expressed in purchasing power standards (PPS).206 These 
data show that the UK’s relative prosperity is at the top of the range, in 
sharp contrast with the situation in 1984, when the UK was the least 
prosperous of the net contributors. 
Furthermore, one should also acknowledge that at least one of the 
arguments that justified the UK correction is no longer relevant. The VAT 
resource has been reduced to a very limited share in the financing of the 
budget. In addition, more than one-third of this resource is actually 
calculated on the basis of GNI, because of the capping mechanism.207 As a 
result, own resources are a function of GNI to the extent of about 76%.  
Table 3.3 GNI per capita of net contributors (in PPS) (EU-15 average = 100) 
 2003  Comparative 
rank 
1984 
UK 111.2  1  5  90.6 
Denmark 111.1  2  2  104.0 
Austria 109.8  –  –  – 
Netherlands 106.6  3  3  95.0 
Sweden 104.6  –  –  – 
France 104.2  4  2  104.0 
Germany 98.6  5  1  109.6 
Italy 97.3  6  4  92.9 
Source: European Commission (Vol. I, 2004f), p. 5.  
____________________________ 
205 In 1998, the Commission stated that it could be envisaged progressively to phase 
out or to reduce the UK rebate. “This could find a justification in the fact that after 
enlargement, the relative prosperity of the UK, which is already around the EU 
average today, would almost certainly be above the EU average, thus weakening 
one of the conditions for the initial granting of the rebate” (see the European 
Commission report, 1998, p. 30). 
206 The definition of PPS is given in footnote 83. 
207 In 1986, when the present UK rebate mechanism first entered into force the VAT 
resources covered 70% of the EU’s budget revenue. In 2006, it represented only 
17% (see Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1). Moreover, 37% of revenue accruing from VAT 
resources during that year was calculated on GNI-capped bases.  RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 85 
 
Concerning agricultural spending, as Figure 3.2 shows, it still takes 
up a large part of total EU expenditure.208  
  In percentage terms, EU agricultural expenditure on the UK is the 
lowest among the major member states (see Figure 3.3). Nevertheless, the 
trend since 1992 has rather been increasing, and for several years it was 
even at a high level – which shows that the European agricultural policy is 
not per se ‘incompatible’ with the UK’s agricultural structure. 
Figure 3.2 Evolution of EU agricultural expenditure 1992–2006 (%) 
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Source: Own calculations based on European Commission (2007l). 
____________________________ 
208 Agricultural spending represented 71% of the 1975 EU budget. Ten years later, 
this percentage was down to 68% and it did not represent more than 47% in 2006. 
For the Financial Perspective 2007–13, agricultural spending (excluding rural 
development) is expected to account for around one-third of the commitment 
appropriations foreseen. A fundamental reform of the CAP entered into force in 
2004 and 2005. The vast majority of subsidies are now paid independently of the 
volume of production (83% of the agricultural expenditure proposed in the 
preliminary draft budget for 2008). More specifically, more money is available to 
farmers for environmental, quality or animal welfare programmes through the 
reduction of direct payments for larger f a r m s .  M e m b e r  s t a t e s  m a y  c h o o s e  t o  
maintain a limited link between subsidy and production under well-defined 
conditions and within clear limits. See European Commission (2003a). 86 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
Figure 3.3 Share of EU agricultural spending on major member states 1992–2006 
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Source: Own calculations based on European Commission (2007l). 
 
Agricultural spending in the UK takes a significant share. On average 
(see Table 3.4), agricultural spending constitutes 60% of EU expenditure on 
the UK. Only France shows a higher percentage (78%).  
Table 3.4 Expenditure allocated to the major member states – Yearly average 1992–
2006 (€ million) 
  Germany  (%)  Spain  (%)  France  (%)  Italy  (%)  UK  (%) 
Agricul-
ture 
5,796  58 5,309 44  9,111  78 4,838 55 3,740 60 
Structural 
policies 
3,386  34 6,478 54  2,014  17 3,344 38 1,874 30 
Internal 
policies 
757  8 287 2  614  5 563 7 644  10 
Total  9,939  100 12,074 100  11,739  100  8,745  100 6,258  100 
Source: Own calculations based on European Commission (2007l). 
In the end, the only convincing and decisive argument for 
maintaining the UK rebate is the unanimity rule, which prevails for this 
kind of decision and the apparent political will of the UK to keep its 
contributions to the EU budget both as low as possible and as close as 
possible to the EU expenditure received. Figure 3.4 shows that this 
objective has been largely achieved thanks to the UK rebate. At the same RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 87 
 
time, Germany and Spain are, for different reasons, in a completely 
different situation. 
Figure 3.4 National contributions paid by major member states and the allocation 
of EU expenditure – Total for 1992–2006 (in € million) 
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Source: Own calculations based on European Commission (2007l). 
Concluding remarks 
The UK’s rebate is illustrative of the decision process in the context of the 
EU’s finances. It represents one of the many arrangements negotiated in 
successive intergovernmental deals. Given the prevailing unanimity rule, 
there is little chance of discontinuing this rebate without introducing 
equivalent compensations for the UK and specific arrangements for other 
member states. It would be more logical in many respects if all member 
states were prepared to accept a single financing system, applied to all 
member states in the same way. 
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4. BUDGETARY BALANCES – AN 
IRRESISTIBLE TEMPTATION  
ince the EU budget is largely financed through national contributions, 
member states feel justified in calculating the benefits accruing from 
it. The existence of the UK rebate and its calculation based on 
budgetary balances has established a practice that, moreover, draws 
support from an official methodology.209 On this basis, data on member 
states’ budgetary balances are regularly published by the Commission. 
Hence, since they provide a balance between contributions paid by 
the member states and the payments they receive, budgetary balances 
conventionally represent the reference yardstick to define ‘winners’ and 
‘losers’ in the framework of the EU budget. It is on this basis that the 
member states consider themselves (and are conventionally considered) net 
contributors or net beneficiaries. However undesirable it might be, the 
temptation “to try to strike a narrow arithmetical balance as to exactly how 
much day-to-day profit or loss each country is getting out of the 
Community”  cannot be ignored.210 Figure 4.1 shows the cumulative 
budgetary balances for the EU-15 member states for the period 1995–2006. 
One should also observe (see Figure 4.2) that if EU expenditure may 
represent a significant amount in relation to GNI for some member states 
(Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal), the impact of the negative balance 
for net-payer member states is at most equal to 0.47% of their GNI. 
____________________________ 
209 The principle of the calculation of budgetary balances is enshrined in the Own 
Resources Decision. The calculation method for the 2007–13 financial framework is 
provided for in a Commission Working Document presented to the Council of 
Ministers (see Adoption of a Council Decision on the system of the European 
Communities’ own resources (EC, Euratom), Commission Working Document on 
calculation, financing, payment and entry in the budget of the correction of 
budgetary imbalances, 9851/07 ADD 2, Brussels, 23 May 2007(a)). 
210 See the speech by the then President of the European Commission Roy Jenkins 
to the European Parliament, 11 January 1977 (Jenkins, 1977).  
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Figure 4.1 EU-15 budgetary balances – Total for 1995–2006 (€ million) 
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Source: Own calculations based on European Commission (2007l). 
Figure 4.2 EU-15 budgetary balances as a share of GNI – Total for 1995–2006 
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Estimating the benefits, a facile solution 
As the Commission pointed out, budgetary balances “measured by the 
difference between contributions to and receipts from the EU budget, fail to 
account fully for the benefits accruing to member states from participating 
in the EU”.211 Notwithstanding the general acceptance that the balance of 
losses/gains of belonging to the EU cannot be captured by a single 
budgetary figure, such calculations have become a key element of the 
decision-making process of the Union.212  
In addition, the method is based on the calculation of a balance 
between two sets of data that are conceptually different. While member 
states’ contributions are financed through general taxation by all taxpayers, 
a similar parallelism does not exist for the payments made from the EU 
budget to a given country. The fact that EU expenditure is channelled 
predominantly into two main policies reduces at the same time the number 
____________________________ 
211 See European Commission, Budget Contributions, EU Expenditure, Budgetary 
Balances and Relative Prosperity of the Member States, Paper presented by President 
Jacques Santer to the Ecofin Council, 13 October 1997(b). A full statement was 
made by the Commission in the 1998 own resources report (European 
Commission, 1998), chapter 2 and Annex 3. See also European Commission, 
Proposal for a Council Decision on the system of the European Communities’ own 
resources, COM(2004) 501, Brussels, 3 August 2004(k), p. 2 and European 
Commission (Vol. II, 2004g), p. 17. A similar conclusion was drawn by the Court of 
Auditors: “Because of the integration of the member state economies within the 
single market, establishing a strict link between the destination of Community 
payments and the benefits accruing to the member states is becoming increasingly 
open to question” (see European Court of Auditors, 1998, para. 3.29). The 
European Council also “recognised that the full benefits of Union membership 
cannot be measured solely in budgetary terms” (see para. 68 of European Council, 
Presidency Conclusions of the Berlin European Council of 24-25 March, SN 
100/1/99, Brussels, 1999). Finally, the European Parliament insisted “that the only 
possible solution is the abolition of the net balances system once and for all in 
parallel with a reform of the pattern of expenditure” (see European Parliament, 
Resolution of 29 March 2007, op. cit., para. 19). 
212 For example, in the framework of the 2007–13 financial perspective negotiations, 
the European Commission prepared the document “Calculating member states’ 
net budgetary balances” for the European Council’s Working Group on Own 
Resources (Brussels, 21 February 2005(f)), which presents different ways of 
calculating budgetary balances illustrated with quantitative estimates and a range 
of possible results. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 91 
 
of potential direct beneficiaries.213 In terms of ‘financial’ flows these latter 
are substantially fewer than the taxpayers. 
If the direct costs of the EU budget are easy to measure, the 
quantification of benefits is a different issue. The Commission has listed a 
series of reasons for which conventionally measured budgetary balances 
fail to represent the benefits of EU membership adequately, ending up with 
results that are not uncontroversial.214 The concept of budgetary balances 
suffers from at least three main drawbacks: 
•  Budgetary balances fail to take account of positive externalities 
arising from EU policies as they benefit not only the immediate 
recipients but also give rise to spillover effects transcending national 
borders. Also, in areas such as research the level of expenditure does 
not adequately represent its impact in terms of growth and 
employment. 
•  EU budget expenditure is heterogeneous by nature. Agricultural, 
structural, research or administrative expenditures generate different 
spillover levels and a different added value for the recipient country. 
Owing to the diversity of circumstances and productive structures 
among member states, a given amount of EU expenditure will not 
result in the same economic benefits for all the member states.  
•  There are often difficulties associated with the identification of the 
ultimate beneficiaries of EU expenditure policies. CAP spending on 
export refunds is an example where expenditure may be recorded as 
allocated to the member state from which goods are exported when in 
fact the ultimate beneficiaries are the producers in other member 
states. Research expenditure, where the EU payment is made to one 
member of the consortium, also gives rise to similar difficulties. 
The limited focus of the budgetary balances approach is shown for 
example by the link established between the Lisbon agenda and the 
structural funds. A substantial part of the 2007–13 appropriations will be 
used to contribute to the Lisbon growth and jobs objectives.215 The 
Commission has observed that, “in a single market, those funds will be 
spent on procuring works, goods and services from all over the EU. That 
____________________________ 
213 Among these are, for example, the almost 7 million EU farmers. 
214 See European Commission (1998), Annex 3. 
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will benefit all member states and not just those directly receiving the most 
substantial amounts of structural funding.”216 
EU budget expenditure has indeed a role to play in raising the level of 
income in less developed areas and in making them more competitive. 
Raising the growth rate of these areas contributes definitively to the growth 
of the Union as such. Also, concerning specifically the impact of the 
enlargement on the EU-15 member state economies, several studies confirm 
that they will benefit to a greater extent from EU budget expenditure in 
relation to new member states.217  
An indication is given in this respect by the trade balance of the new 
member states (EU-10) with the EU-15 as a whole. As shown in Table 4.1, 
the value of imports rose significantly after accession to the EU. In the 
period 2004–06, imports from the EU-15 increased on a yearly average by 
56%, while exports to the EU-15 increased only by 38%. As a result, the 
negative trade balance for the period 2004–06 was considerably higher 
when compared with the period 2000–03. In contrast with the previous 
period, all EU-10 member states have recorded a negative trade balance 
with the EU-15 after accession. 
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
216 See European Commission, “Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs: Frequently 
asked questions”, Memo 06/474, Brussels, 8 December 2006(g). 
217 In European Parliament (2005a), the following studies are cited by Prof. Jedrzej 
Krakowski: European Commission, Enlargement papers: The economic impact of 
enlargement,  DG for Economic and Financial Affairs, June 2001; F. Breuss, 
Macroeconomic Effects of EU Enlargement for Old and New Members, Working Paper 
No. 143, WIFO, Vienna, March 2001; P. Havlik, EU Enlargement: Economic Impacts 
on Austria and the Five Acceding Central European Countries, Research Reports No. 
290, WIIW, Vienna, October 2002; C. Keuschnigg and W. Kohler, Eastern 
Enlargement of the EU: Economic Costs and Benefits for the Present Member States?, 
European Commission Study XIX/B1/9801, Brussels, September 1999; W. Quaiser, 
M. Hartman, E. Honekopp and M. Brendenmeier, Die Osterweiterung der 
Europäischen Union: Konsequenzen für Wohlstand und Beschäftigung in Europa, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, March 2000. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 93 
 
Table 4.1 Trade balance of EU-10 member states with the EU-15 
 – Total for 2000–03 and 2004–06 (€ billion)  
Member 
states 
2000–03 2004–06 
 Imports  Exports  Trade 
balance 
Imports  Exports Trade 
balance 
Cyprus 8.33  3.61  -4.72  9.76  5.15 -4.61 
Czech 
Republic 
99.95  104.11  4.16  125.94  109.41 -16.53 
Estonia 11.61  12.26  0.65  14.69  11.47 -3.23 
Hungary 87.75  98.17  10.42  93.38  91.75 -1.63 
Lithuania 12.83  10.49  -2.34  16.05  9.90 -6.15 
Latvia 8.50  7.75  -0.75  9.73  8.39 -1.33 
Malta 7.82  4.27  -3.55  6.37  3.25 -3.12 
Poland 139.81  109.70  -30.12  163.82  124.21 -39.61 
Slovenia 31.22  26.91  -4.31  34.74  23.51 -11.24 
Slovakia 34.12  37.17  3.04  42.56  42.16 -0.39 
Total 441.95  414.45  -27.50  517.04  429.21 -87.83 
Yearly 
average 
110.49  103.61  -6.88  172.35  143.07 -29.28 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
 
It is also interesting to note the relative situation concerning the main 
net-payer member states. Figure 4.3 compares the value of exports of these 
countries to EU-10 member states with the value of financial assistance that 
the EU-10 will receive during 2007–13 from the EU budget (for cohesion 
and rural development). The lower column in Figure 4.3 represents the pro 
rata of financing for net-payer member states (2007 budget). Two elements 
could be highlighted: 
•  In terms of value, the EU financial assistance planned during the next 
seven years represents around one fifth of the value of imports of the 
EU-10 from net-payer countries in the previous seven years. 
Moreover, as indicated earlier, the accession has increased the 
imports from the EU-15 and one could expect that this trend will 
continue in the future.  
•  Unsurprisingly, countries have not been performing in the same way. 
Some (for example, Germany and Italy) seem to have benefited from 94 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
the EU-10 accession more than others. As observed earlier, member 
states have different productive structures and thus they record 
different results in relation to the economic consequences of the 
market enlargement. 
Figure 4.3 Value of EU support for cohesion and rural development for EU-10 
member states (2007–13) and their imports from net-payer member 
states, 2000–06 (€ million) 
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Source: Own calculations based on pre-allocated funding of the 2007–13 Financial 
Framework and Eurostat data. 
 
The limited value of budgetary balances is also recognised at the 
national level, where one can assume that estimations of the potential 
economic benefit of EU expenditure is a current practice for national 
administrations. For example, the UK government highlights the positive 
impact for its economy derived from the enlargement.218 Also, independent 
____________________________ 
218 See the following extracts from the UK government’s website 
http://www.fco.gov.uk:  
Expanding the single market will have a profound effect on the economies of 
both new member states and existing members. It will provide new markets 
to exporters, and force prices down and increase choice for consumers across 
Europe.  
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studies were reported to indicate that the direct benefits of Agenda 2000 
and enlargement for the UK would easily exceed £1 billion per year and 
that there would be, in addition, indirect benefits resulting from increased 
efficiency and competition and the development of new markets.219 
Another example is given by the decision of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) countries, i.e. Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein as well 
as Switzerland, to contribute to the reduction of economic and social 
disparities in the member states that have recently joined the EU. Through 
the European Economic Area Financial Mechanism220 and the Norwegian 
Financial Mechanism, Norway will make available €1.1 billion over the 
five-year period 2004–09, supporting investment and development 
programmes and projects in a wide range of priority sectors such as 
protection of the environment, conservation of the European cultural 
heritage, health and childcare and the development of human resources. A 
further €33 million will be provided by Iceland and Lichtenstein. In a 
similar context, Switzerland will provide around €650 million over five 
years (see Box 4.1). 
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
 
UK merchandise trade with the new member states has increased by 392% 
since 1992, nearly 10 times as fast as with the rest of the world, and is steadily 
rising. There were around 14,000 UK firms exporting to Central and Eastern 
Europe in 2001. Firms like Tesco, Unilever, Vodafone, BP and International 
Power are successful investors in new member and candidate states.  
New member states have adopted EU legislation on health and safety, the 
environment, consumer protection and state aids, meaning that UK 
investment is less risky, more transparent, and more competitive. The 
adoption of EU legislation means that in almost all areas, member states 
cannot discriminate between domestic businesses and those from other EU 
states.  
219 See House of Commons, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Third Report, 
Appendix 11, Supplementary Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, London, 1999. 
220 This mechanism also funds investment projects in Greece, Portugal and Spain. 96 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
Box 4.1  Switzerland and EU cohesion policy 
The Swiss financial assistance to Central and Eastern European countries was 
approved by referendum on 26 November 2006. It is interesting to note that among 
the arguments advanced by the Swiss government during the referendum to 
justify its financial assistance were the following points: 
•  On the basis of a study on the effects of public development aid, one 
franc of expenditure generates between 1.42 and 1.63 francs of GDP 
increase. The number of jobs generated is estimated to be between 13,000 
and 19,000.∗ 
•  Since 1990, the financing of infrastructure in the Eastern European 
countries has generated orders for Swiss enterprises worth 780 million 
francs. 
•  Swiss development aid increases the possibilities for Swiss enterprises to 
obtain further orders. 
The Swiss economy records huge commercial surpluses with the Eastern 
European countries (in 2005, 1.4 billion Swiss francs with the new EU-10 
member states). Trade with these countries increases by about 10% each year 
and their economies record high growth rates. 
∗ See Neumann et al. (2004) and Secrétariat d’Etat à l’économie SECO, Loi sur la coopération 
avec l’Europe de l’Est: Points principaux, October 2006. 
 
Table 4.2 Trade balance of EFTA countries with EU-10 member states – Total for 
2000–03 and 2004–06 (€ billion)  
Countries 2000–03  2004–06 
  Imports  Exports  Trade 
balance 
Imports  Exports  Trade 
balance 
Total EFTA 
countries 
13.1  16.1  3.0  15.4  12.1  -3.3 
Switzerland 7.8  10.2  2.4  7.6  7.5  -0.1 
Norway 4.8  5.6  0.8  7.1  4.3  -2.8 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
These contributions reflect the fact that these countries, through a 
multitude of bilateral agreements enjoy privileged access to the enlarged 
internal market and benefit from access to a number of EU programmes 
and activities. Although they are not EU members, their economies largely 
benefit from the development of the EU economy, even if, contrary to EU-
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10 member states after their accession to the EU. As Table 4.2 shows, this is 
mainly the case for Norway. 
Concluding remarks 
Despite being merely an accounting exercise that gives no reliable 
indication of the benefits of EU expenditure, above all on the economic 
impact for member states’ economies, budgetary balances play a decisive 
role in EU finances. The ‘negative balance’ of the net-payer member states 
represents a limited fraction of their GNI, while it is assumed that their 
economies benefit from spillover effects derived from EU expenditure. For 
these reasons non-EU member states have decided to give financial support 
to the EU’s cohesion policy. This move shows that while member states 
have a legitimate interest in assessing the benefits accruing from the EU 
budget, estimates should not be restricted to the ‘budgetary balance’ 
concept. Indeed, not only should citizens be made aware of the cost of the 
EU budget, they have also an interest in knowing the full benefits of EU 
expenditure in a meaningful way.  
The ‘betrayal’ of Fontainebleau’s ultimate goal 
When introducing the UK rebate, the Fontainebleau European Council 
established the principle that “any member state sustaining a budgetary 
burden which is excessive in relation to its relative prosperity may benefit 
from a correction at the appropriate time”.221 The need for a rebate is 
examined on a case-by-case basis; there is no automatic mechanism that 
would allow other member states to qualify for a correction. Its application 
is founded on the agreement of the other member states, which 
consequently have to increase their own contributions correspondingly.222 
Despite specific requests by several member states,223 the rebate has thus 
____________________________ 
221 See European Council (1984). 
222 This means in practice a modification of the Own Resources Decision, which 
requires unanimity. 
223 In early 1998, Germany, Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands made such a 
request. The extension of the correction mechanism to other net contributors would 
have implied a huge – more than fourfold – increase of the rebates, from €2.9 
billion (with the UK as the sole beneficiary) to €12.4 billion (with the UK and the 
other six member states), as it has been calculated by the European Court of 
Auditors (see European Court of Auditors, 1998, para. 3.27). See also European 
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been and still is being applied only in favour of the UK. Moreover, as 
member states benefiting from the rebate do not participate in its financing, 
a linear application of the UK rebate rules would imply that the burden of 
these huge rebates would have to be born by the less favoured member 
states. For this reason, other ways of reducing the financial burden of 
certain member states have been found.224 
In an attempt to solve once and for all the issue of the budgetary 
burden, in 2004 the Commission proposed a generalisation of the correction 
mechanism, aimed at introducing a sort of safety net for large net 
contributors whose net contributions (calculated on the basis of the net 
budgetary balance) exceeded a certain level meant to represent the 
maximum accepted level of financial solidarity among member states 
(0.35% of a member state’s GNI).225 Net positions exceeding such a 
threshold would have been eligible for a correction (at a rate of 66%). Yet, 
the total refund volume was limited to a maximum of €7.5 billion a year, 
financed by all member states based on their relative share of GNI. 
According to a simulation, the UK was expected to receive €2.1 billion 
annually on average (raised to €3.1 billion thanks to transitional measures), 
against an average of €4.6 billion over the period 1997–2003.226  
Unsurprisingly, “a broad spectrum of views [was] expressed”227 by 
the member states on the Commission’s proposal, which was finally not 
____________________________ 
224 Among the solutions found are, for example, the gradual reduction of the 
weight of the VAT resource and the establishment and continuous increase of the 
GNI resource, a different share among member states for the financing of the UK 
rebate and ad hoc lump sums to some member states as decided for the financial 
perspective 2007–13. Also, the decision to increase, as of 2001, the share of 
traditional own resources retained by member states as ‘collection costs’ (from 10% 
to 25%) belongs to the category of ways of correcting excessive negative budgetary 
balances. See in this respect footnote 165. 
225 After examining the possibilities of reducing or phasing out the UK rebate, the 
Commission explored different parameters of a generalised correction mechanism, 
each having a different financial impact. This shows that what matters is actually 
not the conceptual design of the mechanism but rather finding an acceptable deal 
among member states, based on the financial impact for each of them in terms of 
contributions paid to the EU budget. See European Commission (Vol. II, 2004g), 
part II.6.  
226 See European Commission (Vol. II, 2004g), p. 40. 
227 See the Ecofin Council Conclusions (2004a), p. 9. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 99 
 
accepted. Indeed, in a context where the unanimity rule is required, why 
should the UK government have agreed to such a huge reduction of its 
rebate, some €4 billion per year less228 compared with the mechanism 
rebate then applicable? 
The Commission’s proposal for a generalised correction mechanism 
calculated on the basis of the net budgetary balance of each member state 
in relation to the EU budget gives further credibility to a concept that fails 
to account fully for the benefits resulting from EU membership. The 
European Parliament has described generalising the rebate as a “double 
mistake since it would only strengthen the anti-communitarian character of 
the system and cement the short-sighted approach of a quantifiable ‘juste 
retour’”.229 This stance taken by the Commission suggests that in making 
the best of a bad job, it has probably abandoned any hope that, as the 
Fontainebleau European Council established, “expenditure policy is 
ultimately the essential means of resolving the question of budgetary 
imbalances”. It is worth recalling how far we are from the principles that 
the Commission tried to establish in the early years of the debate on the 
budgetary questions when it said that “the budget should not be judged in 
the light of the position of each member state, but mainly of the 
effectiveness with which it ensures the conduct of common policies to the 
benefit of the entire Community”.230 The Commission also said that “any 
solution must be found within the Community budget and must respect 
the integrity of the Community’s system of own resources; its objective 
____________________________ 
228 This figure takes into account the impact of the enlargement. See also footnote 
160. 
229 See European Parliament, Resolution of 29 March 2007 (op. cit.), para. 19. The 
Court of Auditors has observed that the existence of any correction mechanism 
“compromises the simplicity and the transparency of the own resources system”, 
as “calculating net balances implies numerous choices that must be made (on the 
items to be included, reference periods and accounting methods) all of which 
render any correction mechanism rather cumbersome”. See European Court of 
Auditors, Opinion No. 4/2005 of 12 May 2005 on a proposal for a Council decision 
on the system of the European Communities’ own resources and on a proposal for 
a Council Regulation on the implementing measures for the correction of 
budgetary imbalances in accordance with Articles 4 and 5 of the Council decision 
(...) on the system of the European Communities’ own resources, OJ C 167, 
7.7.2005, para. 19. 
230 See European Commission, Reference paper on budgetary questions, COM(79) 462, 
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must not be to put a member state in a position of juste retour in respect of 
the Community budget”.231 
Concluding remarks 
The introduction of the UK rebate has been followed by other special 
arrangements on the revenue side for other member states. These 
arrangements have developed in view of finding an acceptable relationship 
for each member state between its disbursements to the EU budget and the 
expenditure it receives. As a result, the emphasis put on budgetary 
balances has overridden the intention of ultimately making EU expenditure 
the main tool for pursuing defined objectives. 
Are there possible alternatives? 
As the Commission had already pointed out in 1974, “it is very difficult to 
give a detailed view of the overall distribution of expenditure by country or 
by region, since it is not a matter of identifying the location of the direct 
recipient but rather of assessing the final economic impact”.232 Indeed, what 
matters is the final impact. The question, however, is whether there is any 
better system than budgetary balances to measure the impact of the EU 
budget. 
In this respect, an attempt to assess the benefits of EU expenditure for 
the member states was made in a previous study,233 which tried to 
overcome the conceptual weakness of the budgetary balances calculation 
by applying a macroeconomic analysis based on input–output tables and 
commercial trade flows. In this way, it was possible to estimate the increase 
in the demand for goods and services generated by EU expenditure. Quite 
unsurprisingly, the results, which are summarised in Figure 4.4, show that 
some member states that are at present considered ‘net contributors’ (for 
instance Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Austria and the UK) 
would actually appear as ‘net recipients’ if the increase in production from 
which they benefit was taken into account. Note the value of the real net 
____________________________ 
231 See European Commission, Communication on Convergence and Budgetary 
Questions, COM(80) 147, Brussels, 20 March 1980, p. 1. 
232 See European Commission, “Inventory of the Community’s economic and 
financial situation since enlargement and survey of future developments”, 
Supplement to Bulletin 7/74, Brussels, 27 October 1974, p. 11. 
233 See Cipriani & Pisani (2004). RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 101 
 
balance for Spain, which is more than two times higher than its budgetary 
balance, but also the fact that the Netherlands and Sweden remain net 
contributors in both scenarios. 
Figure 4.4 Comparison of net balances (average 2000–02), EU-15 member states (€ 
million) 
 
Source: Cipriani & Pisani (2004). 
 
In order to highlight the change of place of each country in the 
hierarchy of net contributors, two rankings have been drawn up in Table 
4.3. The first is based on budgetary flows (column d) and the second on 
induced demand (column e). Both rankings are arranged in descending 
order, placing in the 1st position the country most advantaged and in the 
14th the largest net contributor. Compared with the budgetary flows 
ranking (column d), four countries improve their relative position if the 
induced demand is taken into account. In this way, France recovers nine 
positions, the UK six, Germany and Italy five each. Spain remains at the 
same level while all other member states would be given a lower ranking. 
Independently of the degree of precision of the numerical results 
(very much dependent on the accuracy and the reliability of the available 
statistical data), it seems established that when evaluating the benefits 
accruing from European expenditure, the analysis of budgetary flows 
constitutes a very limited, and in a way misleading, instrument. 
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Table 4.3 Net balances according to budgetary flows and the induced demand, EU-
15 member states (€ million, average 2000–02) 
Net balance (€ million)  Ranking  Member 
states  Budgetary 
flows 
Induced 
demand 
Budgetary 
flows 
Induced 
demand 
Difference 
a b  c   d  e   f = d – e 
Belgium  -299  1,364  7  8  -1 
Denmark  -4  994  6  10  -4 
Germany  -6,216  1,045  14  9  5 
Greece 4,149  6,747  2  3  -1 
Spain 7,504  17,552  1  1  0 
France  -1,237  7,398  11  2  9 
Ireland 1,531  4,043  4  7  -3 
Italy  -894  4,497  10  5  5 
Netherlands  -1,874  -331  13  14  -1 
Austria  -345  381  8  12  -4 
Portugal 2,253  5,574  3  4  -1 
Finland 75  889  5  11  -6 
Sweden  -863  -228  9  13  -4 
UK  -1,270  4,221  12  6  6 
Source: Cipriani & Pisani (2004). 
 
The added value of an analysis based on the increase in domestic 
output generated by EU expenditure is that it discloses both the 
quantitative impact in the production of the EU expenditure and its 
geographical breadth. Actually, the ‘real’ balance is given by how much 
each member state economy really profits from EU expenditure. Indeed, as 
the analysis has shown, the same amount of EU expenditure in a given 
country can have a very different impact in the production of the 
beneficiary country (but also of the other countries benefiting from the 
induced demand), depending on the economic sector and because of the 
diversity of member states’ industrial (and administrative) structures. The 
possibility of estimating both the quantitative and geographical effects of 
expenditure in a given country could give concrete implementation to the 
Fontainebleau European Council statement, according to which 
“expenditure policy is ultimately the essential means of resolving the 
question of budgetary imbalances”.234 
____________________________ 
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Moreover, it would even become possible to estimate the effects of a 
potentially different sectoral allocatio n  o f  E U  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  t a k i n g  i n t o  
account the economic structure of each country. One would expect such 
concerns would also be at the heart of the “full, wide ranging review 
covering all aspects of EU spending, including the CAP”235 asked for by the 
Council. 
Concluding remarks 
Without ignoring the difficulties associated with the establishment of a 
reliable and accepted way of estimating the benefits derived from EU 
expenditure, it seems clear that better alternatives to budgetary balances 
exist. The interest of taking advantage of these methodologies is not just 
their meaningfulness as such, but the fact that they could identify the 
impact by type of EU spending and highlight differences in the productive 
structures of the member states. The use of such instruments in the context 
of EU finances could enhance the guidance function of the EU budget, 
contribute to resolving any imbalances and increase the added value of EU 
expenditure.  
 
____________________________ 
235 See European Council (2005a), para. 80.  
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5. RESPONSIBILITY, LOOKING FOR 
VOLUNTEERS 
he EU budget is implemented through differentiated management 
methods (centralised management, shared or decentralised 
management and joint management), which are defined in the 
Financial Regulation.236 Centralised management means that the 
Commission implements the budget either directly or through the agency 
of third parties. The shared or decentralised management concept implies 
that implementation tasks relating to the budget are delegated to member 
states or to third countries. In the event of joint management, certain 
implementation tasks are entrusted by the Commission to international 
organisations.  
One of the characteristics of the EU budget is that almost all income 
and expenditure is managed by parties other than the Commission. The 
latter carries out, in a system of centralised management, only its own 
income and administrative expenditure,237 some expenditure in the area of 
research and certain external actions. All the remaining appropriations 
(more than 80%) are disbursed either under shared management with the 
member states (own resources,238 agricultural and structural policies)239 or 
____________________________ 
236 See Arts 53 to 57 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002 of 13 
December 2006 (op. cit.).  
237 In the same way, each institution or Community body manages its own income 
and expenditure.  
238 The shared management concept is traditionally associated with expenditure. 
O w n  r e s o u r c e s  w e r e  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h i s  c a t e g o r y  b y  a n a l o g y ,  b e c a u s e  n a t i o n a l  
administrations are at the root of the fixing of the resources put at the disposal of 
the Communities to finance the budget.  
239 Apart from the fields mentioned, the different funds established in the 
framework of the migration flows policy (the external borders fund, the integration 
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under decentralised management with third countries (pre-accession aids) 
or are disbursed jointly with international organisations (humanitarian 
aid). 
The choice of management method is a decision taken by the Council 
and binding on the Commission. Budgetary implementation under shared 
management is nothing other than the direct consequence of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality. According to these principles, the 
Community intervenes only if (and insofar as) the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and 
can therefore be better achieved by the Community.240 
Consequently, shared management also implies the absence of a 
genuine Community administration. The functions of authorising and 
validating income and expenditure decisions taken in Brussels are in the 
nature of formalities, authorising a use of the appropriations that has 
already been decided upon and thus allowing the authorising officer to 
implement measures, the substance of which is predetermined.241 The 
implementation of the budget is hence no more than the utilisation of the 
appropriations; it does not include any genuine underlying decision, as is 
normally the case in national budgets. The decision-taking aspect is 
therefore dissociated from the financial implementation.  
The shared management arrangements make member states 
responsible in the first instance, under the Commission’s scrutiny, for the 
management, monitoring and day-to-day financial control of a large part of 
the present budget. At the same time, according to Art. 274 TEC, the 
Commission has final responsibility for the implementation of the EU 
budget. This system favours a lack of full accountability.242  
____________________________ 
 
fund, the return fund and the European refugee fund) are implemented under 
shared or decentralised management arrangements. 
240 See Art. 5 TEC. See also the section “The ‘European’ added value: What is it?”. 
241 The reference here is to the multi-annual framework of the financial perspective. 
See the section “Financial perspective: Whose perspective?” 
242 Concerning the various aspects of responsibility in implementing the EU 
budget, see Cipriani (2006). 106 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
The need for a management culture 
Since the early 1970s, as a result of the progressive development of 
common policies and successive enlargements, the need to adapt and 
improve the structures and procedures of the Commission’s machinery has 
become more and more evident. Awareness of this has resulted in various 
internal and external studies and reports that have examined the 
functioning of the Commission’s services and provided specific proposals 
for improvement.243 But the recommendations presented in these reports 
have only been implemented to a limited extent. 
The reform process received increased impetus towards the mid-
1990s. At that time, the Commission was about to prepare the future 
financial framework beyond 2000, with the prospect of an enlarged Union 
and following far-reaching changes that had taken place over the previous 
decade (the accession of new member states, the modifications of the 
Treaties by the Single Act and the Treaty of Maastricht and two significant 
financial packages). The time was ripe to prepare future changes, not all the 
implications of which could be imagined.  
The development of the EU required a greater focus than in the past 
on what was essential, giving priority to areas where the EU could provide 
real added value. To do that, it was necessary to promote the sound and 
efficient management of the Commission’s services, by improving the use 
of human and financial resources and enhancing evaluation and 
monitoring. As evidence of the need for a deep change, above all in 
behaviour,244 the then President of the European Commission Jacques 
____________________________ 
243 In 1978, the Spierenburg Group was set up to examine ways of reforming the 
organisation, structures and administrative policy of the Commission. The 
Spierenburg report, published in 1979, called in particular for the appointment of a 
single vice president for coordinating the Commission’s work and for a reduction 
in the number of Commissioners (one per member state), portfolios and 
directorates-general. Almost simultaneously three eminent politicians were asked 
to examine ways of improving the mechanisms and procedures of the Community 
institutions. The ‘Report of the Three Wise Men’, also submitted in 1979, confirmed 
many of the recommendations of the Spierenburg report.  
244 Concerning proper behaviour in the exercise of public office and the 
development of a consciousness for ethics in the functioning of EU institutions, see 
Giusta (2006). RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 107 
 
Santer remarked, “My colleagues and I are determined to improve the 
Commission’s budgetary and administrative culture.”245 
Against this background the Sound and Efficient Financial 
Management Programme (SEM 2000) was launched in 1995.246 In 1997 a 
screening exercise was launched, known as ‘Designing tomorrow’s 
Commission’ (Decode), with the aim of providing an up-to-date analysis of 
all activities carried out by the Commission, as well as the resources and 
working methods used, to enable it to plan its future and begin the process 
of reforming its organisation and the way it works.247 During the same 
year, Agenda 2000 outlined the broad outlook for the development of the 
EU and its policies beyond the turn of the century, for the impact of 
enlargement on the Union as a whole and the future financial framework 
beyond 2000.248 
Both SEM 2000 and Decode were combined in 1998 in a single 
measure, ‘Tomorrow’s Commission’, seeking to change the Commission’s 
management culture. During the same year, as a result of SEM 2000, 11 
____________________________ 
245 See Santer (1995). 
246 The first two stages of the initiative concerned management reforms within the 
Commission itself, resulting in three communications in 1995 setting out a 
programme of action. The third stage concerned improved partnership with the 
member states on the financial management of EU expenditure; it involved the 
creation, in 1996, of a group of personal representatives of finance and budget 
ministers who mainly dealt with the management of the structural policies. One of 
the main results of this exercise was the adoption of Commission Regulation (EC) 
No. 2064/97 of 15 October 1997 establishing detailed arrangements for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4253/88, OJ L 290, 23.10.1997, 
which sets down minimum standards of financial control by the member states of 
operations co-financed by the structural funds. SEM 2000 was also at the origin of 
the MAP 2000 programme, built around a threefold strategy (decentralisation, 
simplification and personnel management) and aimed at in-depth changes in the 
field of administration and personnel policy. 
247 The final report formulated a number of recommendations on the organisation 
and running of the Commission in different areas, including performance 
indicators, internal coordination, good practices and control. 
248 For a description of Agenda 2000, see footnote 42. 108 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
recommendations were presented.249 Also in 1998, the Williamson report 
on the modernisation of staff policy was presented. 
All these initiatives witnessed the acknowledgment that to cope with 
future challenges the Commission’s budgetary and administrative culture 
would have to be radically changed at all levels. Hence, the objective was 
ambitious, covering at the same time improving effectiveness and 
supervision in the management of funds, monitoring the execution of 
decentralised tasks and increasing institutional and staff accountability. 
Indeed, “the Commission has had to take on a growing number of new 
tasks, resulting in successive reorganisations which have often had to be 
carried out hastily and without adequate preparation”.250 
A profound change in the working culture of the Commission would 
have meant transforming a classical international organisation of 
generalists into a modern administration of policy managers, capable of 
managing an increased amount of funds in various policy areas within a 
unique institutional framework. It must be recognised that the task was not 
easy as the Commission was trying to undertake by way of reform in a few 
years more than it had done in the previous 40 years.  
The year 1998 marked a watershed in the reform process, with the 
European Parliament first postponing and then refusing to give discharge 
to the Commission for the 1996 financial year,251 thus making official the 
____________________________ 
249 Among these were the following: Recommendation No. 2 – whenever policy 
decisions are taken, establish the full cost of any proposal in terms of financial, 
human and other resources (link between the administrative appropriations and 
operating appropriations); Recommendation No. 4 – systematic evaluation for all 
Community programmes and action; DG XIX and XX to step up their work on 
improving cost-effectiveness and evaluation techniques; and Recommendation No. 
7 – departments to ensure, when drafting a regulation and at subsequent stages 
ending with final adoption, that it is clear and amenable to control and contains 
safeguards against attempted fraud. 
250 See European Commission (1997a), p. 48. 
251 See European Parliament, Resolution of 31 March 1998 (op. cit.) and the Minutes 
of 17 December 1998. This was the second time discharge was refused. It had 
occurred previously in November 1984 concerning the 1982 financial year. 
Ironically, the Commission’s President was another Luxembourger, Gaston Thorn, 
who did not resign, however, as the term of office of the Commission was to expire 
only few weeks afterwards. RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 109 
 
crisis of the EU’s financial management. One year later, the Parliament 
highlighted “the Commission’s belated recognition of the crisis facing it 
regarding the financial management of the Community budget and its lack 
of transparency and accountability” and finally called for a Committee of 
Independent Experts to “examine the way in which the Commission 
detects and deals with fraud, mismanagement and nepotism, including a 
fundamental review of Commission practices in the awarding of all 
financial contracts”.252 
The Committee of Independent Experts provided two reports253 in 
which they found more particularly that the administrative and financial 
culture, the sense of individual responsibility among staff and awareness of 
the need to comply with the rules of sound financial management had not 
developed with the progressive assignment of implementation tasks to the 
Commission. The Committee noted at the same time a mismatch between 
the objectives assigned to the Commission and the resources that the 
Commission was able or chose to employ. It found no evidence of any 
attempt by the Commission to assess in advance the volume of resources 
required when a new policy was discussed among the Community 
institutions. The Committee also expressed concern at the growing 
reluctance among the members of the hierarchy to acknowledge their 
responsibility:  
It is becoming difficult to find anyone who has even the slightest sense 
of responsibility. However, that sense of responsibility is essential. It 
must be demonstrated, first and foremost, by the Commissioners 
individually and the Commission as a body. The temptation to deprive 
____________________________ 
252 See European Parliament, Resolution of 14 January 1999 on improving the 
financial management of the Commission, para 1. See also the Resolution of 23 
March 1999 on the resignation of the Commission and the appointment of a new 
Commission. 
253 See Committee of Independent Experts, First Report  on Allegations Regarding 
Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission, Brussels, 15 March 
1999(a). The Committee’s Second Report on Reform of the Commission: Analysis of 
current practice and proposals for tackling mismanagement, irregularities and fraud was 
published on 10 September 1999(b). Mr Walter van Gerven, who has been member 
of the Experts Committee, has defined the first sentence of the quotation as a ‘cri du 
coeur’, an overstatement that could have been omitted. See van Gerven (2007), p. 7. 110 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
the concept of responsibility of all substance is a dangerous one. That 
concept is the ultimate manifestation of democracy.254 
  The Committee finally observed that the Community civil service 
“tends to favour planning and negotiation at the expense of management 
and monitoring, which are less highly thought of” and prefers “to think 
rather than to do”.255 
It was not sufficient for the Santer Commission to adopt, in the first 
months of 1999, two codes laying down the rules of conduct and 
organisation applicable to Members of the Commission and governing the 
relations between Commissioners and Commission departments.256 The 
Santer Commission resigned in March 1999, under the threat of a censure 
motion, immediately after publication of the first report of the Committee 
of Independent Experts. 
The Committee’s reports (and the subsequent resignation of the 
Commission) gave rise to serious concerns and a fall in motivation among 
the Commission staff, at all levels. The general feeling was that staff were 
being held unjustly responsible for the somewhat unorganised growth of 
the Commission’s tasks.257 
In 2000, the “revolution in the Commission’s operating procedures”258 
materialised in a White Paper on Reform.259 Meant to be “a real 
____________________________ 
254 See Committee of Independent Experts (1999a), para. 9.4.25.  
255 See Committee of Independent Experts (1999b), para. 8.3.  
256 Later in the year, a code of ethics for officials was also introduced. 
257 Maybe because it was aware of this feeling, the Committee of Independent 
Experts recognised in its second report that they “had the opportunity of meeting 
many Commission officials of widely differing levels of seniority and doing a great 
variety of jobs. In most cases the Committee was appreciative of their abilities, 
their spirit of public service and their sincere desire to play their part in the efforts 
needed to improve the system.” See Committee of Independent Experts (1999b), 
para. 8.4.  
258 See the address delivered by Romano Prodi (1999) to the European Parliament 
of 21 July 1999. 
259 See European Commission, White Paper on Reforming the Commission, 
COM(2000) 200, Brussels, 1 March 2000. The Commission intended to turn over a 
new leaf and to break completely with the past. More specifically, the declared 
objective was to embed in the Commission’s administrative culture the need to 
improve the quality, relevance and definition of objectives and indicators, and to 
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organisational and cultural Big Bang”,260 the main aim was once again to 
put in place an administrative structure suited in all respects to dealing 
with the expanded role and competencies of the EU.  
Since 2000, many actions have been implemented to achieve greater 
efficiency and accountability. Roadmaps261 and action plans have become a 
recurrent practice, as well as the extensive use of reporting initiatives. The 
Commission’s services have undergone sometimes profound 
____________________________ 
 
report on performance. ‘Activity-based management’ was introduced to establish 
the relationships between objectives, actions and resources. To make the best 
possible use of human resources, measures were proposed to favour a greater 
degree of meritocracy, more credible and verifiable performance appraisal, lifelong 
learning and devolved management responsibility. In addition, a new system 
aiming at combining the decentralisation of management control with an effective 
central audit system was introduced to improve financial management (for a 
progress report on the Commission’s reform, see European Commission, 
Communication on a Progress report on the Commission reform beyond the 
reform mandate, COM(2005) 668, Brussels, 21 December 2005(g)). 
260 See the speech by Romano Prodi (2000b) to the European Parliament of 1 March 
2000.  
261 For example, following the repeated qualification of the Court of Auditors’ 
yearly statement on the legality/regularity of EU spending, namely in the large 
expenditure areas of the agricultural and structural policies, in 2005 the 
Commission launched a Communication on a roadmap to an integrated internal 
control framework (see European Commission, COM(2005) 252, Brussels, 15 June 
2005(h)). This has been followed by a panel of member states’ experts, by the 
establishment of a ‘gap assessment’ of the Commission’s services (see European 
Commission,  A gap assessment between the internal control framework in the 
Commission Services, and the control principles set out in the Court of Auditors’ “proposal 
for a Community internal control framework” Opinion No. 2/2004, Commission Staff 
Working Document, SEC(2005) 1152, Brussels, 28 September 2005(i)) and finally by 
an action plan currently under implementation (see European Commission, 
Communication on a Commission Action Plan towards an Integrated Internal 
Control Framework, COM(2006) 9, Brussels, 17 January 2006(h)). In its 2006 
Annual Report, the Court of Auditors found that the impact of the Commission’s 
action plan “is only likely to be evident in the medium to long term” (para. 0.8) and 
that, at the end of 2006, the large majority of these actions were still in progress or 
required follow-up as the objective was not entirely achieved or the impact was not 
yet realised (2007c, para. 2.22). 112 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
reorganisations, audit staff have been increased and their accountability 
enhanced, especially with the reporting obligations of directors-general.262 
The staff culture of the European Commission has changed considerably. 
It remains a fact, however, that the Commission, as an institution, has 
not necessarily evolved in one key aspect: assuming full responsibility for 
the implementation of the EU budget. The European Parliament and the 
Court of Auditors263 were quick to point out that the increased 
responsibility of directors-general was not accompanied by the 
endorsement of direct (and not only political) responsibility by the 
Members of the Commission.264  
____________________________ 
262 According to the Financial Regulation (Art. 60(7)), each director-general is to 
report to his/her institution on the performance of his/her duties in the form of an 
annual activity report together with financial and management information 
confirming that the information contained in the report presents a true and fair 
view except as otherwise specified in any reservations related to defined areas of 
revenue and expenditure. The report must indicate the results of the operations by 
reference to the objectives set, the risks associated with these operations, the use 
made of the resources provided and the efficiency and effectiveness of the internal 
control system.  
263 See the European Parliament, Resolution of 12 April 2005 on the discharge for 
implementation of the European Union general budget for the financial year 2003 
(para. 62). See also Resolution of 27 April 2006 on the discharge for implementation 
of the European Union general budget for the financial year 2004 (paras 74 to 80) 
and the Resolution of 24 April 2007 for the financial year 2005 (op. cit., paras 71 to 
73). In this last Resolution, the Parliament referred to the opinion expressed by the 
Commission’s internal auditor to the effect that “a full involvement of 
Commissioners to evaluate political risks would allow better overall management 
of risks and thus improve planning, resource allocation and policy delivery” (para. 
7 2 ) .  T h e  P a r l i a m e n t  e v e n  w e n t  o n  t o  i n s i s t  t h a t  “ w i t h  s o m e  e x c e p t i o n s ,  
Commissioners need to be better prepared for hearings concerning the 2006 
discharge procedure” (para. 74). For the European Court of Auditors, see the 
Annual Report concerning the financial year 2004 (European Court of Auditors, 2005), 
para. 1.57.  
264 As in 2005, in the synthesis of management achievements in 2006, the 
Commission made this declaration: “By adopting this synthesis, the Commission 
assumes its political responsibility for management by its Directors-General and 
Heads of service, on the basis of the assurances and reservations made by them in 
these Reports, while acknowledging that further efforts are needed to resolve a 
number of weaknesses.” See European Commission (2007d), p. 2. The Commission 
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Concluding remarks 
The staff culture – it could not be otherwise – is very much dependent upon 
the strategic role that the institution attributes to itself. As the European 
Parliament observed, “internal control in the Commission will never be 
stronger than the political will behind it”.265 
Are shared management and accountability compatible? 
Convinced that its responsibility as regards the implementation of the 
budget is broader than its executive powers, the Commission has 
repeatedly shown that it is reluctant to accept full responsibility for the 
execution of a budget that is largely predetermined and managed by the 
member states and their administrations. In 1987, at a time when the EU 
budget was gradually increasing assistance for structural policies, the 
Commission had already held that its “responsibility for monitoring 
implementation will be reduced since the member states will be involved 
more directly in the management” of the programmes.266 In the 2000 White 
Paper on Reform, the Commission developed the policy of externalising the 
implementation tasks for certain programmes to executive agencies, with 
____________________________ 
 
points out that the “2000 reform centred on ensuring Authorising Officers by 
Delegation were solely responsible for the execution of their activities”, hence 
Commissioners “could not be further involved in the management of the risks 
without going against the separation of tasks and responsibilities between 
Commissioners and Directors-general” (see European Commission, Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament on the follow-up to 2005 discharge decisions 
(summary), COM(2007) 538, Brussels, 19 September 2007(r), p. 6, and the attached 
Commission Working Document, SEC(2007) 1185, p. 17). This stance does not seem 
to be in line with the logic of the delegation of tasks set in the Financial Regulation. 
Indeed, the Commission is the ‘authorising officer’ and directors-general are 
authorising officers by delegation of the Commission. According to the general 
principles of Community law, only tasks can be delegated, not the responsibility. 
For example, in the event of subdelegation, the authorising officer by delegation 
continues to be responsible for the efficiency and effectiveness of the internal 
management and control systems put in place and for the choice of the authorising 
officer by subdelegation (see the Financial Regulation, Arts 59, 60 and 66). 
265 See European Parliament, Resolution of 27 April 2006 (op. cit.), para. 78.  
266 See European Commission (1987), p. 21.  114 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
the objective of focusing Commission staff resources on the institution’s 
core tasks of achieving the goals of Community programmes more 
effectively.267 This stance was further confirmed by the proposal in the 
2007–13 financial perspective.268 
The Commission has interpreted the concept of responsibility as 
basically limited to the implementation of the specific tasks that it considers 
its personal duty and tends to dissociate its own responsibilities from those 
____________________________ 
267 See European Commission (2000). Executive agencies are the central element of 
the new externalisation instrument. They are created by the Commission, which 
supervises the steering committee of the agency, and are directly responsible for 
the implementation of specific Community programmes. Four executive agencies 
have so far been created: the Executive Agency for Competitiveness and 
Innovation (previously the Intelligent Energy Executive Agency), the Public Health 
Executive Agency, the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency and 
the Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency. Others are on their 
w a y ,  s u c h  a s  t w o  o r  m o r e  f o r  t h e  implementation of parts of the 7th Research 
Framework Programme. It is worth noting that the European Parliament recently 
considered that the “ever growing number of Agencies does not always reflect the 
real needs of the Union and its citizens” and therefore invited the Commission “to 
present a cost-benefit study before the setting up of any new Agency” (see 
European Parliament, Resolution of 24 April 2007, op. cit., para. 180). In the same 
Resolution, the Parliament also underlined the need for a cost-benefit analysis, 
which, for example, was not satisfactory in the case of the externalisation of the 
management of Community financial support for the trans-European transport 
network (see para. 203). In this respect, the Interinstitutional Agreement for the 
2007–13 financial framework foresees that  
when drawing up its proposal for the creation of any new agency, the 
Commission will assess the budgetary implications for the expenditure 
heading concerned. On the basis of that information and without prejudice to 
the legislative procedures governing the setting up of the agency, the two 
arms of the budgetary authority commit themselves, in the framework of 
budgetary cooperation, to arrive at a timely agreement on the financing of the 
agency. (European Parliament, Council and Commission, 2006, para. 47) 
268 The proposal states, “one of the fundamental principles of Commission reform 
is that the Commission’s core administration will in future focus on the 
development and monitoring of policies under the Treaty. The execution of these 
policies, as well as other executive activities at a European level, will where 
appropriate be delegated to other bodies.” See  European Commission (2004a), 
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that are specifically devolved to the member states.269 As a consequence, 
the Commission and the member states are to a large extent more 
‘counterparts’ than partners. Proof of this way of thinking is, for example, 
the legislative reform of the structural funds, where one of the main goals 
was meant to “clearly delimit…the framework, the nature, and the division 
of responsibility between the different actors concerned by the execution of 
the Community budget”.270 The Commission’s proposal to amend Art. 274 
____________________________ 
269 This concept seems to have recently met with some degree of sympathy at the 
European Parliament, whose position has evolved somewhat in recent years. In 
2004, the Parliament stressed that, “even though the day-to-day management is 
shared, financial responsibility remains indivisible and ultimate responsibility for 
implementation lies with the Commission” (see European Parliament, Resolution 
of 21 April 2004 on the discharge for implementation of the European Union 
general budget for the financial year 2002, para. 8). It repeated the same concept in 
2005 (see the Resolution of 12 April 2005, op. cit., para. 19). The Parliament’s 
p o s i t i o n  c h a n g e d  i n  2 0 0 6  w h e n  i t  e m p h a s i s e d  t h a t  “ t h e  o v e r r i d i n g  p r i n c i p l e  
advocated by Parliament is that the relevant political authorities within the 
member states take full responsibility for the funds placed at their disposal” (see 
European Parliament, Resolution of 2 February 2006 on national management 
declarations, para. 9). One may observe that this same concept was mentioned in 
the 2004 Discharge Resolution, omitting however the reference to the ‘full’ 
responsibility of the member states for the funds placed at their disposal (see the 
Resolution of 27 April 2006, op. cit., para. H). The Parliament finally determined in 
2 0 0 7  “ t h a t  e a c h  m e m b e r  s t a t e  m u s t  b e  a b l e  t o  t a k e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  
management of EU funds received” (see European Parliament, Resolution of 24 
April 2007, op. cit., para. 23). 
270 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation laying down general 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and 
the Cohesion Fund, COM(2004) 492, Brussels, 14 July 2004(l), para. 5.3. Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006 of 11 November 2006 (op. cit.) specifies the 
respective responsibilities of the Commission and the member states (see Arts 70 to 
73). For example, following the Commission’s proposal and in contrast with the 
rules applicable to the previous financial perspective (see Art. 35(2) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, OJ L 161, 26.6.1999), the Regulation does not 
foresee a systematic participation of the Commission in the ‘monitoring 
committees’ (see Art. 64(2)). These committees are nevertheless in charge of 
assessing the effectiveness and quality of the implementation of operational 
programmes financed by the structural funds, by reviewing progress made 
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TEC in the framework of the European Convention271 is another 
confirmation of this principle of management separation.  
The process of progressively shifting the Commission’s management 
responsibilities to third bodies, although often justified on the grounds of 
the ‘smart’ objective of simplification, has found further recognition in the 
recent amendments of the financial rules. The Financial Regulation has 
confirmed that the implementing tasks delegated by the Commission 
“must be clearly defined and fully sup e r v i s e d  a s  t o  t h e  u s e  m a d e  o f  
them”,272 thus requiring the Commission to make sure that all the 
conditions necessary for such a delegation are met (in practice, that the 
national management and control systems work properly). But the 
amended provisions have given an extensive interpretation of the concept 
of delegation, enhancing the responsibility of member states in the event of 
shared management. The Commission’s role of ensuring that the funds are 
____________________________ 
271 The Commission called on the Convention “to examine the feasibility of sharing 
responsibility for budget implementation when the member states are responsible 
for most of the management of funds” (see European Commission, 
Communication on a Project for the European Union, COM(2002) 247 final, 
Brussels, 22 May 2002(d), p. 6). The Commission representatives to the European 
Convention also proposed, although unsuccessfully, that member states take part, 
along with the Commission, in the procedure of auditing the accounts for the 
discharge. Thus, the annual report of the Court of Auditors would have been 
accompanied by the answers of all member states. The European Parliament could 
also have asked to hear the member states, which could even have been the subject 
of observations sent to them directly (see European Convention, Proposal for an 
amendment to Art. III-311 of the draft Treaty submitted by Messrs Barnier, 
Vitorino, O’Sullivan and Ponzano, 2003(d), retrieved from http://european-
convention.eu.int/docs/treaty/pdf/892/Art%20III%20311%20Barnier%20FR.pdf). 
Currently, pursuant to the Financial Regulation (Art. 143(6)), member states 
forward their comments to the Commission, which draws up a report for this 
purpose. In the report concerning the financial year 2002 the Commission 
reiterated its wish to include the member states in the contradictory procedure 
with the Court of Auditors so they could defend their point of view directly (see 
European Commission, Report from the Commission on Member States’ replies to the 
Court of Auditors’ 2002 Annual Report, COM(2004) 859, Brussels, 5 January 2005(j), p. 
14). 
272 See Art. 54(1) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002 of 13 
December 2006 (op. cit.).  RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 117 
 
used in accordance with the applicable rules is focused on financial 
correction mechanisms that “enable it to assume final responsibility for the 
implementation of the budget”.273 (See also Box 5.1).  
Box 5.1  Financial corrections 
For different reasons, reliance cannot be put solely on financial corrections to 
guarantee a correct implementation of the EU budget. Because they are 
likely to lead to legal disputes, financial corrections often generate long 
drawn-out procedures, the outcome of which is uncertain. In addition, the 
amount of the financial corrections appears to be in practice not particularly 
high (around 0.5% in agricultural and structural policies), so it is not 
possible to argue that the financial corrections have a key dissuasive effect. 
Also, financial corrections do not constitute genuine financial sanctions. 
They essentially represent the recovery of irregular expenditure, the impact 
of which is often neutralised by the replacement of one project by another, as 
happens in the case of the structural funds. In addition, the cost is generally 
borne by the member states and not by the final recipients. In this 
perspective, they constitute a further contribution by taxpayers. The 
practical possibility of imposing financial corrections is also limited by the 
necessarily reduced number of the Commission’s controls, which, moreover, 
generally occur at the end of a programme, i.e. at a stage where, despite any 
potential financial correction, it is no longer possible to correct fundamental 
system weaknesses and re-direct the objectives to be achieved by the co-
financed policies. Finally, by their very nature, financial corrections can be 
applied only in the event of the established violation of precise rules. They 
are therefore much more suitable for sanctioning violations of legality and 
regularity rather than weaknesses in terms of sound financial management.  
____________________________ 
273 Ibid., Art. 53b(4). While expressing “grave concern at the large number of 
errors detected by the Court in transactions at final beneficiary level”, the 
European Parliament noted “where there is a shared management arrangement, 
responsibility for preventing, identifying and correcting errors at final beneficiary 
level lies with the member states whilst at the same time the Commission is 
responsible for giving clear, efficient and effective guidelines to member states on 
how to prevent, identify and correct these errors”. In the case where member 
states’ control systems are still insufficient the Parliament called on the 
Commission to “impose clear deadlines and apply sanctions where those 
deadlines are not met” (see European Parliament, Resolution of 24 April 2007, op. 
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Box 5.1, cont. 
Observance of the latter principle is however a key element of the conditions 
on which the implementation of the budget should be based. For all these 
reasons the Commission’s confidence in the capacity of this instrument to 
ensure observance of the applicable provisions, thus making good any loss 
to the Community’s budget, does not meet with unanimous agreement. The 
European Parliament wondered for example “if the current system of 
financial correction is sufficient to encourage member states to combat fraud 
and irregularities”.*  The Court of Auditors remarked that the financial 
corrections could provide no more “than a limited, auxiliary contribution to 
the necessary rigour of everyday management. Their effectiveness is 
essentially dependent on the number of checks performed. Furthermore, 
since financial corrections would intervene only after the fact, they could not 
be enough on their own to make good all the consequences of any 
transactions that might be implemented even though they did not meet the 
necessary regulatory requirements.”** 
______________ 
* See European Parliament, Resolution of 10 April 2002 on the discharge for 
implementing the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2000, para. 
78. 
** See European Court of Auditors, Opinion No. 2/2005 of 18 March 2005 on the proposal 
for a Council Regulation laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund, OJ C 121, 
20.5.2005, para. 14. 
 
It is worth noting that a recent amendment to the Commission’s rules 
implementing the Financial Regulation omitted the previous provision 
whereby in the event of shared management, the Commission “shall first 
carry out document and on-the-spot checks into the existence, relevance 
and proper operation within the entities to which it entrusts 
implementation, in accordance with the rules of sound financial 
management” of the procedures applied, of control systems, of accounting 
systems and procurement and grant award procedures.274 
____________________________ 
274 See Art. 35(1) of Commission Regulation No. 2342/2002 of 23 December 2002 
laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, 
Euratom) No. 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general 
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This means that in practice, the setting-up and the management of the 
programmes implemented in shared management arrangements are left 
fully in the hands of the member states. The supervisory role of the 
Commission is limited to issuing manuals and notes on best practice, 
which, however detailed, cannot be imposed (because of the subsidiarity 
principle) on the thousands of national bodies that are not directly or 
functionally subordinated to it. Incidentally, the Commission also carries 
out, to the extent possible, some controls that are limited in number and in 
impact. Its services acknowledge that they are unable to check 
systematically the reliability of information on the numerous national 
systems, especially as regards the structural policies.275 The European 
____________________________ 
 
budget of the European Communities (OJ L 357, 31.12.2002). This provision is no 
longer applicable since Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 478/2007 of 23 
April 2007 amending Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 2342/2002 laying down 
detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 
1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the 
European Communities (OJ L 111/13, 28.4.2007). The low implementation rate for 
the structural funds (see the section “Is the size of the budget a major issue?” and 
footnote 29 in particular) is symptomatic of the necessity to make sure beforehand 
that national systems can effectively cope with the different requirements and the 
volume of funds attributed. A study undertaken for the European Parliament 
investigated the main reasons limiting the effective implementation of structural 
funds in Poland. According to the study, the implementation of the structural 
funds suffered from deficiencies in terms of establishing the necessary legal, 
organisational and human resources framework to enable the effective use of 
support. To ensure a proper implementation during the 2007–13 period, the study 
concluded that the legal framework needs to be finalised, access to co-financing 
should be made easier, a close monitoring of the implementation should be made 
certain and, finally, staff training should be organised, in particular on public 
procurement and environmental legislation (see European Parliament, The 
Structural Funds’ Implementation in Poland – Challenges for 2007-2013, Budgetary 
Affairs, September 2007(b)). 
275 See European Commission, Communication on Synthesis of 2003 Annual 
Activity Reports of DGs and Services,  COM(2004) 418 final, Brussels, 19 July 
2004(m), p. 8. The assessment of the effective functioning of national systems 
undertaken by the directorates-general responsible for structural policies indicate 
that the majority of the funds are managed by national systems in need of 
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Parliament has nonetheless asked the Commission to “present every six 
months a scoreboard showing member states’ progress as regards efficient 
implementation of supervisory and control systems as described in the 
regulations”.276 
____________________________ 
 
improvements to correct material deficiencies in key controls and, in some cases, 
by seriously deficient systems.  
276 See European Parliament, Resolution of 27 April 2006 (op. cit.), para. 135. The 
Interinstitutional Agreement for the 2007–13 period also provides, 
As part of their enhanced responsibilities for structural funds and in 
accordance with national constitutional requirements, the relevant audit 
authorities in member states will produce an assessment concerning the 
compliance of management and control systems with the regulations of the 
Community. Member states therefore undertake to produce an annual 
summary at the appropriate national level of the available audits and 
declarations. (European Parliament, Council and Commission, 2006, para. 44) 
This is confirmed by the Financial Regulation (see Art. 53b(4) of Council 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002 of 13 December 2006, op. cit.). The 
modalities of this assessment by the relevant national audit authorities concerning 
the compliance of management and control systems for the structural funds are 
provided for in Art. 62(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006 of 11 
November 2006, op. cit.). The European Parliament has expressed confidence that 
this assessment of the audit authorities “should make a substantial contribution 
towards improving management of the Community budget”, and has asked the 
Commission “to draw up, on the basis of that information, a document analysing 
the strengths and weaknesses of each member state’s national system for the 
administration and control of Community funds and the results of the audits 
conducted” (see European Parliament, Resolution of 24 April 2007, op. cit., paras E 
and 34). In the light of the important role played by the member states in 
budgetary implementation, the European Parliament previously suggested that 
each minister for finance draw up “an annual ex-post Declaration of Assurance as 
regards the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions” (see European 
Parliament, Resolution of 12 April 2005, op. cit., para. 21). This suggestion, 
however, was not favourably received by the member states, with the Council of 
Ministers invoking the need “not to put into question the existing balance between 
the Commission and the member states or to compromise responsibility and 
accountability at the operational level” (see the Ecofin Council Conclusions, 
13678/05, Brussels, 8 November 2005, p. 9). Nonetheless, some member states have 
expressed the intention of proceeding in that direction on a voluntary basis (for 
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If shared management has developed de facto into two distinct levels 
of management, the ‘solution’ towards accountability has been found in a 
tightly-woven system of declarations, to be produced by the relevant 
national bodies with a view to certifying the compliance of the operations 
financed by the EU budget with the rules applicable. This has especially 
been the case since 1995, when the Court of Auditors established for the 
first time a yearly statement of assurance on EU expenditure.277 Because of 
the level of errors found, the Court has never been able to deliver an 
unqualified statement concerning expenditure under shared 
management.278 The Barroso Commission has made a strategic objective 
out of obtaining an unqualified statement of assurance from the Court.279 
The Commission expects to derive assurance from this system of 
declarations and thus to be confident that the expenditure it authorises will 
prove in the end to be in full compliance with the applicable rules.  
____________________________ 
277 Art. 248 TEC, as modified by the Maastricht Treaty, stipulates that the Court of 
Auditors “shall provide the European Parliament and the Council with a statement 
of assurance as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of 
the underlying transactions”. The main objectives are to inform the discharge 
authority of whether 
•  the consolidated financial statements of the general budget of the European 
Union, as drawn up by the European Commission, present a true and fair 
view of the financial activities for the year and of the year-end situation; and 
•  legal and contractual provisions have been respected when executing the 
budget.  
278 Although the Court has recently recognised, concerning agricultural spending, 
that “where properly applied”, the “Integrated Administration and Control 
System…is an effective control system for limiting the risk of error or irregular 
expenditure” (see European Court of Auditors, 2006a, para. 5.53). It is worth noting 
that the Court has issued a qualified statement also for areas where the 
Commission has a direct management responsibility, such as in the case of 
research spending. It should also be observed that despite the continuous qualified 
statements by the Court on the legality of expenditure, the European Parliament 
has not, for all that, refused to give discharge to the Commission or demanded its 
resignation by a censure vote (ex Art. 201 TEC).  
279 See European Commission, Communication from the President in agreement 
with Vice-President Wallström, Strategic Objectives 2005–2009, Europe 2010: A 
Partnership for European Renewal, Prosperity, Solidarity and Security, COM(2005) 
12 final, Brussels, 26 January 2005(k), p. 5. See also footnote 261. 122 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
It seems clear that the responsibility itself cannot be delegated,280 all 
the more so because member states do not seem prepared to accept it in 
place of the Commission. The question is therefore how this cascade of 
declarations will allow in practice for full accountability, knowing, for 
example, that the Commission is not willing to take a position, on an 
annual basis, on the legality of the expenditure incurred by the member 
states, but rather prefers to wait (because of the multi-annual nature of the 
programming period) for the closure of the programming period, hence 
putting absolute confidence in the ‘thaumaturgic’ effect of financial 
corrections, which nonetheless remains to be proved.281 The European 
Court of Auditors has just made this observation: “A declaration that 
systems are functioning as required by EU regulations may not in itself 
provide assurance about the legality and regularity of the transactions 
concerned.”282 The risk is that, on the contrary, a fundamental gap in the 
chain of financial responsibility will remain and will result, in the end, in a 
de facto amendment of the provisions of Art. 274 TEC, according to which 
the Commission “shall implement the budget…having regard to the 
principles of sound financial management”. 283 
____________________________ 
280 One could not state this principle more solemnly than by referring to the 
Financial Regulation: “The implementation methods should guarantee that the 
procedures for protecting Community funds are complied with, whatever the 
entity responsible for all or part of this implementation and must confirm that final 
responsibility for budgetary implementation lies with the Commission in 
accordance with Art. 274 of the Treaty” (see Financial Regulation (EC) No. 
1605/2002 of 13 December 2006, op. cit., Recital No. 16). The Commission’s full 
responsibility is reiterated in Recital No. 37. Several judgements of the European 
Court of Justice have confirmed this interpretation (see for example, Case law C-
16/88, Commission v. Council [1989] ECR I-3457, para. 15; Case law C-106/96, UK v. 
Commission [1998] ECR I-2729, para. 15).  
281 See Box 5.1. 
282 See European Court of Auditors, Opinion No. 6/2007 of 19 June 2007 on the 
annual summaries of member states, ‘national declarations’ of member states and 
audit work on EU funds of national audit bodies, Luxembourg, para. XI. 
283 The new reform Treaty for Europe, agreed by EU heads of state and government 
in Lisbon (18-19 October 2007), will modify article 274 of the EC treaty along the 
lines of the modifications agreed in article III-407 of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. In particular, the new provision emphasises that the 
budget is implemented by the Commission "in cooperation with the Member 
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Concerning in particular the issue of sound financial management, 
one should note that practically all efforts in the reform of the EU’s 
financial management have been concentrated on the conformity of EU 
budget expenditure with specific eligibility conditions. Most of the rules 
were and are devised primarily with the objective of ensuring compliance 
in terms of the legality of expenditure. The European Parliament has 
indeed pointed out that “the focus actually given to the legality and 
regularity of the spending does not help to inform the legislator and the 
public as to whether the money has been spent effectively”.284 Moreover, 
the ‘regularity’ of expenditure does not ensure that the objectives have been 
met, which are, for example in the case of structural policies, “reducing 
disparities between the levels of development of the various regions”.285 
Indeed, it has been observed that “there can be projects, brilliantly executed 
in terms of formal rules and formulas, but still failing in achieving any 
objective, and vice versa”.286 
In this respect, one should note that there seems to be an unclear 
understanding of the concept of sound financial management. For example, 
the Interinstitutional Agreement for the 2007–13 financial framework 
provides that “priority will be given to sound financial management 
aiming at a positive Statement of Assurance, for funds under shared 
management”, however referring back to the assessment concerning the 
compliance of management and control systems with the regulations of the 
Community to be produced by the member states.287 Similarly, the director-
generals at the Commission have confirmed that they have obtained 
reasonable assurance that the resources allocated to the activities of their 
directorate-general have been used “for their intended purpose and in 
____________________________ 
 
States" and that "the control and audit obligations of the Member States in the 
implementation of the budget and the resulting responsibilities" will be fixed by 
regulation. 
284 See European Parliament, Resolution of 12 April 2005 (op. cit.), para. 32(d). 
285 See Art. 158 TEC. 
286 See the speech of Siim Kallas of 23 October 2006 before the European Parliament 
Budgetary Control Committee (Kallas, 2006). 
287 See European Parliament, Council and Commission (2006), para. 44.  124 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
accordance with the principles of sound financial management”.288 On 
what ground this assurance is based, remains vague. The parameter under 
consideration is the legality of spending: an audit of the performance of 
projects is not a current practice at the Commission.  
Actually, the concept of value for money is now well defined by the 
Financial Regulation. The Regulation provides that the appropriations shall 
be used “in accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness”, that “specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed 
objectives shall be set for all sectors of activity covered by the budget”, that 
“achievement of those objectives shall be monitored by performance 
indicators for each activity” and also that “information shall be provided 
by the spending authorities to the budgetary authority”. The Regulation 
finally provides that the institutions “shall undertake both ex ante and ex 
post evaluations in line with guidance provided by the Commission. Such 
evaluations shall be applied to all programmes and activities which entail 
significant spending and evaluation results disseminated to spending, 
legislative and budgetary authorities.”289 Yet, concerning the evaluations, 
____________________________ 
288 See for example the following European Commission reports: Annual Activity 
Report for the Year 2006, DG Regional Policy, Brussels, 30 March 2007(f), (p. 47); 
2006 Annual Activity Report, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunity, Brussels, 28 March 2007(g), (p. 54); and Annual Activity Report 2006, 
DG Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, Brussels, 29 March 2007(h), (p. 41). 
289 See Art. 27 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002 of 13 December 
2006 (op. cit.). The concept of ‘sound financial management’ made a late 
appearance in the provisions of the Treaty concerning the implementation of the 
budget. True, as early as in the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (1957), auditing the budget had been entrusted to an Audit Board with 
the purpose of establishing that “the financial management has been sound” (Art. 
206 TEC). But sound financial management is one of the principles applied to EU 
spending only since 1990, when the Financial Regulation was modified (Council 
Regulation (Euratom, ECSC, EEC) No. 610/90 of 13 March 1990 amending the 
Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977 applicable to the general budget of the 
European Communities, OJ L 70, 16.3.1990) to provide that “the budget 
appropriations must be used in accordance with the principles of sound financial 
management, and in particular those of economy and cost-effectiveness. 
Q u a n t i f i e d  o b j e c t i v e s  m u s t  b e  i d e n t i f i ed and the progress of their realization 
monitored.” The concept was subsequently enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union in 1992 where a few words were added to Art. 205 (nowadays 
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the specific rules applicable to the structural policies290 constitute an 
exception to the general principles of the Financial Regulation. First, the 
Commission’s guidance on evaluation methods, including quality 
standards, must be agreed upon with the member states and it will remain 
indicative. Also, contrary to the provisions of the Financial Regulation, ex 
ante evaluations are carried out by the member states. The Commission 
may carry out strategic evaluations and, in partnership with the member 
state concerned, evaluations linked to the monitoring of operational 
programmes where the monitoring of programmes reveals a significant 
departure from the goals initially set. The Commission is nevertheless 
responsible for ex post evaluations. The economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of expenditures are issues that are essentially dealt with later 
at the EU level in the evaluation process, with the limitations therein.291  
Concluding remarks 
It seems clear that shared management arrangements result in weaker 
accountability. This ‘cost’ is in the end a political choice. In addition, the 
increased emphasis on the compliance of EU budget expenditure with 
specific eligibility conditions has made the concept of value for money a 
kind of ‘poor relation’ in this context. The process of progressively 
discharging its management responsibilities to third parties (for example 
____________________________ 
 
Art. 274) of the EC Treaty, to indicate that the budget is implemented “in 
accordance with the principles of sound financial management”. In 1995, the 
Financial Regulation was modified again (Council Regulation (EC, Euratom, 
ECSC) No. 2333/95 of 18 September 1995, amending the Financial Regulation of 21 
December 1977 applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, OJ 
L 240, 7.10.1995), providing that the “mobilization of Community resources must 
be preceded by an evaluation to ensure that the resultant benefits are in proportion 
to the resources applied. All operations must be subject to regular review, in 
particular within the budgetary procedure, so that their justification may be 
verified.” The present provisions on sound financial management were introduced 
by the Financial Regulation recasting of 2002. 
290 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006 of 11 November 2006 (op. cit.), 
especially Arts 47 to 49. See also European Commission, Indicative Guidelines on 
Evaluation Methods: Evaluation during the programming period, Working Document 
No. 5, April 2007(m). 
291 See European Court of Auditors (2006a) and European Parliament (2006). 126 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
the member states and executive agencies) gives rise to the question of 
whether the Commission is not actually retracing its steps, gradually 
becoming once again an institution that devises and proposes policies 
instead of one that implements programmes.  
All responsible, nobody responsible? 
Experience suggests that separating responsibility from management has 
led to a shuttling of responsibilities backwards and forwards between the 
Commission and member states, agencies and other delegated bodies. In 
these circumstances, it is often difficult to identify who should do what to 
remedy a problem. As has been observed, 
The member states have a conflict of interest. On the one hand as 
members of the Council it is their duty in adopting regulations to 
create conditions for their implementation that are readily 
implemented and controlled by the Commission. On the other hand 
as nation states they favour their own systems of management and 
control. This hybrid arrangement leads to a lack of clarity on mutual 
responsibilities and obligations and fails to give any guarantee that 
the right balance has been struck in the interests of good management 
of Community monies.292 
The  millefeuille  of procedures, intervention levels and management 
and control bodies that characterises budgetary implementation in shared 
management arrangements inevitably brings with it the dilution of the 
responsibilities of the various protagonists. In the absence of a ‘taker’ for 
genuine final responsibility, the budgetary implementation is subject  de 
facto to a limited form of responsibility. One can even wonder whether the 
defining characteristic of budgetary implementation under shared 
management is not in fact the absence of full control by the Commission. 
Because if the Commission did have full control, it would end up in conflict 
with the prerogatives of the member states, thus upsetting the institutional 
balance laid down by the Treaty. It is clear, however, that if the full 
____________________________ 
292 See Committee of Independent Experts (1999b), para. 3.5.3. It is worth noting 
that the Financial Regulation establishes the principle that “all financial actors and 
any other person involved in budget implementation, management, audit or 
control shall be prohibited from taking any action which may bring their own 
interests into conflict with those of the Communities” (see Art. 52(1) of Council 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002 of 13 December 2006, op. cit.). RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 127 
 
responsibility borne by the Commission were to disappear, the measures 
that are the subject of shared management would inevitably be subject to 
nothing more than self-audit by the member states themselves. This 
approach would put the member states in a situation that would have all 
the characteristics of a ‘potestative’ state.293 
It is by means of the discharge procedure that “the right to ask a 
public official for an accounting of his administration” is materialised.294 
Indeed, the discharge procedure constitutes not only the formal act of 
closing the accounts, but also represents an opportunity for a political 
judgment on the way the Commission has discharged its responsibilities.295  
Yet, in the field of shared or decentralised management, the exercise 
of presenting the accounts concerning the funds spent through the 
Community budget has traditionally proved to be extremely difficult. The 
separation of responsibilities as regards implementation objectively 
deprives the European Parliament of a real interlocutor. In this respect, the 
European Court of Auditors has expressed concern that “if the Commission 
no longer had final responsibility for implementing the budget, the 
Community’s financial process, and in particular the discharge procedure, 
would lose a good deal of its significance. The budgetary authorities’ 
recommendations (Art. 276 (3) of the EC Treaty) would be deprived of all 
practical effect.”296 
____________________________ 
293 In its conclusions concerning Case C-16/88, Commission v. Council [1989] ECR, p. 
3480, the Court of Justice of 24 October 1989, Advocate General Darmon envisaged 
the possibility of a ‘potestative’ situation where the Council “would ultimately 
have the power to empty of their substance the powers” of the Commission.  
294 See Art. 15 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (National 
Assembly of France, 26 August 1789). The glossary of terms of the European Court 
of Auditors gives this definition: “Accountability means the obligations of persons 
or entities, including public enterprises and corporations, entrusted with public 
resources to be answerable for the fiscal, managerial and programme 
responsibilities that have been conferred on them, and to report to those that have 
conferred these responsibilities on them.” 
295 For example, Art. 201 TEC envisages the resignation of the Commission as a 
result of the passing of a motion of censure by the European Parliament. 
296 See European Court of Auditors, Opinion No. 2/2005 of 18 March 2005 (op. cit.), 
para. 6.  128 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
The Commission does not hesitate to point out the responsibilities 
specifically allocated to the member states whenever management on the 
ground is challenged. As a matter of example, the Court recently noted for 
an operational programme on structural policies that despite an initial 
intention to spend approximately equal amounts on road and rail, “on 
absorption grounds it was proposed to allocate all of the performance 
reserve to road construction”, so not “in line with environmental or 
transport policy objectives, but according to progress in spending”. The 
Commission replied that it was not ‘happy’ with this high allocation of 
funding to the transport infrastructure, especially the road infrastructure. It 
claimed nonetheless that it has regularly raised the matter with the member 
state concerned and will “take up this point in the negotiations for the next 
programme period”.297 Again, to a Court report observing that “despite 
problems in the set-up and management of the ERF [European refugee 
fund], there were numerous positive examples of management systems”, 
the Commission replied that these examples demonstrate that the legal 
provisions and guidance provided by the Commission have helped the 
member states “which wished to do so” to build sound control systems.298 
Meanwhile, the European Parliament does not have the authority to 
question national administrations regarding their management of 
Community funds. In such a situation, the share of the budgetary 
implementation that has been ‘devolved’ to the member states – more than 
80% it must be pointed out – is likely ultimately to escape any genuine 
exercise of the rendering of accounts. 
Concluding remarks 
The identification of clear and complete responsibility regarding the 
implementation of the Community budget might well condition its 
development as much as the volume of the appropriations to be authorised, 
the level of the contributions to be paid by each member state and the 
typology of the policies to be financed. There is in fact no valid reason the 
____________________________ 
297 See European Court of Auditors, Special Report No. 1/2007 concerning the 
implementation of the mid-term processes on the Structural Funds 2000–06, OJ C 124, 
5.6.2007(a), para. 33. 
298 See European Court of Auditors, Special Report No. 3/2007 concerning the 
management of the European Refugee Fund, Luxembourg, OJ C 178, 31.7.2007(b), para. 
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implementation of the Community budget, which is financed by the 
European taxpayer through general taxation, should not be subject to the 
principle of responsibility, one of the fundamental principles of public 
finance.   
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6. THREE UNAVOIDABLE REFORMS 
he price ‘paid’ (or maybe one of its achievements) for the necessarily 
unanimous agreement on the 2007–13 financial perspective was the 
European Council’s decision “that the EU should carry out a 
comprehensive reassessment of the financial framework, covering both 
revenue and expenditure, to sustain modernisation and to enhance it, on an 
ongoing basis”.299 The idea of a review of the EU budget is actually not 
new.300 The fact is, however, that past reviews have not succeeded in 
____________________________ 
299 See European Council (2005a), para. 79. The document states that the agreement 
consists of three parts (expenditure, revenue and review) considered 
“complementary and inseparable”. The intention was that all aspects of the EU 
budget would be examined in 2008–09, and that this process could lead to 
fundamental reform. In particular, the UK government made a clear and 
categorical link between the UK rebate and the fundamental reform of expenditure 
across the EU, notably the issue of the CAP. 
300 The 1988 Own Resources Decision had already required the Commission to 
“submit, by the end of 1991, a report on the operation of the system, including a re-
examination of the correction of budgetary imbalances granted to the United 
Kingdom” (see Council Decision 88/376/EEC, Euratom of 24 June 1988, op. cit., 
Art. 10). The same request was repeated by the 1994 Own Resources Decision, with 
the Commission also asked to submit, by the end of 1999, “a report on the findings 
of a study on the feasibility of creating a new own resource, as well as on 
arrangements for the possible introduction of a fixed uniform rate applicable to the 
VAT base” (see Council Decision 94/728/EC, Euratom of 31 October 1994, op. cit., 
Art. 10). Finally, the 2000 Own Resources Decision asked the Commission to  
undertake, before 1 January 2006, a general review of the own resources 
system, accompanied, if necessary, by appropriate proposals, in the light of 
all relevant factors, including the effects of enlargement on the financing of 
the budget, the possibility of modifying the structure of the own resources by 
creating new autonomous own resources and the correction of budgetary 
imbalances granted to the UK as well as the granting to Austria, Germany, 
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solving these problems or even in bringing some progress. On the contrary, 
each review has increased the lack of transparency and found short-sighted 
solutions, entirely subservient to the achievement of a unanimous 
agreement among member states. The EU’s finances have developed in fits 
and starts, according to the expediency of the most urgent ‘needs’ taking 
precedence over a consistent budgetary design for key features, such as 
revenue, expenditure and, not least, accountability. 
One might form the impression that, in the end, it is all a question of 
money. Yet this conclusion seems reductive, as the defence of purely 
national financial interests often reveals only the first layer of a wider 
reality. Behind the scenes, sensitive matters such the unanimity rule, the 
institutional balance of powers between the European institutions (for 
example, in deciding the amount, type and management of the EU’s budget 
revenue and expenditure) and the role of national parliaments are at stake. 
The weaknesses of the EU financial framework are not attributable to 
a supposedly wrong conceptual design, but rather derive from the EU 
integration process. This is why it would not seem appropriate to restrict 
the incoming reform review to an academic debate. If there is one subject 
that has been thoroughly explored for many years it is the EU’s finances. 
Institutional actors, such as the Commission301 or the European 
Parliament302 and many academic experts303 have all provided valuable and 
largely converging diagnoses and each put forward their own ‘therapy’. 
The time seems therefore ripe not for a study but for a decision process 
about possible solutions. The incoming review is at once an opportunity 
and a difficult challenge, unpredictable in its outcome. As such, the EU 
budget is a key condition for the evolution of European integration and 
____________________________ 
 
the Netherlands and Sweden of the reduction. (Council Decision 
2000/597/EC, Euratom of 29 September 2000, op. cit., Art. 9) 
301 See the European Commission reports on the own resources (European 
Commission, 1998, and Vol. I and Vol. II, 2004f and 2004g).  
302 See the European Parliament reports (1994a and 1994b). See also the report by 
the European Parliament, Report on  Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the 
Enlarged Union 2007–2013, Temporary Committee on Policy Challenges and 
Budgetary Means of the enlarged Union 2007-2013, Rapporteur: R. Böge, A6-
0153/2005, 19 May 2005(b).  
303 See, for example, footnote 4.  132 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
part of the debate on the legitimacy of the Union’s actions. It cannot remain 
an issue among governments alone.304 Indeed, to debate the EU budget is 
actually to discuss visions of Europe’s future, starting from the role of EU 
institutions.  
The coming reform will have to deal with fundamental issues, such as 
the volume of the EU budget and by what kind of revenue it should be 
financed; if and to what extent the EU budget should finance redistributive, 
allocative or stabilising policies; whether some policies should be 
discontinued and, in particular, whether the EU budget should continue to 
finance agricultural spending;305 whether a larger share of the EU budget 
should be reserved for research spending; and whether structural policies 
should be re-directed towards a limited number of regions.  
These are key political issues that are not examined as such in the 
present study. It seems nonetheless that the inconsistencies and problems 
that have been described in the previous sections can be reduced to a large 
extent to a common denominator: the lack of a link with the taxpayers, the 
lack of a proper intervention logic and a delivery deficit about the results 
____________________________ 
304 In this respect, it is to be welcomed that the Commission launched a broad 
consultation to stimulate an open debate on the EU’s finances (see European 
Commission, “Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe: A Public Consultation 
Paper in View of the 2008/2009 Budget Review”, Brussels, September 2007(s)). 
305 The general public does not seem to share the rather negative opinion of 
academic experts about the financing of the CAP through the EU budget. A survey 
carried out at the end of 2006 shows that, in response to the question of whether 
the current agriculture and rural development budget is “insufficient, adequate or 
too high” (knowing that CAP financing represents “around 40%” of the whole EU 
budget), a large section of the public endorses the current level of agricultural 
expenditure. The majority (45%) thinks that the current proportion of the budget 
devoted to agriculture is “about right”. This share outnumbers the combined 
figure for those who think that the budget is “insufficient” (15%) or “too high” 
(16%). In the UK, despite a reputation for being anti-farm spending, 40% of those 
polled said that the EU’s current farm budget was suitable (11% said it was not 
high enough and 20% said it was too high). When it comes to the question of the 
CAP budget in the future, the picture is slightly less clear. Nevertheless, the 
dominating view held by over half (58%) is that the share of the total EU budget 
taken up by agriculture should at the very least stay the same, if not increase (see 
European Commission, Europeans, Agricultural and the Common Agricultural Policy, 
Special Eurobarometer No. 276, Brussels, March 2007(i)).  RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 133 
 
achieved. In this respect there are three issues, inextricably interlinked, on 
which the common interest of all concerned (above all the member states) 
should be found, thus ensuring that the coming review does not become a 
losing battle. These issues are revenue, results and responsibility.  
Revenue: One system for all 
There are numerous possibilities for a new system of revenue for the EU 
budget. These go from the very ‘simple’ solution of a contribution scale by 
member state,306 through a classical system of financing based on a GNI 
allocation key, to tax-based resources such as a genuine VAT resource. A 
mix of different types of resources is also imaginable. Within this 
framework, an almost infinite number of suboptions could be envisaged, 
each having different political implications (above all the issue of fiscal 
sovereignty) and a variable financial weight for the member states. One 
might wonder, however, whether agreement could not be reached on three 
elements: 
•  Whatever the system, it should be applicable to all member states in 
the same way.307 Also, it should be a built-to-last system, not subject 
to change at each financial perspective with a view to accommodating 
specific claims. Exceptions should not be a subject of negotiation. 
•  Any imbalances should be examined in the context of the expenditure 
side, by assessing the economic impact of the policies on the various 
economies. From this point of view, there would be no place for 
budgetary balances and special revenue arrangements. This approach 
would, in a way, simply recognise what the Council decided in 1999 – 
a system that should be “equitable, transparent, cost-effective and 
____________________________ 
306 In the founding EEC Treaty, the financing of the budget was based on a 
percentage share by member state, although differently concerning the European 
social fund expenditure (see footnote 102). For a review of the different options 
examined, see the European Commission reports on the own resources (European 
Commission, 1998 and Vol. I, 2004f).  
307 For example, the European Parliament has stressed “that any new system of 
own resources – regardless of its structure – must be applicable to all member 
states in accordance with the same principle”. See European Parliament, 
R e s o l u t i o n  o f  1 1  M a r c h  2 0 0 3  o n  r e f o r m  o f  t h e  b u d g e t a r y  p r o c e d u r e :  P o s s i b l e  
options in view of the revision of the Treaties, para. 17. 134 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
simple”, resolving possible budgetary imbalances “by means of 
expenditure policy”.308 
•  The volume of the EU budget is such that it is no longer possible to 
avoid raising European citizens’ awareness of the cost of European-
driven policies. It is only if this link is made that one can expect more 
commitment from them, and consequently greater accountability, 
presently rather weak, on the part of the policy actors. As has been 
observed, “Citizens of each member state elect their Government on 
the basis of their proposed distribution of resources and level of 
public spending, and on the types and level of taxation required to 
deliver these. This is fundamental to the democratic control and 
accountability of government and results in a greater acceptance of 
taxation decisions by individual electorates.”309 The best way of 
achieving this would be to introduce a genuine European tax, 
preferably a VAT resource that would fulfil all the guiding criteria, 
including the advantage of being an existing tax.  
Still, if the time has not yet come for such a tax and a system of 
national contributions is maintained, this should not be detrimental to the 
need for better awareness about what is disbursed and for the benefit of 
whom. There is no reason, when national finance laws are the subject of 
(sometimes huge) debates, for the same not to happen at the European 
level. Indeed, in one way or another, citizens should be made aware of the 
‘cost of Europe’. Without transparency, the low level of confidence among 
public opinion about the way the EU spends its money can only fall even 
further. 
Results: Fewer, better targeted and verifiable objectives 
We must put member states and institutions on their guard against 
overlarge or ill-defined projects, in whatever area of policy these may 
be proposed, which would be ill-suited to the Community’s present 
stage of development and would consume quantities of money and 
effort without appreciable results. Such projects must be defensible 
____________________________ 
308 See European Council (1999), points 65–66.  
309 See European Convention, Contribution to the European Convention, Articles 
III.59 and III.60 in the draft EU Constitutional Treaty (submitted by P. Hain et al.), 
CONV 782/03, Brussels, 3 June 2003(e). RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 135 
 
on their own merits and certainly should not be advocated as a means 
of correcting budgetary imbalances in the Community.310 
This rather old warning still seems relevant today. The question here 
is two-fold: Can there really be European added value almost everywhere? 
And is there a risk that the EU budget may fund so many policies that, in 
the end, this will result in limited impact given the restriction on the 
financial resources available? In the end, one cannot have one’s cake and 
eat it. The traffic jam produced by a multiplicity of objectives and actions is 
detrimental in many respects. The size of the policies, if they are to have a 
clear and visible impact, matters much more than the size of the budget 
itself. Lack of proven effectiveness does not enhance the merits of EU 
actions; nor does it strengthen the much-needed accountability. In the end, 
the limited size of the EU budget should be taken as an advantage and 
could be used as an argument for selectivity. It would be unwise to “saddle 
the Union with a set of goals and then deny it the resources required”.311 
Indeed, EU spending “must be organised in such a way that the spending 
meets its goals. Optimising EU spending is therefore about choices, and 
about concentrating resources where they generate the highest profit.” 312 
There are also in this context three elements on which agreement 
should be reached as a precondition for progress: 
•  Discussions of a future financial perspective should not start with the 
overall amount of resources put at the disposal of the EU budget. It 
seems more reasonable that the process should rather start with an 
examination of the proposed policies, on the basis of their own merits, 
but also of their costs, including ‘delivery’ costs such as the 
administrative costs of designing, implementing, monitoring and ex 
post evaluating any given policy.  
•  When selecting a policy and deciding upon a programme, the 
institutional actors should also fix the objectives to be achieved by the 
beneficiaries and make sure that these will be verifiable in practice. In 
this respect, making full use of the funds cannot be in itself an 
objective. The legality of spending should not override considerations 
about value for money. 
____________________________ 
310 See the ‘Report of the Three Wise Men’ by Biesheuvel, Dell & Marjolin (1979). 
311 See European Commission (2004a), p. 26. 
312 See European Commission (2007s), p. 7. 136 | GABRIELE CIPRIANI  
 
•  There are probably good reasons for fixing a multi-annual financial 
framework, above all the need for a certain stability. Yet one should 
question whether the current practice of committing the whole 
appropriations at the beginning of the financial perspective (in 
particular for structural policies) should not be relaxed. This change 
would make it possible to take account of new emerging priorities 
and take corrective action during the execution of programmes. Not 
least, this would make the annual budgetary procedure more 
meaningful.  
Responsibility: A single, fully endorsed, responsibility 
The Commission has rightly said that “[t]axpayers should have reasonable 
assurance that the funds of the European Union are managed in a legal and 
regular manner”.313 This assurance is all the more necessary as the absence 
of a direct link between European taxpayers and the Community budget 
encourages the false idea that these funds grow on trees and that they 
therefore constitute a kind of ‘manna’. Full responsibility and good 
management are closely interlinked. The implementation of the EU budget 
must give the taxpayer (and the potential recipients of its policies) the same 
guarantees that exist in respect of national budgets. 
Logic would plead in favour of a single, undivided responsibility. 
This question is one of political priorities. If shared management is to 
remain the main type of management system, it is inevitable that full 
accountability will not be achieved. If in practice the bulk of the 
expenditure is devolved to the member states (the design of actions, 
implementation and control), it should not be surprising to observe that the 
effectiveness of this expenditure will actually be proportional to the trouble 
the member states take to ensure value for money. Despite all the 
Commission’s efforts, in the end the member states will take the key 
decisions. 
Concerning the issue of responsibility, there are also three elements 
where, if not agreement, at least awareness could be reached: 
•  It would be difficult to achieve full accountability in the case of 
shared management, especially in a system where a limited number 
of sanctions exist and where these very often do not target the 
____________________________ 
313 See European Commission (2005h), p. 2.  RETHINKING THE EU BUDGET | 137 
 
beneficiaries, but rather constitute further expenditure charged to the 
national budgets. This situation could be changed, by making the 
faulty beneficiaries directly and financially answerable.  
•  Without full accountability, the discharge procedure for the EU 
budget, which is exclusively directed towards the Commission, will 
probably become less and less significant and needs to be seriously 
rethought. As it would not be imaginable to summon 27 member 
states (or their administrations) before the European Parliament, the 
question is whether, having delegated the management of a 
significant part of the budget to member states, the discharge 
procedure should not also involve increasingly  national Parliaments. 
The recent move towards the establishment of national declarations 
on the use of EU funds in certain member states seems to point in that 
direction. 
•  Finally yet importantly, is accountability to the European citizens. 
They contribute to the EU budget but, even more crucially, they 
expect that whoever is made responsible in the end will be easily 
identifiable. An acceptable solution to the issue of responsibility in 
executing the EU budget would also contribute to the legitimacy of 
the EU’s actions. As the European Council recently concluded, “[W]e 
have to maintain and develop the European Union’s capacity to act 
and its accountability to the citizen”.314 
 
____________________________ 
314 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European 
Council of 21-22 June, 11177/1/07 REV 1, Brussels, 20 July 2007(b), point 2.   
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